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increased by about 3.5% - 4% in real terms in the first six month of 2003 year-to-
year. Significant growth was registered in transport, trade and construction, while 
all other sectors recorded a drop in real terms 
With regard to the decrease in industrial and 
growth in services indicates that private sectors of production and services, 
which are not covered by official statistics, generate a considerable level of activ-
ity. 
Acco
lated to the fall in industrial production, result to a significant extent from tardi-
ness in the process of privatization and enterprises restructuring, in particular in 
the industry, as compared with the projected rates.  
The labor market displayed negative trends: a dec
ployed and a rise in registered employment. The total number of active firms de-
clined, while the number of small start-ups which employ about 5 workers, on av-
erage, slightly increased. If the current pace of starting up new small companies 
continues, given the above mentioned number of employees per a company, it 
would take, according to our estimations, about 28 years to create jobs for one 
million persons. We underline that in the last two years, as well as in the course 
of the first few months of 2003, only small-sized companies have started up, 
which indicates not only the lack of capital, but also that entrepreneurs are very 
wary of the continual political instability in our country. 
Total private consumption registered intensive growth, 
real increase in supply and real growth in the average real wages and average 
real pension. This indicates that: (1) consumption continues to exceed production 
and productivity; and (2) that income from work does not account for the most 
significant portion in the structure of household income, whereby other income 
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 development, because 
ix month of 2003, but, on the 
icant increase and improve-
 from 
he basis of taxes and contributions collected in the period 
ment is that revenues on the basis of social insurance con-
roduction and Services 
vailable statistical data implies a sharp decline in industrial production in Serbia 
egistered a 3.1% 
rd to sectors of industrial production, mining and quarrying decreased 
year.  
sources – e.g. property, gray economy, natural consumption, remittances from 
foreign countries, etc. – seem to be much more relevant. 
Such trends in final consumption threaten to compromise
the volume of private consumption is exaggerated, not leaving enough room for 
investments from gross domestic product. It is hard to believe that serious foreign 
investors would decide to invest in a country which thus demonstrates its lack of 
orientation towards investments and development. 
Serbian exports increased substantially in the first s
other hand, the dynamics of import growth were much more intensive than pro-
jected, resulting in a wider trade deficit. In the first five months, commodity ex-
ports were nominally up by 29%, year-to-year; commodity imports rose by 33%, 
thus increasing the trade deficit by nearly half a billion of nominal US$, which ex-
ceeds total commodity exports by as much as 85%. 
The results of our analyses indicate that any signif
ment of competitiveness of the Serbian exports is not very likely without thorough 
restructuring and improvement of the managing of existing enterprises, as well as 
without more intensive increase in the number of start-ups and FDI inflow. 
Social policy also recorded positive trends. It has been gradually removed
enterprises, with the Government taking over functions in this area. Following the 
adoption of a National Poverty Reduction Strategy, and with international finan-
cial assistance, projects of a developmental character are expected to start. 
These projects will be primarily directed at job creation and education programs 
designed to improve and update skills of the unemployed for the sake of their 
easier employment. 
Public revenues on t
January – June 2003 increased by 17.3%; both the collection of taxes and of so-
cial insurance contributions registered similar dynamics of growth (by 17.1% and 
17.8% respectfully). 
A worrisome develop
tributions were growing much slower in nominal terms than the mass of paid 
wages and salaries (by about 6 percentage points). This indicates lower effi-
ciency in the collection of social insurance contributions after the restructuring of 
ZOP (Payment and Settlement Bureau), when this activity was transferred to the 
Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Serbia. 
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in the first six month of 2003, year-to-year. Such a trend to a great extent re-
sulted from the drop in industrial production registered in January 2003, relative 
to December 2002, considerably decelerated growth in March relative to Febru-
ary, and month-on-month stagnation in the period April – June. 
Industrial production in Serbia, without Kosovo and Metohija, r
drop in the period January-June, year-to-year, or by 6.5% compared to the 2002 
average. 
With rega
by 5.9% and manufacturing by 4.8%, while the sector of energy, gas and water 
production and supply was up by 3.2% in the first six months of 2003 year-to-
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 the production of intermediate goods decreased by 1.1%, while the pro-
dina (-0.8%). 
ture of coke and re-
14% in real terms. Transport is also estimated to 
he labor market in Serbia registered a downward trend in the period January-
ay. Total employment in Serbia in the first five months of 2003 dropped by 3% 
ucture of enterprises. The number of em-
inations in the same 
By destination of consumption, the production of capital goods was down by 
19.9%,
duction of consumer goods dropped by 4.1%. 
A year-to-year drop in industrial production in the first half of 2003 was more in-
tensive in Central Serbia (-4.3%) than in Vojvo
In the sector of manufacturing, only several groups registered growth in output in 
the period January – June 2003 year-to-year: the manufac
fined petroleum products (22.6%), the manufacture of chemicals and chemical 
products (12.6%), the manufacture of basic metals (7.2%), the manufacture of 
rubber and plastic products (2.6%), publishing, printing and reproduction (1.9%) 
and recycling (1.4%). The decrease registered in other industries ranges from -
44.5% in the manufacture of clothing and fur through -1.9% in the manufacture of 
food products and beverages. 
The value of construction works realized in the first quarter of this relative to the 
same period last year rose by 
have increased substantially during this period. The total freight transport, meas-
ured in ton kilometers, was up by 88%, while passenger transport dropped off by 
about 20%; the result is growth in the total transport volume by about 40%. Retail 
trade turnover in the period January – May 2003 increased by 18% year-to-year. 
The turnover in catering industry showed a downward trend – it was down by 
6.9% in real terms in the first five months of this year relative to the same period 
in 2002. The turnover in tourism also fell by 3.0% in the first quarter of 2003. 
 
Labor Market 
 
 
T
M
year-to-year. Total registered unemployment in May 2003 stood at 951,270 per-
sons, 18.2% year-to-year increase, while regarding the period January – May 
2003 it increased by 17.5%. The unemployment rate in May 2003 was 32%, be-
ing at the same level as in the previous month, as compared to the 27.9% unem-
ployment rate registered in May 2002. 
However, significant changes occurred with regard to the structure of total em-
ployment in terms of the ownership str
ployees in the socially-owned sector has been decreasing month after month, 
being down by 7.2% in the period January-May. Employment in the private sector 
in May 2003 rose by 10.6% month-on-month, or by 4.2% relative to December 
2002. The number of employees in small-sized enterprises in May rose by 3.5% 
month-on-month, or by 1.1% compared to December 2002. 
The total number of new jobs in the period January – May 2003 stood at 168 
thousand, a year-to-year drop by 1.1%. The number of term
period decreased by 3.4. As far as the structure of employment is concerned, a 
larger share of  fluctuation in total employment indicates decreasing rigidity of the 
labor market. Fluctuation in the first five months of 2003 was up by 19.6% rela-
tive to the same period last year, accounting for 42.9% in the total of new jobs, 
while the remainder refers to persons previously registered as unemployed with 
the Labor Market Bureau. 
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d January-May 2003 decreased by 0.4% year-to-year, 
g 
rship, all of them being small-size compa-
icates that these companies employ about 35,000 per-
eatures of Domestic Demand 
 
n the basis of developments in retail trade, real growth in personal consumption 
 the first six months of 2003 is estimated at about 18% year-to-year, which is 
ominal terms, or 13.75% in real terms. 
The average net wage paid out in May was YuD 11,043, a nominal decrease of 
According to the data of the Labor Market Bureau, the number of job openings 
(labor demand) in the perio
and therefore the demand for labor (the ratio of the total number of the employed 
in the period under consideration to the number of vacancies) is fulfilled by 84%. 
According to the data released by the Federal Statistics Bureau, the number of 
start-ups in the first quarter of 2003 is 3,389, 91.6% of which are private compa-
nies, with the majority of them being small-sized firms. In 2002 there were 6,893 
start-ups, 92.4% in private ownership, all of them being small-sized companies. 
It is interesting that in last two years there were more state-owned companies, 
although, expressed in percentage points, their share was rather small, indicatin
that big state-owned companies are at issue. The portion of the employed in the 
state-owned companies significantly increased (11% in 2002 relative to 6.8% in 
2000). This indicates that in these companies the process of restructuring has 
not started yet, while changes in companies of other forms of ownership are no-
table, which increases their relative share both in terms of the number of enter-
prises and the number of employees. 
During the last two years, as well as in the first several months of this year, over 
90% of startups were in private owne
nies. Over 90% of new jobs during this period were created in these companies. 
Since 2001, new small-sized private companies constitute 92%, on average, of 
the total number of start-ups. 
This is a consequence of changed legal regulations and simplified procedure for 
registering companies.  
The data on the number of small start-ups and the number of employees in them 
in the last two years ind
sons a year. Given the pace of opening new firms and the number of the em-
ployed in such firms in the previous two years, it would take nearly 30 years to 
achieve the goal promoted by the Government, i.e. one million new jobs in small-
sized enterprises. The Government of Serbia obviously does not possess rele-
vant information on trends in the entrepreneurship and on the labor market. 
Namely, the goal itself is very desirable given the high level of both registered 
and hidden unemployment, but in order to realize this idea in practice in an ac-
ceptable, shorter period, the Government’s measures and mechanisms are nec-
essary to encourage entrepreneurship and job creation. Among other things, the 
Government must find ways to attract more FDIs, as well as to motivate domestic 
employers to invest more in job creation. 
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O
in
significantly above the estimated GDP growth. High growth of real domestic de-
mand continues to generate much faster increase in real wages of the employed 
compared to production and productivity. 
The average net wage in Serbia in the period January-May 2003 was YuD 
10,427, a rise of 27.4% year-to-year in n
  6
et for a four-
rvices (44.7%). The sharpest drop in wages 
a-
first five months of 2003 equaled 36.6%, compared to 
.  
he area of social policy has registered positive developments. Social functions 
eing removed from enterprises and transferred to the Govern-
ent. 
 for the determination of pensions, which is aimed at approximating the 
opted the draft of the National Poverty Reduction Strategy.  
de-
0.94% compared with previous month; in real terms, given the 0.4% increase in 
costs of living relative to April, the average net wage fell by 1.34%. 
The real purchasing power of citizens of Serbia in the first six months of this year 
significantly increased relative to the same period the year earlier in spite of 
monthly variations in nominal wages. The average consumer bask
member family in the period January-May 2003 was valued at YuD 11,220, or 1.1 
wages. Compared to the ratio of consumer basket and the average net wage of 
1.35 registered in the same period last year, today, this indicator is lower by 20%. 
The average net wage paid out in the economy in the period January-May was 
nominally up by 25.35% or by 12% in real terms year-to-year. As far as non-
economic activity is concerned, the average net wage nominally increased by 
31.56% or by 17.5% in real terms.  
With regard to individual industries, the most intensive real growth in the period 
under consideration was registered in the sector of insurance (by 52%), real es-
tate activities (by 50%) and other se
was registered in the renting of machinery and equipment (by 42.1%), the manu-
facture of clothing and fur (by 21.2%) and the mining of metal ores (by 16.9%). 
The average pension paid put by the Old Age Pension and Disability Fund of the 
Employed in the period January-June 2003 increased by 23.1% nominally, or by 
7.5% in real terms. The average pension paid out in June was up by 8.1% rel
tive to December 2002. 
The purchasing power of pensioners during the period under consideration im-
proved. The share of the consumer basket per family member in the average 
pension paid out in the 
44.1% the year earlier, i.e. a decrease of 17%. 
According to the presented figures, a year-to-year increase in the purchasing 
power of pensioners in the first six months of 2003 is slightly slower than the in-
crease in the purchasing power of the employed
 
Social Policy 
 
T
are gradually b
m
At the beginning of 2003, the new Law on Old-Age Pension and Disability Insur-
ance was adopted. It came into force as of April 2. The Law introduced a new 
formula
value of a pension to the amount of pension insurance contributions made during 
the working period. 
The Draft Law on Modifications and Amendments to the Law on Health Insur-
ance has been prepared. It is now waiting to enter parliamentary procedure.  
The Government ad
The PRS was created in cooperation with domestic and foreign experts, repre-
sentatives of the Government and local and international NGOs. The PRS is 
velopment-based, implying that the major part of the resources allocated for the 
realization of the strategy will be directed toward job creation and educational 
programs; indirectly, through the increase of the total mass of paid wages and 
taxes and contributions, the Strategy will provide resources for financing social 
programs and deprived citizens. 
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re of great importance for social dialogue, seem 
oday it has been two years since the Privatization Law was adopted and since 
 regulations. With regard to 
e time anticipated for privatization of the socially-owned and state-owned capi-
ere sold in 72 public auctions. In 2003 only, 
 in auctions has been actually privatized so far, the entire 
evident competition between potential buyers. However, with regard to tender 
We assess the relation between social partners on the labor market, i.e. trade 
unions, the Union of Employers and the Government as still being tense and dys-
functional. Trade unions, which a
to be especially disharmonious today. Therefore, besides the necessity for the 
membership of certain social partners to press their leaderships to focus on cre-
ating conditions for development and job creation, and greater flexibility in nego-
tiations, it is also necessary to provide education for representatives of certain 
social partners on social dialogue in societies in transition toward democracy and 
market economy, and on the constructive role that social partners should have in 
that process. 
 
Privatization and Restructuring of the Economy 
 
T
the privatization process has started under the new
th
tal of the Serbian economy, we have reached the halfway point. The privatization 
method set up under the Privatization Law foresees 1) the sale of majority pack-
ages of shares, in public tender or public auction (up to 70% of assets); 2) trans-
fer of socially-owned and state-owned capital free of charge in two ways: transfer 
of shares to employees in the entity undergoing privatization, and the transfer of 
capital to all citizens (up to the remaining 30%); and 3) restructuring of those en-
terprises that record negative operating results, are not able to fulfill their liabili-
ties, or have organizational or age structures inappropriate for successful privati-
zation. Basic principles embodied in this Law are publicity, transparency and 
competitiveness, as well as a limited time framework for completion – all socially-
owned legal entities must be privatized within four years (until June 2005). How-
ever, the privatization process progresses quite slowly and it is unlikely to be 
completed in the prescribed period. 
Until the beginning of July 2003, 22 big enterprises were sold in tender (of the 
total of 130 enterprises foreseen for privatization), and 604 small and medium 
enterprises (of the total of 6,000) w
ten big enterprises were sold in tender, and 398 small and medium enterprises 
(of projected 1,000) were sold in 38 public auctions. Privatization receipts real-
ized so far total about EUR 560 million, of which EUR 218 million were realized in 
2003. Out of this sum, 10% are to be transferred to pension funds, 5% are re-
served for funding the state’s obligations on the basis of restitution, one portion 
will be spent on incentives for small and medium enterprises, another portion is 
to be earmarked for social programs, etc., in accordance with the Government’s 
economic policies.   
In the first six months of 2003, the pace of auction privatization was faster than 
the year earlier. However, given that only 10% of the total number of companies 
projected to be sold
process must be accelerated. Faster privatization would make possible for small 
and medium enterprises and private entrepreneurs to constitute the majority of all 
economic entities, thus being one of the key sources of jobs, as is the case in the 
economies of developed countries,. 
Auction privatization is by definition transparent and public, ensuring clear and 
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 public tender when a company meets crite-
 and thorough process. It is projected that 33 
ments of Serbia and Montenegro agreed that the National Bank of 
Serbia will perform the duty of the fiscal agent in the International Monetary 
al agent in the World 
ank. 
acility (EFF) in the total amount of about US$ 137 million (SDR 100 mil-
nt Credit (SOSAC) in the amount of US$ 80 million. All these credits have 
privatization, the most frequent criticism refers to the lack of transparency. 
Namely, privatization is carried out by
ria in terms of its size (big enterprises), strategic significance and buyers’ inter-
ests. There are four criteria for ranking participants in the tender (price; future in-
vestments; social program; environmental protection program), and for this rea-
son final selection of the best buyer depends on non-market criteria, as well. 
Many believe that the decision on the best bid should be based on one criterion 
only, i.e. the price offered, in line with practices in developed countries. Other-
wise, offers are not comparable, there is purchasing of social peace in some 
way, while the state shows that it is not ready yet to accept its social function, try-
ing to pass a portion of its social responsibility onto new owners. In the area of 
environmental protection, new owners are required to assess and cover envi-
ronmental protection costs, but since these costs result from the absence of 
measures in this area from the past, foreign buyers therefore want to shift re-
sponsibility for them to the state. 
There are 50 insolvent and heavily indebted big socially-owned complexes identi-
fied in our economy, with many subsidiaries and a large number of workers.  It is 
not possible to privatize these companies without previous financial and corpo-
rate restructuring, which is a long
companies will commence the procedure in 2003, among which there will be 
some public enterprises, as well. The Government pays special attention to the 
creation of social programs for workers that will become redundant. Namely, so-
cial programs will be supported from the transition fund, which has a clear and 
strict budgetary position, which enabled the completion of the restructuring proc-
ess in 20 companies in 2002 as far as the social program is concerned. In spite 
of the complexity of the process, it is anticipated to be completed within the next 
24 months. 
Cooperation with International Financial Organizations 
 
The Govern
Fund, while the Central Bank of Montenegro will act as a fisc
B
As a result of the agreement of the two governments and the adoption of the 
Constitutional Charter, in April, after the delay of several months, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund released the third and fourth installments of the Extended 
Fund F
lion).  
The World Bank has granted Serbia three credits in 2003: the second Private 
and Financial Sector Adjustment Credit (PFSAC) in the amount of US$ 60 mil-
lion, a credit for health sector reform (US$ 20 million) and the Social Sector Ad-
justme
been approved under IDA conditions, which means a grace period of ten years 
and twenty-year maturity. 
Exchange Rate and Foreign Currency Reserves 
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e was showing slightly more 
tensive nominal depreciation relative to the previous months. In the mid-2003, 
e rate, 
(the av-
 Montenegro 
ia and 
s Tariff Law by the end of the year. 
eds for 56 tariff lines of strategic products; under this regime, Monte-
 of ferrous and non-ferrous 
odity exports recorded very dynamic growth in the first five 
ear, commodity imports continued to grow at a pace higher than 
Throughout the first half of 2003, the exchange rat
in
the exchange rate of the dinar against the euro nominally depreciated by 6% 
relative to December 2002, or by 8% year-to-year. Given the slower growth in 
prices, the exchange rate has started displaying a mild, but permanent real de-
preciation as of beginning of the year, for the first time after many months. 
Developments on the foreign exchange market did not have any significant im-
pact on foreign trade because, in spite of the depreciation of the exchang
the trade deficit continued to grow. Such a trend is not surprising since the G 17 
Institute analysis showed several times that the foreign exchange rate is not a 
significant determinant of commodity exports and imports in our country. 
Foreign exchange reserves in the National Bank of Serbia reached nearly US$ 
2.5 billion in the mid-2003, which covers Serbia’s imports for 5.3 months 
erage commodity imports in 2002). This is a considerable improvement com-
pared to the previous year, when this indicator stood at 4. 
 
Free Movement of Goods on the Territory of Serbia and
 
The Action Plan for the Harmonization of the Economic Systems of Serb
ontenegro comprises measures designed to remove obstacles to free move-M
ment of goods, people, services and capital. 
These measures foresee a considerable reduction in the existing tariff rates in 
Serbia, and the adoption of the new Custom
93% of the harmonized tariff rates are coming into effect by the mid-August, 
while the reminder will be applied within 18 to 24 months. Among the products 
that will be subjected to new tariff rates in 18 months are footwear, some prod-
ucts of ceramic and glass, telephone sets, transmitters, etc. Meat, flour, baked 
products, some glass products, heating devices, vehicles, certain electric ma-
chines are some of the products that will be subjected to new tariff rates in 24 
months.  
Montenegro was granted the right to set up different tariff rates in accordance 
with its ne
negro is allowed to import the products in question under tariff rates currently ap-
plied in Montenegro, which are lower than the rates agreed in the Action Plan. 
Among these products are pork, cereals, flour, oil and sugar. The Action Plan 
does not foresee any other export or import quotas. 
An important novelty with regard to the foreign trade regime in Serbia is the in-
troduction of 15% export tariffs on some products
metallurgy, and a 20% export tariff on raw hide. These measures are also pro-
jected to come into force as of mid-August.  
 
Trade Balance 
 
Although comm
onths of this ym
expected, which resulted in further widening of the trade deficit. Commodity ex-
ports were nominally up by 29% year-to-year, while commodity imports increased 
by 33%; thus, the trade deficit rose by nearly half a million of nominal US$, being 
by as much as 85% higher than the total commodity exports. 
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lated to this group 
rily owing to transfers, as well as to a 
ions on membership in 
ess improvement. Such a strategy 
ny significant improvement of competitiveness is not very likely without 
etary Policy 
 
months of 2003 was nominally up by 61% year-to-
ear. Deposits were growing at a higher pace (78%) than the cash money supply 
 by 39.1% over the period under consideration. 
A notable trend, not only in recent months, but also over the last two years, is in-
crease in the imports of consumer goods. Namely, imports re
of products during the first five months of 2003 were nominally up by 50% year-to 
year, or by 250% compared to the same period two years ago. This growth might 
be in part a consequence of the expansion of credit activities of commercial 
banks which are less enterprises- and more population-oriented, and to the great 
demand for durable consumer goods. However, increase in the imports of con-
sumer goods is primarily an indicator of the inability of domestic companies to 
satisfy domestic consumers with the quality, price or quantity of their products, as 
the population’s purchasing power and probably the extent of demand sophistica-
tion improved. The inability or impossibility of the majority of Serbian enterprises 
in meeting the requirements of domestic demand has unsatisfactory export per-
formances as an obvious consequence.  
An enormous trade balance deficit was slightly alleviated by the positive balance 
on the side of current transactions (prima
mild surplus on the side of services); hence, the current account recorded a defi-
cit of US$ 675 million in the first four months of this year. 
The announced reduction of customs rates foreseen under the Action Plan, to-
gether with all other reductions in the context of negotiat
the World Trade Organization and the European Union would, at least in the 
short run, affect growth in imports and further widening of the trade balance defi-
cit. Some of the measures that could partially compensate the downside effects 
are the adoption and efficient enforcement of non-tariff measures, such as anti-
dumping procedure and protection measures. 
The previously advanced trends have increased the awareness of the necessity 
to define the national strategy for competitiven
would certainly have to focus on products with higher added value, which are 
competitive with their quality and not with price, since the structure of present 
trade, as well as the existing factors of competitiveness do not leave much room 
for any significant rise in commodity exports. Also, more attention should be paid 
to the development of the sector of services and its internationalization, as there 
is much more room for increase in foreign exchange inflow, not only in traditional 
services such as transport, construction and tourism, but also in business ser-
vices.  
However, in spite of all the measures that the Government might take in this 
area, a
genuine restructuring and improvement of corporate governance in the existing 
enterprises, as well as without dynamic growth in the number of startups and the 
inflow of FDIs.  
Fiscal and Mon
Money supply in the first five 
y
(36%). The level of foreign currency reserves increased by 56.9% over the same 
period. 
The NBS’s discount rate was reduced by 30.1%, while the market interest rate 
dropped
  11
ail prices growth), which 
 
ng much slower in nominal terms than the total mass of paid 
Such trends in monetary agents indicate that monetary policy is successfully 
achieving established objectives. The inflation rate (ret
was only 3.7% in June 2003 relative to December 2002 proves this assessment. 
Public revenues  on the basis of taxes and contributions collected in the period 
January-June 2003 increased by 17.3%; both the collection of taxes and of social
insurance contributions registered similar dynamics of growth (by 17.1% and 
17.8% respectfully). 
A worrisome development is that revenues on the basis of social insurance con-
tributions were growi
wages (by about 6 percentage points). This indicates considerably lower effi-
ciency in the collection of social insurance contributions after the restructuring of 
ZOP (Payment and Settlement Bureau), when this activity was transferred to the 
Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Serbia. 
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Forecasts of Macroeconomic Trends in the Second Half of 2003 
 
In this issue of the Economic Review, we will present the results of a forecast of 
selected macroeconomic variables of the Serbian economy in the next six 
months. We added several new variables to the set of macroeconomic variables 
that we forecasted for the period until June 2003. In forecasting trends of the 
analyzed variables we applied two methodologies of time series modeling. The 
first methodology is based on ARIMA modeling (modeling of auto-regressive in-
tegrated processes of moving averages), while the second one is based on VAR 
models (modeling by vector autoregressive models). Forecasted values of the 
observed variables are obtained through the results of estimation of specified 
models. Modeling of all time series under consideration required preliminary test-
ing to establish the degree of their integration. 
For the majority of time series, the estimation of specified functional forms was 
carried out in the period July 1999 – May 2003. It is necessary here to point to 
some changes in the coverage of trends in time series which result from our wish 
to include dynamics in the sector of services in our analysis. Namely, the total 
retail trade turnover from January 2003 encompasses the value of turnover real-
ized in private trade companies, while, as of January 2003, the value of realized 
construction works, realized effective working hours and the number of workers 
in this area has been monitored on a quarterly basis. We did not have informa-
tion on trends in transport from the beginning of the year, and therefore the fore-
casted values of passenger and ton kilometers in passenger and freight transport 
refer to the whole year 2003. 
Prices, Wages and Employment 
 
Cumulative growth of retail prices, measured at 3.7% in June 2003 indicates the 
trend of long-term stability of these prices. Namely, according to the results of the 
forecast of the estimated equation, by which trends in inflation were modeled, the 
expected cumulative rate of retail prices in December 2003 is forecast at about 
8%, while the average inflation rate in 2003 year-to-year is projected at 11.8%. 
 
Chart 1 –Inflation Growth Rate, in %,  
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After a considerable decrease in average net wages in Serbia in January 2003 
compared to December 2002, average wages have recorded a year-to-year 
growth in the first five months, which determines trends in this segment in the 
upcoming period. According to the results of the forecast of the estimated model 
of wages, average nominal net wages are expected to be up by 26.1% relative to 
the wages paid out in 2002. 
We expressed average nominal net wages as a function of the inflation growth 
rate and the nominal exchange rate. By modeling the three observed variables, 
we estimated one relationship. Wages and prices are adjusted to the estimated 
relationship with the time lag of one period. Statistical significance of the esti-
mated relationship is not confirmed in the equation by which trends in the nomi-
nal exchange rate were modeled. In the estimated relationship, the value of coef-
ficients, together with growth rates in prices and the exchange rate, indicates a 
weaker impact of the exchange rate upon the trends in average net wages. 
With regard to the projected inflation rate, wages are likely to increase by as 
much as 12.8%, which exceeds the projection of GDP growth in 2003.  
 
Chart 2 – Average Nominal Net Wages, in YuD 
 
According to current trends in the employment, the number of the employed is 
likely to drop by the end of the year by about 2.1%, relative to the year earlier. At 
the same time, total unemployment is estimated to increase by about 10.9% 
year-to-year. Forecasted trends in total employment and total unemployment 
throughout the year would result in an unemployment rate of about 33.2% in De-
cember. The forecasted unemployment rate for December 2003 would be the 
highest in the Serbian economy ever. 
The downward trend in employment is likely to continue by the end of the year, 
and, together with the forecasted dynamics of industrial output, it would result in 
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the improvement of productivity1 of workers in industrial production by the year-
end. Productivity in 2003 is forecasted to increase by 9% compared to the pro-
ductivity realized a year earlier. This would be the result of more intensive reduc-
tion of employment in the industrial sectors, compared with production trends. 
Given the results of the forecast of the estimated model of average wages in the 
industry, they are likely to increase nominally by about 22.1%, or by 9.2% in real 
terms. The total number of the employed in the industry is forecasted to drop by 
8.6% year-to-year. 
 
Chart 3 – Trends in Total Employment 
 
Chart 4 – Employment in the Industry (in thousands) and 
Average Wages of Industrial Workers 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Productivity of work in industry is expressed as a ratio of industrial production to the number of workers 
employed in this sector in the given period under consideration. 
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Production and Services 
 
A sharp drop in industrial output of over 20% in January 2003 contributed to a 
negative cumulative growth rate in industrial production in the first six months of 
2003, year-to-year. Industrial production is likely to develop at a more dynamic 
pace in the second half of the year. According to the forecasted values of trends 
in industrial production until the end of the year, industrial production is estimated 
to be up by 0.4%, relative to December 2002. 
 
Chart 5– Industrial Production Index, average 1995=100 
 
Trends in agricultural output were estimated by analyzing the value of the pur-
chase of agricultural products by industrial producers and socially-owned estates. 
The total value of the purchase includes the value of purchased cereals, vegeta-
bles, fruits, stock, dairy, poultry, eggs, raw hide, wool and industrial herbs. Nega-
tive trends in the purchase of agricultural products registered last year continued 
in the first quarter of 2003, when the purchase value dropped by 7% year-to-
year. The value of the purchase of agricultural products is, on the basis of fore-
casted trends in its dynamics, estimated to be lower by 3%, compared to the 
value of the purchases realized in the course of last year. 
The value of realized construction work is a variable under the influence of sea-
sonal factors. Having selected the appropriate models, we obtained some esti-
mates which we further used in forecasting future trends in the value of construc-
tion works. On that basis, the value of construction works is forecast to increase 
by about 15% in real terms in 2003. 
The realized number of tourist nights in Serbia in the first five months was lower 
by 3% compared to the same period last year, but with regard to final results, we 
estimated a year-to-year rise of 0.6% by the end of the year.  
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Chart 6– The Value of Purchase of Agricultural Products – in real terms, YuD 
thousands 
 
Chart 7– The Value of Realized Construction Works– in real terms, YuD thou-
sands 
 
As of January 2003, retail trade turnover has included the value of turnover real-
ized in private companies operating in the trade sector, as well. Thus the struc-
ture of dynamics in retail trade turnover has changed, compared to the previous 
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period, because the nominal value of retail trade turnover realized in the first 
several months of 2003 has increased significantly.  
 
Chart 8– Retail Trade Turnover, in YuD million 
 
 
The value of retail trade turnover in real terms in the next six months is fore-
casted by modeling real turnover relative to trends in average real wages. The 
estimated model, which was used for forecasting future real turnover trends, ex-
plained over 70% of the total variability. Retail trade turnover is hence forecasted 
to record a cumulative growth of 33.3% in real terms in the course of 2003.  
Public transport trends in 2003 were forecasted by modeling the series of the to-
tal number of kilometers realized in passenger and freight transport. Transport 
statistics are very poor as there is no relevant monthly monitoring of the dynam-
ics of revenue realized in the transportation of passengers and goods according 
to transport branches. Much more precise estimations of the transport volume 
would be made if, besides the indicators of physical volume of transport, we had 
information on income realized on the basis of passenger and freight transport 
for each transport branch. 
In 2002, the number of realized passenger kilometers was down by 5%, while the 
number of ton kilometers rose by 9%. According to the trends in the observed 
variables, passenger transport is forecast to increase this year. A comparison of 
forecasted values for this year and the values actually realized last year implies a 
decrease in the number of passenger kilometers by about 2%, i.e. of ton kilome-
ters by about 4.8%. 
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Chart 9– Retail Trade Turnover – in real terms, YuD thousands 
 
 
Foreign Trade 
 
The set of variables by which we modeled foreign trade developments over the 
forecasted period comprises the following time series: commodity exports and 
imports, the real exchange rate2, industrial production and industrial labor pro-
ductivity. By modeling the selected set of variables, we estimated a long-run rela-
tionship formed by exports, imports and the real exchange rate. Applying the ap-
propriate statistical procedure, we found that the real exchange rate is a weakly 
exogenous variable relative to the parameters of the estimated relationship. We 
estimated two equilibrium correction models: the model of commodity exports 
and the model of commodity imports. According to the results of the estimated 
models, besides a significant impact of the estimated relationship with the foreign 
exchange rate from the former period, export trends are significantly determined 
by trends in the productivity of work in the industry and industrial output, while as 
far as import trends are concerned, statistical significance lies in the dynamics of 
industrial production.   
According to forecasted trends in commodity exports until December, the value 
of commodity exports is likely to increase nominally by about 29.2%, relative to 
the value realized in 2002. In the estimated equilibrium correction model by 
which commodity export trends were modeled, the set of explanatory variables 
explains over 74% of the total variability of exports. 
Preliminary statistical data indicate that in the first five months of this year com-
modity imports registered a nominal growth relative to the same period last year. 
Due to the regularity in the trends of the import series in the former period, im-
ports dynamics are likely to intensify. According to the results of the estimated 
                                                 
2 The real exchange rate was defined as a ratio of the nominal exchange rate to the inflation growth rate in 
Serbia. 
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equilibrium correction model, the ratio of the total forecasted value of imports that 
is likely to be achieved this year to the real value of imports achieved in 2002, 
results in growth of the nominal value of imports by about 17.6%. 
 
Chart 10– Commodity Exports, in US$ thousands 
 
 
 
Chart 11 – Trade Balance Deficit, in US$ million 
 
According to our forecasts, the trade balance deficit is not likely to decrease. 
Namely, the average monthly value of the trade balance deficit this year is esti-
mated to be around US$ 307 million, which is up by 19.7% compared with the 
deficit realized in 2002. 
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We underline again that special attention must be paid to the interpretation of the 
results obtained from the forecasted trends in foreign trade by the end of the 
year, as they are most probably understated. Namely, statistical data on com-
modity exports and imports which were used in the estimation of the period June 
2002 – June 2003 are only preliminary data. Additional corrections of statistical 
data which are made monthly will affect the obtained results of forecasts.  
 
Exchange Rate, Money Supply and Interest Rates on Short-Term Securities  
 
The forecasted values of the real exchange rate by the end of the year are ob-
tained by estimating two types of models. With the first model, we expressed 
trends in the real exchange rate in the function of prices and the real money sup-
ply3. By modeling the given set of variables, we estimated their long-term rela-
tionship. Inclusion of the estimated relationship in the equation of the real ex-
change rate was confirmed to be statistically significant, which means that trends 
in the real exchange rate in the forecast period are to a significant extent ex-
plained by the previously achieved relationship with prices and real money sup-
ply. Then, by using the auto-regressive model, we modeled the real exchange 
rate relative to its own dynamics from the previous period. By combining obtained 
estimations from these two models, we forecasted trends in the real exchange 
rate in 2003. 
 
 
Chart 12 – Real Exchange Rate 
 
The real exchange rate is likely to depreciate in real terms on a monthly level by 
the end of the year. According to forecasted trends in the real exchange rate by 
the end of the year, real depreciation of the exchange rate by about 3.8% year-
to-year is probable in December. However, if we compare forecasted trends of 
the exchange rate this year with the average real exchange rate realized a year 
                                                 
3 Real money supply is deflationed by the inflation growth rate in Serbia 
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earlier, we may expect real appreciation of the exchange rate by about 3.4%. 
The estimated equation by which we modeled trends in the exchange rate ex-
plains the high percentage of the total variability of the real exchange rate in the 
forecast period. 
Chart 13 – Real Money Supply, in YuD million 
 
The real function of money demand was modeled, relative to real exchange rate 
and the interest rate on short-term securities.  The estimation of the selected 
sub-set of variables formed a relationship to which trends in real money supply 
and interest rate conform, while the real exchange rate is identified as a weakly 
exogenous variable in relation to the parameters of the estimated long-term rela-
tionship. The dynamics of real money supply, estimated by the equilibrium cor-
rection model, are determined by trends in the real exchange rate and the inter-
est rate on short-term securities, which became a statistically significant explana-
tory factor in real money supply trends as of the second half of 2000. 
Real money supply had a declining trend in the first half of 2003. However, ac-
cording to the results of the forecast of the estimated model, real money supply is 
likely to increase in the upcoming period. The comparison of the estimated value 
of real money supply in 2003 and the value realized in 2002 indicates an in-
crease of 19.2% year-to-year. 
Trends in the interest rates on short-term securities were estimated by the equi-
librium correction model. The results of estimations indicate that the interest rate 
is to a great extent determined by the real money supply and the real exchange 
rate.  
The results of the forecasted model indicate that the interest rate on short-term 
securities in December is likely to be lower by about 4.3%, relative to the actual 
interest rate from December 2002. Interest rates are forecasted to decrease by 
about 23.4% in 2003, compared with the interest rate realized the year earlier. 
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Public Finance 
 
Trends in total public revenues in the Serbian economy were modeled relative to 
trends in prices and average wages. The estimated relationship with prices and 
wages from the previous period, to which total public revenues are adapted, is a 
statistically important explanatory factor in the estimated equilibrium correction 
model. The estimated model covered over 72% of the dynamics of total public 
revenues in the analyzed period. 
 
Chart 14 – Total Public Revenues, in YuD thousand 
 
Public revenues are forecasted to increase by 23.3% by the end of the year, rela-
tive to the total public revenues collected in 2002. 
 
Gross Domestic Product 
 
Analyzing the dynamics of the most important elements on the side of production 
and services which are included in the structure of the gross domestic products, 
we forecast it to increase by over 4% in real terms in 2003. The estimated GDP 
growth rate is obtained by weighting the forecasted growth rates of the most im-
portant variables covered by it. 
It might be said that the expected GDP growth rate in 2003 is underestimated. 
Namely, if the contributions of the private sector to the total volume of production 
and services were to a greater extent included, GDP growth this year would be 
very likely. 
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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PENSION SYSTEM REFORMS IN THE 
COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
 
 
On their path towards a market economy, countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe have faced many problems with regard to their pension systems.  These 
problems are much more complex than those encountered in OECD countries, 
which mainly concern demographics, i.e. aging of the population. As far as for-
mer socialist countries are concerned, problems are for the most part the result 
of the past. Pension systems of each of these countries suffered serious financial 
difficulties. After having applied various strategies in order to adapt their pension 
systems to new burdens, those countries opted for reforms. 
CEE countries have chosen different approaches to the restructuring of their 
pension systems and different rates of reforms. This makes it possible for coun-
tries in the early stages of reforms to benefit from the experience of those more 
advanced on the road of reforms (table 1). The experiences of Hungary and Po-
land are especially interesting since these countries recorded the greatest pro-
gress in the privatization of their pension systems. These two countries are cur-
rently implementing so called radical reforms which are aimed at replacing par-
tially public pension funds with mandatory system of individual commercially 
managed saving accounts.  
Given the commitment of our Government to the reform of pension and disability 
insurance, in this article we will pay special attention to two countries – Slovenia 
and the Czech Republic. These countries chose to reform their existing public 
pay-as-you-go systems. At the same time, they passed legislation which encour-
ages citizens to save for retirement in private pension funds on voluntary basis. 
 
 
1. Comparative Analysis of Pension System Reforms Implemented in 
the Czech Republic and in Slovenia 
 
 
Policy makers in Slovenia and the Czech Republic decided not to carry out radi-
cal reforms of their pension systems for the time being. In the second half of the 
90s, both countries had favorable conditions for the implementation of radical 
pension system reforms. 
Today, pension systems in Slovenia and the Czech Republic are based on two 
pillars – a public mandatory PAYG system and a supplementary funded pillar. 
The second pillar in the Czech Republic4 consists of a voluntary private scheme 
which offers individual pension plans, while in Slovenia, it involves three supple-
mentary pension plans: a voluntary private pension insurance, either occupa-
tional or in the form of individual pension plan; mandatory insurance for occupa-
 
4 According to the World Bank’s terminology, this is the third pillar 
  24
                                                
tions which used to be privileged in the past, and pension funds for privatization 
certificates. Unlike other post-socialist countries, Slovenia and the Czech Repub-
lic did not carry out pension system reform which stimulates development of 
mandatory private funds to the detriment of mandatory public funds. 
The context in which these two countries began reforms of their pension systems 
could be described as “a triple transition”, as they embarked on the consolidation 
of their national states alongside economic and political transformation. After ten 
years of transition, both Slovenia and the Czech Republic are among the most 
advanced post-socialist countries, and their accession to the EU is definite. Both 
countries have stable democratic institutions which work well, and regularly re-
port the highest GDP per capita among the post-socialist countries – candidates 
for accession to the EU. 
Over the last ten years, Slovenia and the Czech Republic rank first among former 
socialist countries with regard to human development index, calculated on the 
basis of UNDP methodology. Among all transition countries, these two countries 
report the highest life expectancy at birth (in 1999, 75.3 years in Slovenia and 
74.7 years for the Czech Republic) and the highest probability at birth of surviv-
ing to age 60. 
Although the share of the population aged 65 and above in the total population in 
these two countries in 1999 was lower than in Croatia, Estonia, Hungary and 
Bulgaria, they are going to surpass all other countries in the region by 2015. Both 
Slovenia and the Czech Republic have a low share of under-15-years-old popu-
lation. Fertility is expected to fall below replacement in the coming years. Yet, 
decrease in the population will probably be compensated through migrations, as 
Slovenia and the Czech Republic currently record the highest migration rates 
among post-communist countries – candidates for membership in the EU. 
As the old-age dependency ratio5 largely remained unchanged in both countries 
in the period 1990 – 2000, it becomes obvious that the direct threat to the finan-
cial stability of pension systems in Slovenia and the Czech Republic is not posed 
by aging, but by transformation of the economy. Restructuring and privatization 
of state-owned companies affected the revenues and expenditures of public pen-
sion funds, accompanied by an increase in the number of disability pensioners 
and early retirements. In order to avoid larger scale unemployment, these poli-
cies resulted in an increased number of pensioners and a decreasing number of 
contribution payers. 
 
5 Ratio of population aged 65 or above to the population aged 15-64. 
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Table 1.  Stage of Pension System Reforms in 25 Countries in Transition in 2001            
 Fundamental Reform Program 
Second Pillar Introduction (man-
datory funded system) 
Major First Pillar Reform (PAYG 
system) 
Third Pillar Introduction (manda-
tory insurance based on savings) 
Country in prepa-ration approved        legislated
in prepa-
ration approved legislated
in prepa-
ration approved legislated
in prepa-
ration approved legislated
Hungary     yes     yes     yes     yes 
Latvia   yes     yes       yes   yes   
Kazakhstan     yes     yes     yes       
Poland   yes       yes   yes       yes 
Croatia   yes     yes     yes     yes   
Romania yes     yes     yes     yes     
Macedonia yes     yes     yes           
Russia yes     yes     yes       yes   
Slovenia yes     yes       yes   yes     
Bulgaria yes     yes     yes       yes   
Czech Republic yes               yes     yes 
Slovakia               yes       yes 
Ukraine yes     yes     yes       yes   
Armenia yes               yes  yes     
Georgia yes               yes   yes   
Lithuania yes               yes   yes   
Estonia                 yes     yes 
Albania                 yes     yes 
Kyrgyzstan yes               yes  yes     
Uzbekistan yes           yes     yes     
Azerbaijan yes           yes     yes     
Moldavia yes           yes       yes   
Byelorussia             yes           
Bosnia and Her-
zegovina             yes     yes     
Tajikistan             yes           
Source: http://www.worldbank.org/transitionnewsletter/julaug98/rutkowsk.htm          
 Table 2 - Selected Demographic Indicators, 1999-2015     
  Population under  Population above  Fertility    rate 
  age 15 age 64 (per woman) 
  (% of total population) (% of total population)     
  1999 2015 1999 2015 1999 2015 
Slovenia 16.4 11.9 13.6 18.6 2.2 1.2 
Czech Republic 16.8 12.8 13.7 18.7 2.2 1.2 
Eastern Europe and 
former Soviet Union  21.4 15.9 11.5 12.9 2.5 1.5 
Source: UNDP (2001)       
Note: Data for 2015 refer to medium variant projections   
Table 3 - Number of Insured Persons to Pensioners, Pension Expenditures 
and the Replacement Rate, 1990-2000 
  
Number of insured 
persons to  one 
pensioner  
Pension 
expendi-
tures 
(%GDP) 
Replacement
rate * (%) 
  Slovenia 
Czech 
Republic Slovenia 
1990 2.3 - 11.7 89.2 
1991 1.95 - 10.9 73.8 
1992 1.7 - 13.8 78.4 
1993 1.71 2 14.1 74.5 
1994 1.69 2.1 14.5 77.2 
1995 1.67 2.04 14.7 77.9 
1996 1.65 2.07 14.7 75.8 
1997 1.67 1.97 14.9 75.4 
1998 1.66 1.93 14.3 75.6 
1999 1.68 1.84 14.4 76.8 
2000 1.67 1.8 14.6 76.1 
*Replacement rate is the average net old-age pension divided by the average 
wage. “Net” is equal to “gross” minus social security contributions and personal 
income tax. 
Sources: Institute for Pension and Disability Insurance, annual reports of the so-
cial protection system in Slovenia, White Paper on pension reform; Bulletin of the 
Bank of Slovenia; and ILO, Pension Reform in Central and Eastern Europe 
(2002) 
Pension expenditures rose both in Slovenia and the Czech Republic in the last 
ten years. It was therefore necessary to increase transfers from the state budget 
in order to cover pension expenditures. 
It is difficult to make comparisons due to some shortcomings in the data for the 
Czech Republic for the period until 1993. Slovenia recorded the highest increase 
in pension expenditures in the early 1990s, when the country faced a significant 
drop in the number of insured persons relative to pensioners. Unlike in Slovenia, 
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 in the Czech Republic this problem was not significant until the late 90s, when 
the economic crisis lead to growth in the unemployment rate. 
Slovenia faced stronger pressure to reform its pension system because the net 
replacement rate reached 89.2% of the wage in 1999, while it remained very high 
in 2000 as well, i.e. 76.1%. In the Czech Republic, the net replacement rate 
amounted to 65.2% and 57.2% of the wage respectively. Slovenia had more fis-
cal space than the Czech Republic and that is why this country could afford 
greater fiscal transfers to the pension system. 
When economic and political transformation started, it became clear both in Slo-
venia and in the Czech Republic that the systems of pension insurance inherited 
from socialism needed reform in  order to ensure their financial stability and to 
adapt some features of the pension systems from the past regime to the new 
economic order. The reforms they were preparing mainly referred to the reform of 
the public PAYG system (table 4), gradual increase of the retirement age, intro-
duction of stricter retirement conditions, more restrictive conditions for early re-
tirement and disability pensions, abolition of special benefits for certain occupa-
tions in the Czech Republic and their transformation into the regime which are 
capitalized and funded by employers. 
Table 4 – Basic Features of the Public Pension Schemes in the Czech Re-
public and Slovenia  
 
Characteristics Czech Republic Slovenia 
Type mandatory, PAYG mandatory, PAYG 
Nominal contribution rate 26.0 24.35 
- employee 6.5 15.50 
- employer 19.5 8.85 
Contribution ceiling none none 
Separation of pension fund from 
state budget 
None, but specially ear-
marked account exists 
Yes, autonomous pension in-
surance institute 
Structure of pension formula Flat-rate basic part + earn-
ings-related component 
Benefit calculation based on 
individual wage history and 
contributory years 
Minimum insurance period 25 15 
Earnings considered in pension base Last 30 years (2016.god.) Average of best 18 years 
Pensionable age after transition pe-
riod (men/women) 
62/57-61 65/63* 
Bonus for late retirement Yes Yes 
Penalties for early retirement Yes Yes, if prior to age 61/63 (with 
many exceptions) 
Branch privileges Abolished Transformed into separate con-
tributory funded tier 
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 Source: Mácha i Stanovnik, ILO, Pension Reform in Central and Eastern Europe (2002); Müller 
(1999) 
*For a pension qualifying period of 20 years and above the full Pensionable age is 63/61 
(men/women).  
 
 
2. Reforms of the Pay-As-You-Go Pension Systems 
 
2.1. Reform of the “First Pillar” In Slovenia  
 
There were two major legislative attempts to improve the position of the PAYG 
system in Slovenia – Pension and Disability Insurance Laws from 1992 and 
1999. The 1992 Law mainly tightened retirement conditions as a reaction to the 
growing expenditures for pensions, while the 1999 Law introduced the system of 
penalties and bonuses for early and postponed retirement, increased the retire-
ment age for women, reduced accrual rates of the pension base in pension cal-
culation formulas for each additional year of work and further tightened pension 
conditions. 
The 1999 Law made the system rather complex, partly because of protracted 
negotiations within the governing coalition, and even more because of negotia-
tions between the government and social partners. 
The most important element in the calculation of the pension base is the pension 
qualifying period which includes years of service, as well as any purchased pe-
riod or special qualifying period (refers to additional years credited by the state 
on the basis of, for example, time spent in World War II). There is also an added 
qualifying period, relevant only for achieving pension conditions, but not for the 
calculation of the pension, e.g. years of university education, military service, etc. 
These years can also be purchased, and in that case they become the pension 
qualifying period, i.e. purchased period. 
The 1999 Law introduced a few elements that improved horizontal gender equal-
ity. Gender differences with regard to retirement conditions and benefits were 
considerably reduced (Table 4). Among other things, much more attention was 
paid to actuarial fairness, following the introduction of “maluses”, i.e. penalties for 
early retirement and bonuses for later retirement relative to full pensionable age 
(63 for men and 61 for women). The period for the calculation of the pension 
base was extended to the best eighteen years, compared to the previous best 
ten years of service.   
Even greater emphasis was laid on vertical equity, or “inter-generation solidarity”. 
The ratio between two comparable pensions6 cannot exceed 4:1, which is con-
siderably narrower than the previous 4.8:1. 
The main novelty in the first pillar, introduced under the 1999 Law, is flexible re-
tirement, with the system of maluses and bonuses, which is similar to the Italian 
system. The retirement criteria became stricter, especially for women, and the 
                                                 
6 Comparable pensions exist for persons who enter the pension system under the same condi-
tions, both of them having a full pension qualifying period of 40 years for men and 38 years for 
women. 
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 benefit level was significantly reduced. If a person is not subject to maluses, 
his/her pension will amount to 72.5% of the pension base after 40 years of work. 
If the best eighteen-year period is taken as a basis for pension calculation, the 
reduction in pensions is even greater. However, new regulations for retirement 
and pension calculation have been introduced gradually. 
 
2.2. Reform of the “First Pillar” In the Czech Republic 
 
The main parametric reform which has been in force as of 1996 retained some 
former elements, such as a unified system for all economically active persons, 
the vesting period of 25 years and a different retirement age for women accord-
ing to the number of children raised. Plenty of new elements and principles were 
introduced, as well. The most important ones refer to the introduction of a two-tier 
structure for pensions and an increased retirement age. All pensions now consist 
of a basic flat-rate sum and an earnings-related element. The basic amount is 
fixed, being paid out only once, even if the beneficiary draws two or more pen-
sions. The earnings-related part is calculated on the basis of the average wage 
earned during the last ten years of work prior to retirement. This period is being 
extended every year by one year. It stands at 15 years at present, and will be in-
creased until it reaches 30 by 2016. 
Among the most important changes was the increase in the retirement age from 
age 60 to 62 for men, and from age 53-57 to 57-61 for women. This increase was 
followed by very generous conditions for early retirement. The number of persons 
who opted for early retirement considerably grew in the period 1997-2000, in part 
owing to the generosity of benefits and in part due to the significant rise in unem-
ployment.  Under pressure, which resulted from financial imbalance of the sys-
tem, the government introduced stricter conditions for early retirement in 2001. 
Although reduction rates for early retirement were increased in 2001, they are 
still bellow actuarially fair rates. 
The 1995 Law also introduced a set of clear rules for benefits adjustment. Al-
though it increased the real value of pensions and the pension/wage ratio, pen-
sions are still well below the 1989 levels. 
 
 
3. Supplementary Insurance Models 
 
3.1. Voluntary Supplementary Insurance in the Czech Republic 
 
Besides parametric reforms which are aimed at improving financial viability of the 
public PAYG systems, policy makers in many transition countries decided to in-
troduce supplementary insurance models on a voluntary basis in order to en-
courage self reliance in ensuring security for old age. Moreover, new pension 
funds were expected to provide long-term investment capital, thus contributing to 
the development of local capital markets. This model was followed in the Czech 
Republic, and under the 1994 law on pension insurance, this country allowed set-
ting up supplementary private pension funds. The proposal to establish occupa-
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 tional pension funds was not accepted. Although the number of private pension 
funds flourished, reaching the figure of 44 in 1995-96, the amount of voluntary 
contributions collected fell short of initial expectations. In 2000, with 43% of the 
labor force participating in supplementary insurance in the remaining 19 funds, 
total assets reached merely 2.3% of the GDP. For the most part this was due to 
the fact that, on average, beneficiaries spent only about 3% of their average 
wages for monthly contributions. After amendments from January 2000, more 
favorable tax incentives were introduced. The effect of this measure on the col-
lected capital and participation in funds remains yet to be seen. 
 
Table 5 – Development of Supplementary Pension Insurance in the Czech 
Republic 1994-2000 
Indicator 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Number of participants (in thousands) 183 1,290 1,546 1,637 1,740 2,006 2,281 
Number of participants  (as % of eco-
nomically active population) 3.7 25.7 30.7 33.1 35.7 42.7 49.7 
Total assets (in CZK bn) 0.1 4.4 11.5 19.6 28.4 37.7 43.2 
Total assets (as % of GDP) 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.2 1.6 2.1 2.3 
Operating costs (as % of total assets)  9.0 3.3 4.2 3.9 2.5 2.5 
Average monthly contribution
(amount of state contributions) 
 118          
(43) 
262        
(93) 
305    
(103) 
333     
(97) 
329     
(93) 
39       
(96) 
351     
(97) 
Average monthly contribution 
(as % of average wage) 1.7 3.2 3.2 3.1 2.8 2.7 2.6 
Number of pension funds  44 44 38 29 22 19 
Source: Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs       
 
Many shortcomings were detected in the area of supplementary insurance 
throughout the first five years of operation, the most important of them being the 
following: operating costs of pension funds were very high and not separated 
from assets; the level of state contributions were not adjusted to reflect changes 
in wages and prices, which resulted in a fall in interest in supplementary insur-
ance; average contributions paid by participants were rather low and therefore 
pension funds income stagnated; supplementary insurance was originally 
planned to serve as a form of long-term savings  scheme for younger age 
groups, but was instead used by the elderly as a form of  short-term savings 
scheme; authority and powers of supervisory institutions were inadequate. Con-
sequently, the Law on Supplementary Pension Insurance was amended in 2000; 
these amendments increased the authority of the state’s supervision of pension 
funds and obliged pension funds to raise their minimum capital. The main reason 
for these changes was to prevent bankruptcy of pension funds. To discourage 
this insurance to be used as short-term investments, the minimum savings period 
was increased to five years, whereas savings could only be withdrawn when par-
ticipant reaches the age of 60.  
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 Table 6 - Basic Features of the Voluntary Supplementary Funds in the 
Czech Republic and Slovenia * 
Characteristics Czech Republic Slovenia 
Year of introduction 1994 2000 
Financing fully-funded fully-funded 
Types of pension plans offered personal personal or occupational 
Corporate structure  joint stock companies joint stock companies or mu-
tual funds  
Government incentives state subsidy and tax incen-
tives 
tax incentives 
Employer’s contributions tax-exempt (with ceiling) tax-exempt (with ceiling) 
Supervision Ministry of Finance Insurance Supervision Agency 
or Securities Market Agency 
Number of funds 18 15 
Number of members (in thou-
sands) 
2,281 40 
Members as % of population 
22.3 0.02 
Total assets (% of GDP) 2.3 - 
Source: Mácha i Stanovnik, ILO, Pension Reform in Central and Eastern Europe (2002); Müller 
(1999) 
*Here only the competitive supplementary schemes are covered, i.e. both the state-owned “First 
Pension Fund” and the monolithic supplementary scheme introduced in 1992 are left out of con-
sideration. 
 
3.1. Introduction of Supplementary Pension Scheme in Slovenia 
 
Slovenia had a much more heterogeneous approach to supplementary pension 
insurance. Supplementary pension insurance in Slovenia was introduced in 
1992. Having been run by a public monopoly, it could not manage to attract more 
than a couple of hundred participants due to the absence of tax incentives7. At 
the end of 1999 the market was finally opened to private providers of collective 
and individual insurance schemes, resulting in a coexistence of occupational 
schemes which are sponsored by employer and individual personal pension ar-
rangements. Slovenia introduced mandatory supplementary insurance which 
covers beneficiaries involved in particularly hard and health damaging work, or 
ones performing activities which cannot be continued after attaining a certain 
age. For these occupations employers are obliged to pay higher contributions. 
The amount above the normal contribution rate defined under the Law is capital-
ized at “Kapitalska druzba”, making it possible for this special category of benefi-
ciaries to opt for early retirement from supplementary scheme. The other new in-
surance is run by the “First pension Fund”, which is also managed by “Kapitalska 
                                                 
7 At the end of 2000 there were only 739 individual contracts. 
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 druzba”. This is a voluntary insurance which allows the citizens of Slovenia to ex-
change their remaining ownership certificates from privatization for pension cou-
pons. At present, only 5% of the total value of the remaining ownership certifi-
cates has been allotted to the First Pension Fund.  
Tax incentives for collective schemes are rather favorable and depend on a 
threshold in terms of the number of employees participating in the scheme. The 
threshold was initially set at 66% of the workforce of a given employer, but under 
amendments from January 2002, that threshold was reduced to 51%. 
The number of pension funds and companies grew rapidly. Coverage of the labor 
force by insurance depends to a great extent on whether those employed in the 
public sector will join the supplementary pension schemes. The number of com-
panies and funds which offer pension insurance seems likely to drop following 
their consolidation. 
 
 
4. Reasons Why Privatization of the Pension System Did Not Occur in the 
Czech Republic and Slovenia 
 
 
Full or partial privatization of the pension system is feasible when the actors in-
clined to pension reform, i.e. the Ministry of Finance and the World Bank, partici-
pate in the reform process. For example, radical pension reforms have not con-
tinued in those countries where the Ministry of Labor and Social Issues existed 
as the only relevant actors of pension reform. 
A fiscal crisis turns the Ministry of Finance into a potential participant in pension 
reform, especially when financing of pension insurance records deficits and con-
sequently becomes dependant on state subsidies. 
Another factor is also of importance - namely, under conditions of high foreign 
debt, governments are prone to stress their general commitment toward market-
oriented reforms. In that context, the announcement of privatization of the pen-
sion system might be interpreted as a signal. And really, by the mid-90s, agen-
cies which rank and assess countries were including radical pension reform as a 
point in favor of assessing the level of risk in the country in question. Critical in-
debtedness also increases the likelihood that international financial institutions 
will take part in local pension reforms. Policy makers were well aware that finan-
cial and/or technical assistance by international financial organizations was re-
served only for those pension reforms which involved privatization. 
Although full or partial privatization of pension insurance was clearly the major 
recommendation by external factors to all East European countries facing pen-
sion system reforms, ultimately, domestic political decisions resulted in accep-
tance or rejection of radical pension reform. 
The amount of implied debt8 gives a picture of long-term (in)stability of a pension 
system. Implied pension debt is determined by many factors, in particular by the 
degree of coverage of a population, the maturity of the system and abundance of 
                                                 
8 Current value of promised pensions owed to present pensioners and workers on the basis of 
their contributions in the old system. 
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 benefits. When it becomes explicit, it turns into a huge fiscal expenditure. There-
fore, the greater the implied pension debt, the smaller the probability for the most 
radical structural pension reform.  
 
4.1. Slovenia 
 
The reform implemented in Slovenia does not represent fundamental or radical 
change in the area of social policy. Although the option of introducing a manda-
tory funded second pillar was taken into consideration very seriously during the 
process of reforms, especially since the World Bank’s experts9 insisted on it, the 
proposal was rejected after the government’s reform proposals were made pub-
lic. In early 1998, one of the most influential economists in Slovenia, Vladimir 
Bole,  assessed in his study that the total fiscal deficit as a result of the transition 
to a three-tier system (assuming that 8% of the contribution rate goes to the sec-
ond pillar) would reach the level of 75% of GDP in 2030 and 102% of GDP un 
2050. Under the second scenario described by this author, which postulates a 
pension system consisting of the first and the third pillars only, the accumulated 
fiscal deficit would be much lower, amounting to 16% of GDP by 2030 and 25% 
of GDP by 2050. Thus, Mr. Bole was not in favor of the introduction of the second 
pillar. On that basis, Slovenian trade unions put a veto on pension system priva-
tization in 1998 and on the introduction of the mandatory second pillar. There-
fore, in the middle of 1998, the Slovenian government decided to begin the re-
form of the public PAYG scheme in combination with the introduction of a volun-
tarily funded tier. After long negotiations within governing coalition and among 
social partners, this Law was passed in December 1999. The decision-making 
process in Slovenia, with the rather wide political coalition that was in power in 
the period 1997-2000 was more a search for consensus than a rapid implemen-
tation of radical structural reforms. Hence, strong opposition by unions and the 
lack of support on the part of the Ministry of Finance contributed to the rejection 
of a proposal to introduce the second pillar. Also, owing to a good fiscal position 
of Slovenia, the World Bank was not in a position to play any major role in the 
process of pension reforms. Thus, circumstances were not in favor of the estab-
lishment of the second pillar. 
Public opinion polling was regularly conducted during the pension reform proc-
ess, and particularly during the final phase of negotiations among social partners, 
from October 1998 through April 1999. According to these polls, a large portion 
of respondents (about 70%) was in favor of reform, but only 10% said they fully 
understood its basic features. Public support weakened over time, probably as 
people became more informed and aware of consequences. While in November 
1998, 54% of respondents supported reform proposals, this support recorded a 
constant drop, which shrank to as little as 45% in March 1999.  
                                                 
9 The IMF and World Bank’s experts calculated the implied debt of the pension system in Slove-
nia to be very high, between 2 and 2.6 of the annual GDP. In comparison to G-7 countries, only 
Italy records a higher implied debt. The World Bank recommended a combined approach with 
three pillars, with a mandatory and fully funded second pillar.  
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 However, reform yielded significant changes, although the approach was grad-
ual. Parametric changes within the public pension system significantly tightened 
retirement conditions and benefit levels, at the same time as increasing the redis-
tributive function relative to the insurance function. It is still early to anticipate to 
what extent decrease in the pension/wage ratio within the first pillar will be com-
pensated by supplementary benefits from the second pillar. 
The success of the pension reform in Slovenia is highly dependant on successful 
expansion of voluntary supplementary pension schemes. This, on the other 
hand, depends on whether future collective bargaining on wages will include em-
ployers’ contributions to the second pillar. If the agreement between employers 
and workers is realized and voluntary scheme coverage grows rapidly, pension 
reform could achieve the unachievable – i.e. fiscal viability together with satisfac-
tory pensions for the elderly. 
 
4.2. The Czech Republic 
 
Pension system reform in the Czech Republic began during a period of relatively 
stable economic conditions, low unemployment and absence of social conflicts. 
These conditions were ideal for implementing experts-lead reforms. By the mid-
90s, major conflicts with regard to pension reform in the Czech Republic con-
cerned the extent of parametric reforms. After the simulation of total impact and 
costs linked to partial privatization of the Czech pension insurance, and of alter-
native solutions for implementing a thorough reform of the existing PAYG sys-
tem, experts at the Labor Ministry concluded that there was still enough room 
within the existing public PAYG system to face the challenges in the decades to 
come. The concept of reform adopted by the Czech government in 2001 relies on 
the continued existence of the pension system based on two pillars, i.e. manda-
tory pension insurance (funded from current inflow of contributions) and voluntary 
supplementary insurance (fully capitalized). 
The Czech Government kept refusing privatization of pension insurance (old age) 
primarily because of the high costs of transition to such as system. Transitional 
costs that would result from partial privatization of the pension system, assuming 
the introduction of new and fully capitalized insurance alongside the existing 
PAYG system, were assessed as very high. Such a privatization would entail that 
the new pillar is mandatory only for new participants at the labor market, i.e. peo-
ple under the age of 20. Transitional costs were calculated in the form of addi-
tional percentage points that should be added to current pension contributions. 
Bearing in mind the still unstable foundations of the local capital market, the in-
troduction of a mandatory capitalized tier is considered to be especially inappro-
priate. 
Because of low foreign debt, the World Bank did not have considerable influence 
on pension system reform in the Czech Republic. 
Another factor that influenced such a decision is political. Namely, there were 
three stages of reform in the Czech Republic, each one having included different 
political actors and several stakeholders set against each other. In 1996, a very 
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 important year when Poland and Hungary started preparing for partial privatiza-
tion of their pension systems, the Czech government did not have a majority in 
parliament. Also, the Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus has never been too 
much in favor of the idea of a mandatory capitalized pillar; he was more in favor 
of lower compensation rates in the public pillar in order to stimulate Czechs to 
voluntary take part in supplementary insurance. 
It is clear that the final decision on pension system reform is in the hands of poli-
ticians, although other stakeholders have a certain influence, as well. A compro-
mise that will result in extensive parametric reform will be the most likely scenario 
in the future. It will probably involve the promotion of the NDC model and further 
incentives to the development of voluntary supplementary models. 
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 Dušan Pavlović 
 
PRIVATIZATION POLICY IN SERBIA IN 2003 
(Policy Recommendations) 
  
 
Two years after the privatization law has come into force and the process was 
launched, privatization in Serbia has yet to yield anticipated results. Private prop-
erty is still not prevalent; there is little evidence of substantial restructuring in cor-
porate governance or of improved performance in privatized companies; and 
growth is still not picking up. By mid-June, 2003, 20 large firms have been sold 
(out of 200), and 545 smaller ones (out of 7,000). The revenue totals some $525 
million USD ($229 in tenders, $195 in auctions, and $101 in the stock market ex-
change). 
The complex reality of privatization mandates clean sales, competent and honest 
owners, and quick privatization. Unfortunately, all this cannot be accomplished at 
the same time, and some aspects of privatization have to be sacrificed. If one 
goal has to be traded off for another, experience teaches us that it is better to 
sacrifice some speed for improved quality. Effectiveness and legitimacy rather 
than speed of the process are in this paper taken to be essential for a successful 
privatization at this point. The paper sets out nine recommendations for a privati-
zation policy that could make the privatization process more effective and legiti-
mate. 
 
 
1. The privatization policy model should not be changed or amended by 
other models that do not involve direct sale. 
 
• The existing privatization policy is based on the model of direct sale ac-
cording to which up to 70% of the shares of a firm are sold either in tender 
or in public auction. This model has proven to yield best results in coun-
tries in transition in the last decade. It generates revenues for the govern-
ment that can be used up for servicing foreign debt, reducing budget defi-
cits, and building public sector institutions that will stimulate better corpo-
rate governance. 
 
• The standard objection—that the direct sale model is flawed because “it 
cannot work without full-blown market institutions (wide openness of the 
market, developed financial market, and high level of competition), which 
still do not exist in Serbia”—is itself flawed. In Hungary and Estonia, where 
the model was applied, market institutions were weak and fragile in the 
beginning of the 90s. Yet these two countries are regarded today as suc-
cessful privatization cases. In addition, more than 385 auctions carried out 
so far in Serbia have exhibited no grave market failures. Third, although it 
is true that the tender procedure is administered by the government (which 
diminishes the impact of market competition), that is simply the nature of 
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 the tender procedure, regardless of the environment in which it takes 
place. (Other problems related to the tender procedure are addressed in 
sections 2 and 8.) 
 
• The argument that the market is necessary in order to carry out the direct 
sale privatization model points at the misunderstanding of the goals of a 
privatization policy within the context of economic transformation. Privati-
zation is meant to create market institutions. If Serbia was already a mar-
ket economy, a comprehensive privatization program would not be re-
quired.  
 
 
2. The agency of privatization should settle on the price as the key criterion 
by which it sells big enterprises in tender. 
 
• The Serbian government established four criteria that are decisive for ten-
der sale of an enterprise: price, social program, future investments, and 
environmental program. The number of criteria brings about a number of 
problems. First, the method makes the comparison of the bids compli-
cated, if not impossible. Second, the agency of privatization enjoys a dis-
cretionary right to decide which criterion is decisive for each particular 
sale. This discretionary right does not contribute to the transparency of the 
privatization process; it rather gives rise to the suspicion that corruption is 
possible. Selecting one single criterion by which the enterprises are sold 
beats off the objection that the process is non-transparent and corrupt. 
 
• The price of the firm, not future investment or any other criterion should be 
the key criterion for sale. It goes against the logic of private property to 
oblige the bidder to invest in his own property. Additional social and envi-
ronmental conditions essentially lower the price of the firm. Beside the fact 
that the conditions may never be fulfilled, they can potentially make a 
mockery of the sale. (In October 2002, to take one such example, three 
large sugar factories were sold for €3 each.) By insisting on more than one 
criterion, the government shows it wants to pursue manifold goals with 
one policy. The goal of the privatization policy is to sell enterprises. Other 
public policy goals are legitimate but they are best pursued by other poli-
cies (e.g. taxation, accounting legislation, environmental protection laws, 
etc.). 
 
• To achieve this, it is not necessary to eliminate from the sale procedure all 
conditions that are not related to the price. It suffices to adopt minimal re-
quirements that determine social program and future level of foreign in-
vestments that must be met by every bidder, and let the price affect the 
decision as to whom to sell the enterprise. (How such a sale could look 
like see in section 8.) 
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 3. The pace of selling firms in tenders and in auctions, considering the cir-
cumstances, could speed up. 
 
• Excessively hasty pacing and sequencing may create social problems that 
could have adverse effects on privatization and the reforms. Successful 
privatization increases growth in the medium-term but always brings about 
job losses in the short-term. The government should take steps to ensure 
that workers, who unavoidably lose jobs, have a chance to find new jobs. 
This can be done by retraining programs, but much more effectively by 
higher levels of FDIs (see section 4). 
 
• The agency of privatization could step up privatization of smaller firms, 
considering the fact that some 10% of the total number was privatized in 
this way. In many countries in transition small firms have been major in-
vestment and employment generators. However, it is quite possible that, 
considering the circumstances (shortage of investment capital in Serbia) 
and the capacity of the agency, the pace of auction sales has reached its 
peak. (How auction sales can be accelerated is discussed in section 6). 
Privatization of bigger firms should accelerate gradually in accordance 
with the opening of new jobs.  
 
• One should not fear that faster privatization will exacerbate the situation 
on the labor market. Nowhere in East Central Europe has privatization led 
to social disaster. The unemployment rate in the Czech Republic in 1991 
was 4.1%, and in 1998, 7.5%. In Hungary, in the same years, it was 7.4% 
and 7.8%, respectively. In 2000, Serbia had 12.6% and in 2002, the un-
employment rate was 13.8%. The reason why larger social unrest did not 
occur was that the government did not act entirely in agreement with mar-
ket principles in privatizing socially-owned firms. As long as this is the 
case with the Serbian privatization program, privatization can move faster. 
 
 
4. The government must intensify its efforts to remove obstacles for direct 
investments. 
 
• Privatization is not a panacea for a transitional economy. It sets the pre-
condition for growth, but also implies layoffs, other forms of restructuring, 
and time-consuming changes in the way the economy functions. Privatiza-
tion must be a part of a comprehensive program, the most important part 
of which is the attraction of FDI that builds new, competitive firms, and 
creates new jobs. FDI does not come into an environment in which there 
are too many obstacles. In Serbia, the obstacles are mainly of an adminis-
trative nature. The average time for registering a firm in the beginning of 
2002 amounted to 50 days and cost €230 on average. Comparable costs 
are expected in terms of real estate, operating licenses, equipment, im-
ports and transit of goods, commodity exports, certification of products 
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 and services, inspections etc. Such an environment is FDI-diverting, rather 
than FDI-attracting. 
 
• On the other hand, the corporate tax rate also does not seem to be in-
vestment-attracting enough. Although Serbia has one of the lowest corpo-
rate tax rates in the region (14%), it still appears to be too high to attract 
the sought-for level of FDI. In 2002, FDI was mostly concentrated in trade, 
and not in production, which is why trade growth rate was 8.5%, whereas 
the industrial production growth rate was only 1.7%. In many countries—
not only in those that employed the same method in privatizing—the gov-
ernment gave tax holidays for greenfield investment in the beginning of 
the transition. The same could be tried in Serbia.  
 
• The removal of the administrative barriers is critical for starting up small 
and medium sized Serbian companies. The most important reason for the 
low level of investments for bigger foreign companies is most likely bound 
up with the weak rule of law, macroeconomic imbalances and high risks 
(including political risks). 
 
 
5. The government should accelerate the building of other necessary mar-
ket institutions (notably, the bankruptcy law and investment funds). 
 
• Serbia still does not have a complete bankruptcy law but only an insol-
vency law. This model of privatization dominated the Polish privatization 
program, Until March 1992, over 1,000 socially-owned firms went bank-
rupt, which enabled the creation of 545 new firms. The absence of the 
bankruptcy law enables firms to default on loans and get liquidated without 
the lender being compensated. The repercussions are dangerous:  
o Banks will not lend if they are not sure they can protect their assets; 
the shortage of investment and working capital does not contribute 
to the increase of growth;  
o The government will be under pressure to bail out companies when 
they default on loans, which imposes financial burden on the state 
budget; 
o The number of inefficient enterprises will not decrease, which 
causes their “healthy” assets to lie dormant. 
 
• The investment funds law allows for the protection of smaller holders. 
There are lots of small stockholders who became stockholders under the 
1997 privatization law. Besides, since the privatization program implies a 
free distribution of up to 30% of shares to insiders, there will be lots of 
small stockholders who will be created under the 2001 law. The example 
of the Apatin brewery shows how these smaller stockholders are unpro-
tected, which undermines the belief of small holders that privatization pays 
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 off. Financial market institutions are necessary, for it is significant to en-
able small holders to trade their shares safely. 
 
• The land registry is also one of the greatest problems in implementing the 
privatization program. It turned out that there are cases in which it is not 
possible to sell an enterprise because its company information is not en-
tered in the land registry. The registry is a data base that serves as a ba-
sis for settling legal disputes between conflicting parties. For the solution 
of this problem, it is of paramount importance to amend the registry legis-
lation. 
 
 
6. The agency of privatization has monopolized the privatization process. 
Its sway should be lessened, especially when it comes to the kickoff for the 
process. 
 
• The agency is in charge of “promoting, initiating, carrying out, and control-
ling the privatization process.” Although the privatization law (art. 16) pos-
tulates that privatization of a firm can be initiated by the firm itself, the min-
istry of privatization and the potential investor, in practice the agency ap-
pears to be the dominant agent in these matters. 
 
• The agency cannot control itself. This should be done by the Council for 
fight against corruption, or some other special body established especially 
for this purpose. 
 
• The privatization law should be amended to allow greater freedom to in-
vestors and firms to kick off privatization without the permission of the 
agency. The agency could retain the right to block the process if there is a 
reasonable doubt that crooks and drug-dealers intend to “privatize” a firm, 
but there should be some way for investors to initiate privatization. 
 
• Article 61 of the privatization law by which local authorities get 5% of the 
revenue should also be amended. The proposed solution is that revenue 
can be higher (say, 8 or 10%) for every deal kicked off and completed by 
local authorities. This will increase the motivation of local authorities to 
look around for potential bidders and new owners. 
 
 
7. The government should work more closely with trade unions and the 
main political stakeholders in the country on implementing the privatization 
policy. 
 
• Successful privatization is not possible without public and political support. 
Public support implies that citizens (especially laid off workers) who stand 
to lose from privatization and economic reforms have the understanding 
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 that the process is necessary, and that they have the patience to hold out 
until they find another job. For this strategy to work, it is of paramount im-
portance that the government and trade unions work together. The gov-
ernment must strive to reach a consensus on most important decisions, 
programs, or laws that relate to the losers in the transition. 
 
• In order to strengthen consensus and reduce the social costs of privatiza-
tion, the government should continue to compensate laid off workers with 
substantial compensation in terms of generous severance packages, low 
cost shares, or both. However, since these shares are only rarely going to 
be of high value in the short run, severance pay and unemployment insur-
ance are likely to be of greatest compensation value. 
 
• The government should abstain from excluding the main political factors 
from the policy process, for a tendency for arrogance and exclusion could 
be a double-edged sword in the near future. Serbia is still not a consoli-
dated democracy. If they continue to be sidelined, such forces may at-
tempt to significantly modify the privatization model if they get into the 
government after the next elections.  
 
• The government does not seem too concerned with both matters. It often 
and unnecessarily frustrates trade unions by not listening to them in the 
Socio-economic Council. Privatization is a politically contentious and diffi-
cult policy in the best of circumstances. Governments that wish to imple-
ment privatization must do their best to build a broad political consensus 
on the basic objectives and procedures of the program. 
 
 
8. The work of the agency of privatization should be more transparent and 
under more effective parliamentary control. 
 
• The agency does not make public its criteria for including a firm in a ten-
der. It also does not always publish the offers that were turned down, but 
only the offer that won. It is difficult for members of the public to obtain a 
copy of regular monthly reports the agency writes up for the ministry, and 
the six-month reports the ministry forwards to the Serbian parliament. 
Such information should be accessible to the public as much as possible. 
The agency should make public how the tender committee reaches the 
decision on whom to sell the firm to. It should publish all rejected offers. 
The reports should be easy accessible either on the Internet, or on per-
sonal demand. 
 
• Since some business people may fear that exposing their losing bids to 
public scrutiny will give their competitors unfair advantage in how they 
value assets and business opportunities, the way to achieve this goal, 
while at the same time protecting confidential business practice, is to use 
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 a “two envelope” system—the first containing all the non-price criteria (e.g. 
investment and other commitments, or firm information required by the 
seller); the second containing a price only. The tender commission could 
examine the first envelope, determine which firms qualify, and then pub-
licly (in Bolivia this was done on national TV) open the second envelope. 
The best price wins, and other prices are known. 
 
• The privatization law mandates that the ministry of privatization forward to 
a parliamentary board a monthly report. The parliament is not required to 
discuss the reports, which is probably why no discussion on privatization 
has taken place in parliament since the adoption of the privatization law in 
June 2001. The minister should be obliged to address the parliament at 
least once a year, whereas the parliament should discuss its annual re-
ports. Understandably, both things should be made public. 
 
• Although in November 2002 the agency set up its web page where lots of 
useful data on enterprises under or prepared for sale can be found, the 
abovementioned reports and some rejected bids are still inaccessible. 
Changes to the law with respect to regular parliamentary hearings are not 
planned. 
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 Prepared by Ognjen Obućina 
A roundtable organized by the G 17 Institute 
 
PRIVATIZATION POLICY IN SERBIA IN 2003 
 
 
It has been three years now since the privatization process in Serbia was 
launched under the new model. This period is long enough to make a thorough 
analysis of the results accomplished so far and to assess what was good, what 
should have been done in a different manner and what remains to be done in the 
future. For these reasons, on June 4, 2003, the G 17 Institute organized, a 
roundtable discussion on the topic of “Privatization Policy in Serbia in 2003”. This 
roundtable is a part of a wider project “The monitoring of Institutional and Legal 
Reforms”. Speakers and participants in the discussion tried to answer the follow-
ing questions: 
• Is the existing privatization model and accompanying legislation good? 
• Has the privatization been carried out in an appropriate way? 
• What is the relation between the privatization process and the develop-
ment of the financial market in Serbia? 
• What is the current situation on the financial market? 
 
The conference was opened by Aleksandra Jovanović, Head of G17 Institute 
Department for Institutional and Legal Reforms. Having defined privatization as a 
basis and the pivotal point of all transition processes, Professor Jovanović gave a 
brief chronological review of undertaken privatization from 1989 to 2000, when a 
so called insider privatization was the dominant privatization model.  
Dušan Pavlović, a researcher at the G17 Institute, in his speech (available in full 
in this issue of the Economic Review) gave several recommendations to the gov-
ernment, previously pointing out the developments and results of the privatization 
under the 2001 law, with detailed information on the enterprises sold and reve-
nue earned. Mr. Pavlović highlighted the question that normally appears in all 
transition countries, that is, what privatization model should be opted for, and 
then after the decision has been made, whether it is a good choice. In Mr. Pav-
lović’s opinion, with regard to the experiences of East European countries and to 
the studies on privatization, there is no doubt that Serbia chose the best privati-
zation model, i.e. the model of direct sale to a majority owner. However, Mr. Pav-
lović made a few objections in terms of the manner in which privatization has 
been implemented in Serbia so far with respect to the following issues: 1) there 
are too many criteria for the selection of the best bid in a tender sale, while, in his 
opinion, the Privatization Agency should settle on the price as the key criterion by 
which it sells big enterprises. This is because transition countries experienced 
cases when agreed future investments (which is one of the four criteria in tender 
sale) were never realized. 2.) The pace of privatization should be accelerated. 
The problem of massive unemployment resulting from speedy privatization is ex-
aggerated. 3.) The level of foreign direct investments, which are of crucial impor-
tance for the success of privatization, bearing in mind the privatization model ap-
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 plied and weakness of domestic investors, is not satisfactory. Mr. Pavlović illus-
trated this with the examples from Hungary, which is regarded as a champion in 
attracting FDIs, and Slovakia, which, a few years ago after Meciar’s government 
was removed from power, experienced  a similar situation as the one in Serbia 
today. 4.) As far as legislative activity is concerned, Mr. Pavlović said that certain 
laws should be adopted very quickly, i.e. the Bankruptcy Law and the Law on In-
vestment Funds, as well as the Registry Law, in order to increase demand for 
enterprises. 5.) A considerable portion of criticism referred to the lack of trans-
parency in privatization. Mr. Pavlović stressed that it is not clear what criterion 
the Government considers as decisive (price, future investments, social program, 
and environmental program) for each particular tender sale. The Privatization 
Agency is not subject to any control, whereby access to relevant reports on the 
Agency’s work is very difficult. 6.) Finally, with regard to social policy, Mr. Pav-
lović objects to the Government’s not working more closely with trade unions in 
the decision making on the social aspects of privatization. In his opinion, even if a 
decision is good, it is still made without communication with trade unions. 
Boško Živković, President of the Securities Commission, addressed the situa-
tion on the financial market in Serbia and the impact of privatization on the de-
velopment of the financial market. Mr. Živković pointed to the varied success in 
the development of the financial markets in transition countries, with Hungary 
and Poland as positive examples, and Russia and the Czech Republic often re-
garded as negative ones, with these countries often appearing in debates and in 
literature on the transition. As far as particular privatization models are con-
cerned, mass privatization is hardly associated with the development of financial 
markets, and in that respect it is inferior in comparison to the model of direct sale. 
On the other hand, Mr. Živković stressed that the regulation of privatization mod-
els and the design of development of financial markets itself  are not necessarily 
decisive factors for success, but the result of privatization measures and meas-
ures for the development of financial markets primarily depend on so called fun-
damental factors, which are, in  his opinion, the following: 1) degree of wealth, 2) 
income level, 3) the structure of market supply, and 4) the structure of market 
demand. 
Mr. Živković also presented the situation in the emerging stock market in Serbia, 
and stressed that the question is whether we should call this market a stock mar-
ket at all, because of several anomalies which are currently present. Firstly, 
share buyers are primarily interested in acquiring ownership control, and there-
fore what we have today should be better called a market of companies. To 
prove this, Mr. Živković analyzed the trends of share prices: they reach their peak 
at the time the controlling block of shares is made, only to drop again. Secondly, 
demand is insufficient (almost exclusively a demand for companies), while the 
supply is great, which results in undervaluation of shares. The reasons for such 
great supply, in Mr. Živković’s opinion, are low wages and information asymme-
try, which were addressed by other speakers, as well. Information asymmetry ex-
ists because citizens – shareholders do not know much about what exactly they 
possess, which is the result of non-transparency of the financial market and the 
citizens’ ignorance. Because of these factors, shares are traded at much lower 
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 prices than what is considered to be a realistic price. Mr. Živković stressed that 
undervaluation of shares is typical for all transition economies - Ukraine is the 
most extreme example in Europe, with the ratio of the price to the book value be-
ing 0.1, while in developed countries of our region, e.g. in Slovenia and Croatia, 
this ratio is slightly over 1. In OECD countries, this ratio is 5.9:1. As far as the ra-
tio of the price to the book value at the Serbian financial market is concerned, Mr. 
Živković underlined that a relatively good ratio has been achieved on the Share 
Fund’s market, which cannot be said for the market of small shareholders. 
Aleksandar Gračanac, Director of the Share Fund picked up on Mr. Živkovic’s 
discussion, giving some details on the performance of the Share Fund so far. He 
stressed that the objective of the Share Fund, among other things, is to develop 
the underdeveloped financial market in Serbia. As he said, the Share Fund pos-
sesses shares in about 1,500 companies in its portfolio, with their total nominal 
value estimated at around EUR 800 million. The minority blocks of shares of 94 
companies have been sold at the Belgrade Stock Exchange so far, with revenue 
in the amount of US$ 100 million having been realized. The major problems in 
the work of the Share Fund, as well as in the development of financial markets in 
Serbia in general, are inability to cope with the situation and lack of knowledge 
and of shareholding culture among citizens, as well as absence of the Law on 
Investment Funds. 
Introductory speeches were followed by the discussion. Participants addressed 
various topics mentioned in the introductory speeches. First participant in the de-
bate was Professor Ljubomir Madžar, Dean of BK University, who did not object 
to the privatization model itself, but focused on several aspects of implementation 
of privatization policy. He agreed with Mr. Pavlović that privatization should be 
carried out much faster, stressing that the argumentation about rapid privatization 
decreasing the price of enterprises (with the risk of a sharp rise in unemployment 
being the most frequently mentioned argument against unduly quick privatization) 
must be taken with reservation. In his opinion, socially-owned and state-owned 
companies which have been waiting for privatization too long, operate very ineffi-
ciently during that “waiting period”, which results in further devaluation of the eq-
uity of the given companies, which is for professor Madžar a far more serious 
consequence than the fall in price due to accelerated privatization. Professor 
Madžar also addressed the problems of the legislative and institutional environ-
ment, stressing that high taxes divert potential investors, while better coordina-
tion of fiscal and privatization policies would increase demand for companies. He 
characterized the activities in relation to accompanying privatization legislation as 
insufficient, stressing that without complementary legislative activity, the very 
idea of privatization may be compromised. 
Edward Hoffmann from the Policy and Legal Advice Center expressed the opin-
ion that socially-owned and state-owned companies which have undergone the 
privatization process can be called enterprises only conditionally, since they pos-
sess real estate and equipment, but are not market-oriented in their business op-
erations. Therefore, investors are buying “the option to make a company”. He 
stressed that it is very important to find a good buyer who is able to make “a real 
company” out of the purchased enterprise. Mr. Hoffmann also wondered what 
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 are the criteria for the evaluation of the company after it enters the privatization 
process, as, in his opinion, the main criteria should be the prospects for profit in 
the following ten years. Mr. Hoffman further stressed that the practice of initiating 
the bankruptcy procedure in companies should have been started earlier, be-
cause many companies which are in very poor condition (in particular heavily in-
debted companies) are not able to sustain market competition. A positive effect 
of bankruptcy is a release of know-how, human and material resources from 
weak companies and more efficient allocation of these resources.  
Speaking of the factors that slow down and aggravate privatization, Milan Kova-
čević, consultant for foreign investments, pointed out that publicly released sta-
tistical data is not of high quality, because, although the new Law provides for 
detailed record-keeping on privatization, it is difficult to get insight into the com-
plete statistics of privatization measures from 1989 to today. Mr. Kovačević first 
addressed the issue of accounting standards which embodies two basic prob-
lems. Firstly, international accounting standards have not been adopted yet, 
which makes the evaluation of a company more difficult. Secondly, book values 
of companies are exaggerated. A possible solution may be the audit of a great 
number of companies. Mr. Kovačević paid special attention to the privatization of 
public enterprises. Although aware that the process of privatization and restruc-
turing in these enterprises is very complicated and long, Mr. Kovačević believes 
that what is lacking are signals from the Government on the upcoming privatiza-
tion measures, because the greatest loss-makers are concentrated in this sector, 
and, moreover, this sector most often registers practices of soft budget con-
straints, i.e. the government spends enormous resources to subsidize loss-
making companies , which, in fact,  are not anticipated to remain in state owner-
ship for a long time, whereby these subsidies are only a short-term help for these 
enterprises. Activities in the privatization of banks are also unsatisfactory. More-
over, Mr. Kovačević agreed with Mr. Hoffmann that the Serbian economy needs 
very badly bankruptcy as an instrument. As far as the situation on the financial 
market is concerned, he does not believe that privatization by itself will have a 
considerable impact on its development. The Government must start promoting 
shareholding in order to motivate citizens to take their rainy-day-money (esti-
mated at EUR 4 billion, or even a portion of it) and place it on the financial mar-
ket. 
Dejan Šoškić, Professor at the Faculty of Economics addressed the problem of 
information asymmetry which results in anomalies in every market, including the 
financial. The major problem is that insiders, who possess information otherwise 
hidden from the public and from average citizens, are the main participants in 
trading in shares. It is not necessary only to inform the citizens and encourage 
their interest in participating on the financial markets, but they should also be en-
couraged to place their money there. Professor Šoškić agreed that we need an 
urgent adoption of the Law on Investment Funds, stressing that investment funds 
are necessary as an institution of financial mediation on financial markets. It is 
also necessary to make a clear distinction between shares from privatization and 
“common” shares, as well as how much time has to pass for a privatization share 
to become a common share. Professor Šoškić agreed with Mr. Kovačević with 
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 regard to urgency of the adoption of international accounting standards, pointing 
out that book values of our companies were established in different ways, which 
leads both to overvaluation and undervaluation of these companies.  
Although not ao frequently mentioned in the literature on privatization, denation-
alization can also serve as a privatization method. Denationalization of firms in 
East European countries was carried out with varied success, whereby the 
Czech Republic and Estonia are considered to be the countries which gave most 
attention to this problem. Miroslav Prokopijević from the Institute for European 
Studies stressed that more attention should be paid to the problem of denation-
alization of firms in Serbia. Also, if we understand the term “privatization” not only 
as a transition of the existing state-owned or socially-owned  companies into the 
hands of private owners, but also as increase of the share of the private sector in 
production, than starting up new companies may also be understood as a privati-
zation method. Mr. Prokopijević believes that start-ups in Eastern Europe proved 
to be much more efficient than privatized companies, and therefore more atten-
tion should be paid to the promotion of so called “business start-ups”, and not to 
insist on privatization or on any privatization model as a decisive instrument for 
efficient reforms. Mr. Prokopijević also stressed that it is uncertain how much 
revenues the state will collect from the sale of the remaining enterprises that 
have yet to undergo the privatization process, warning that under the current cir-
cumstances, the country is in danger of the “notorious debtor crisis”. 
Milenko Andžić, editor-in-chief of “Privredni savetnik” put the most emphasis on 
workers’ rights in private companies, and in companies which are yet to be pri-
vatized, quoting certain paragraphs of the Constitution (which guarantee equita-
ble treatment of all forms of ownership) and some provisions of the Law on En-
terprisers. In his opinion, workers are unjustly neglected in decision making on 
when, if at all, to start privatization; they are also deprived of their rights in taking 
important business decisions and in the distribution of profits. Mr. Andžić further 
stressed that if this problem were successfully resolved, it would, among other 
things, motivate workers, thus enhancing efficiency. Professor Madžar objected 
to this position, stressing that liability should determine distribution of governance 
rights, and consequently, enterprises should be governed by those who took the 
greatest risk and greatest liability by investing their capital. Professor Madžar 
stressed that this in no way excludes certain workers’ rights in governing the 
company, but these rights should be defined by the company’s owners. Mr. Pro-
kopijević agreed with professor Madžar, but he also added that private firms are 
reluctant to allow any form of codetermination, using all measures recognized by 
the law to circumvent it, which he illustrated with examples from Germany. 
Participants at the roundtable frequently disagreed on privatization policy, but 
certain positions can be distinguished as prevailing, containing in themselves an-
swers to the questions from the beginning of this review: 
• The existing privatization model is good, but changes in the criteria of se-
lection of the best buyer would be welcome. 
• An overall impression is that privatization is unfolding too slowly. The insti-
tutional and legislative environment has a negative impact on privatization 
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 since the lack of appropriate laws and exorbitantly high taxes scares off 
both domestic and foreign investors. 
• Privatization itself cannot induce fast and successful development of a fi-
nancial market in Serbia. In this area it is important before everything else 
to remove the current information asymmetry, and to interest citizens and 
encourage them to be more active participants on the financial market. In 
that respect investment funds would be of great help. 
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 Professor Aleksandra Jovanović, SJD  
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE WORLD AND IN SERBIA 
 
 
The corporate governance framework and financial systems are shaped by 
forces and pressures deriving from the character of an economic system and le-
gal regulations (privatization regulations, company law and the law regulating se-
curities and financial markets). The issue of corporate governance has become 
topical in Serbia because after the coming adoption of the new company law and 
the already passed privatization laws and the Law on the Securities Market, we 
will find ourselves facing a choice of the initial form of the financial system and 
the appropriate corporate governance. 
The reform of the corporate governance framework is primarily focused on the 
reform of company law, as well as on the regulation of financial markets. Privati-
zation laws enforced in transitional economies to a great extent determine the 
configuration of rights and their economic effects, thus indirectly shaping the ini-
tial model of the financial market and corporate governance. On the other hand, 
legal systems are also the products of different models of corporate governance 
and of financial systems which have different specific “requests” in relation to le-
gal regulations, i.e. they require a different legal framework. The practical impli-
cation of such a link is that only few strict recommendations can be drawn, manly 
basic principles with regard to the creation and reform of a corporate governance 
framework and financial systems. This is also confirmed in the OECD Principles 
of Corporate Governance.  
Legal regulations which protect shareholders and shape the model of corporate 
governance are assessed on the basis of the quality of investor protection and 
the level of law enforcement. For legal protection of shareholders, the most im-
portant criteria are: the rule of law, shareholders’ rights which are called antidi-
rector rights (i.e. shareholders are allowed to mail their proxy vote to the firm; 
shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the general share-
holders’ meeting; cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in 
the board of directors is allowed; the minimum percentage of share capital that 
entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less or 
equal to 10 percent; shareholders have preemptive rights that can be waved only 
by a shareholders’ vote) and voting based on the “one share – one vote” princi-
ple. 
In a survey10 conducted to assess corporate governance in several countries it 
was observed that none of the assessed countries complied with the OECD prin-
ciples of good corporate governance in all respects. It was also observed that the 
practice of corporate governance is not often in compliance with an otherwise 
good and efficient regulatory framework, most frequently because regulatory in-
stitutions are weak and because courts do not fully understand how to apply law 
or are unfamiliar with the issue of economic efficiency. 
                                                 
10 Freumond, O. and Capual, M., (2002), The State of Corporate Governance: Experience from 
Country Assessments, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 2858, June; 
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I Corporate Governance, Incomplete Contracting and Information Asymme-
try 
 
Corporations are competing to attract investors on the capital market. Efficient 
corporate governance is reflected in the price of a company’s shares, i.e. in com-
pany’s access to capital market. The systems of corporate governance resolves 
the problem of how those who invest capital into a company can ensure a fair re-
turn on investment. Corporate governance requires separation and protection of 
shareholders’ property rights. Shareholders are entitled to governance rights, and 
to share in the profits of the corporation (excess profit) and capital gain. There is 
always a dilemma whether investors are able to assess the price of an enterprise 
(its equity shares), i.e. what they know about the company. This question is im-
portant for efficient allocation of capital. Investors are protected by the law, but 
without the law, they would protect themselves by assessing the price of the 
share they buy and/or by contracting provisions to protect themselves from un-
due risk which is not calculated into the price of investment instruments. 
Numerous phenomena related to a company (e.g. ownership structure, corporate 
governance, financing of the company and financial markets, selection of the 
structure of the equity, rules of commercial law) cannot be explained by the prob-
lems which result from incomplete contracting. 
Incomplete contracting occurs because economic actors do not have the same 
information at their disposal for concluding and realizing a contract. This is called 
information asymmetry. Secondly, economic actors are prone to opportunistic 
behavior which is common in contracting relations. Opportunism means that con-
tracting parties use information asymmetry (incomplete, distorted, covert informa-
tion, different perception). People will always act in their own interest, in spite of 
the promise given in a contract, if the other side bears the costs of providing ex-
pensive information on such a behavior. For example, a manager (or controlling 
shareholder) will act in his/her own interest as long as the high costs of revealing 
information about such behavior rest with minority owner of the company. 
In company theory and company financing theory, the approach of incomplete 
contracting, starting with the protection of investors, is focused on the relation of 
ownership and control over a company. Ownership and control do not necessar-
ily coincide. Separation of these two functions may result in the structures of cor-
porate governance which are not based on ownership (such as a fiduciary, coali-
tion). Contracts and/or laws therefore should make possible control over a com-
pany in a way that reconciles the interests of different contracting parties in a 
company. Information asymmetry and opportunism of different parties produces 
information (transaction) costs which affect the market value of a company.  
Economic and legal institutions serve to reduce two major and frequently inter-
twined types of costs based on information asymmetry: the relation between 
shareholders and managers and the relation between controlling and non-
controlling shareholders. 
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 II Corporate Governance Deals with Two Types of Information Asymmetry 
 
II1. The Separation of Ownership and Control: Relation Between Share-
holders and Managers 
 
The governance of a company and utilization of resources within a company may 
be a problem. Managers and some categories of employees (not all of them) as 
team members are in a position to have better knowledge of the organization of 
work, the characteristics of resources used, how they are being used and main-
tained, etc. Owners of corporations, if they are outsiders, do not possess such 
information, and this information asymmetry may affect managers who need not 
always act in line with the maximization of profit. Therefore the behavior of man-
agers may direct a portion of profit to themselves, but this still means a smaller 
loss for owners than if owners run the company themselves. At the same time 
some shareholders may act as managers. The shareholders participation in 
management reduces the agency problem of separation of ownership and con-
trol, but at the same time increases the problem of separation of the right to re-
turn and to private benefits resulting from control. 
The costs of supervision and control over managers are increasing and after a 
certain point they exceed the benefits the owners may have with regard to the 
protection of their investment. Namely, owners do not have the know-how, while 
limited liability does not stimulate sufficiently control over managers because lim-
ited liability allows diversification of risk by putting investments in several enter-
prises. Free trade in shares, however, allows a cheap form of control of manag-
ers. On the capital market, each managerial decision is assessed and then ex-
pressed through the price of shares. Every drop in the price of shares gathers the 
shareholders together against managers. Owners replace managers, and if this 
is not possible, they can sell their shares to those capable of appointing more ef-
ficient management. Managers bear a high risk since their investment in knowl-
edge and skills of managing the company is actually an investment in specific 
human capital which cannot be diversified in different companies. It is hence very 
important for them to keep their employment, and they are therefore going to 
make decisions that will increase the market value of shares, thus maximizing 
the welfare of a company’s shareholders. 
Managers run the company’s affairs, they know how the company operates and 
they can hide much information about the company and about their own activities 
from the existing and potential investors. Divergent interests of managers and 
owners are always present. They are expressed as the principal-agent problem, 
i.e. opportunistic behavior of managers in the realization of promises contracted 
with a company’s owner. The principal-agent problem results from information 
asymmetry which makes it difficult for two parties to define their contracting rela-
tion so that both of them are able to realize contracted promises. 
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 II 2. Divergent Interests of Controlling and Minority Shareholders 
 
All shareholders are protected, but shareholders are not a homogenous group, 
and hence their share in a corporation determines the level of protection which 
they expect to be defined in the corporate statute or charter. Hence, the same 
level of protection is not required for controlling shareholders and for minority 
shareholders who do not control the company. 
 
II 2.1. The Separation of Ownership and Control: Private Benefits From 
Control and Control Premiums  
 
The concentration of ownership and the appropriate corporate governance 
framework which leads to the separation of control and participation in the profit 
of a company is achieved thorough various economic and/or legal instruments: 
multiple classes of shares (deviation from the principle “one share-one vote”), 
cross shareholding, pyramidal ownership structures through take-overs and 
through shareholders’ participation in a company’s management. The most im-
portant mechanism, according to empiric indicators, is the establishment of a py-
ramidal structure.11
Empiric results confirm that family holdings and governments are the most com-
mon categories of controlling shareholders, while control by banks through own-
ing shares is not that frequent. Only 5% of big corporations are controlled 
(mainly) by banks and other financial institutions. Control by banks is more com-
mon in countries with weak shareholder protection as compared to countries 
where the shareholders are well protected. Banks as shareholders are not very 
frequent outside Germany, Belgium and Japan. Thus, the ownership of financial 
institutions does not play any significant role in corporate governance, although 
in Germany and Japan banks possess significant power in corporate governance 
through their seats on corporate managing boards or through voting shares of 
other investors.  
Concentrated ownership (big shareholders) reduces the possibility of diversifica-
tion of risk. That is why investors tend to extract private benefits from the com-
pany. Thus, the control pursued by majority shareholders (insiders such as a di-
rector or a family holding in Italy) is determined by the influence of private bene-
fits. The conflict of interest between minority and majority shareholders cannot be 
avoided. The interests of majority and minority shareholders are not likely to be 
harmonized when it becomes necessary to carry out the transfer of control. 
The data from Italy confirms that majority shareholders enjoy huge private bene-
fits not smaller than 1% of the total market value of a medium-size corporation 
from the sample. Private benefits of majority shareholders discourage external 
investors from offering capital to the company. Therefore the costs of a conflict 
between majority and minority shareholders may be reflected in the drop in the 
                                                 
11 Results La Porta,R., Lopez-De-Silanes,F. and Shleifer,A.(1999), Corporate Ownership 
Around the World, The Journal of Finance Vol.54, No.2., are consistent with Barka,F., (1996), 
On Corporate Governance in Italy: Issues, Facts and Agenda, Nota di Lavoro 10.96, Fon-
dazione Eni Enrico Mattei.  
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 global value of the company and the consequent decrease in the value of its 
shares. Empiric data confirms the assumption that private benefits deriving from 
controlling rights are much more important if the protection of shareholders is 
weak. 
Weak protection of minority (non-controlling) shareholders reduces outside fi-
nancing and consequently stock markets are smaller and managers are under 
less efficient control in the market for corporate control. Hence, the development 
of financial markets (the level of capitalization and liquidity of the stock ex-
change) is positively correlated with legal protection of shareholders. Italy, 
France and Germany have relatively small stock exchanges. 
Corporations usually do not deviate from the “one share-one vote” principle, even 
where it is legally possible. Results show that multiple classes of shares are not 
the main method for the separation of ownership and control. Cross shareholding 
is also not of significance for the separation of ownership and control, except for 
Germany and Sweden. Cross shareholding seems to be more significant in coun-
tries where it is prohibited. The separation of ownership and control is of practical 
significance because controlling rights possessed by controlling (majority) share-
holders may be in considerable disproportion with their right to participate in cor-
porate profits. 
On average, 18.6% of capital is necessary to exercise control over 20% of votes. 
In countries with poor shareholder protection, 17.7% of capital on average is 
necessary for control of 20% of votes, while in countries with strong protection of 
shareholders 19.7% of capital is necessary for the control of 20% of votes. 
Considerable data on trade in shares with substantial premiums confirms that 
control over a company has its own value. The level of a control premium (voting 
premium) changes according to the level of the possibility for managers or con-
trolling shareholders to gain benefits. The premium ranges, as shown by the 
data, between 6.5% in Sweden and 82%, a premium measured at the Milan 
Stock Exchange. On the other hand, as a consequence of the wider dispersion of 
ownership or modest concentration, superior voting (controlling) rights in the USA 
are traded at small premiums. The prices of companies incorporate the effects of 
ownership and corporate governance on the future success of the company. 
 
III Shareholder Protection– Legal and Economic Instruments 
 
The protection of shareholders requires a well balanced relation between protec-
tion instruments and instruments which improve and enhance control. The over-
protection of investors who do not control a company allows them to interfere in 
control which may reduce the incentive for efficient behavior of those controlling 
the company. On the other hand, underprotection of investors, especially non-
controlling ones, reduces their incentive to offer capital because of the disturbed 
efficiency of transfer of control. Hence, it cannot be simply concluded that wider 
legal protection of investors is always desirable because it develops financial 
markets. Legal overprotection reduces entrepreneurial innovation activity and ef-
ficiency. Accordingly, optimal legal protection is complementary to economically 
efficient protection instruments. A combination of certain economic and legal in-
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 struments (e.g. concentrated ownership and control by a big shareholder, with 
smaller and narrower financial market and with weaker legal protection of inves-
tors) and their efficiency is a substitute for some other combination of economic 
and legal instruments (dispersion of ownership with a liquid financial market and 
with good legal protection of investors). 
Complex institutional structures – economic and legal – act together to restrict 
contracting parties in their opportunistic behavior, i.e. to reduce information 
asymmetry and minimize information (transaction) costs resulting from incom-
plete contacting. Hence, besides legal protection, shareholders are finding eco-
nomic methods and instruments for coordination of interests of managers and 
shareholders and/or controlling and non-controlling shareholders in order to dis-
courage both managers and controlling shareholders from appropriating the por-
tion of a company’s profits which do not belong to them. These methods are dif-
ferent, varying from the ownership structure (concentration or dispersion), the 
structure of corporate governance (family holdings, pyramidal structures, block 
alliances, obligation to pay out dividends, threats of company takeover), the 
structure of capital (the relation of debt and ownership financing, the risk of bank-
ruptcy), the type of financial market, as well as, for example, whether the manag-
ers’ remuneration depends on the company’s performance. 
Legal systems are equipped to regulate the problems coming out of information 
(agency) problems in different ways, each of them being related to certain costs 
and benefits. Legal instruments provide security for investors, in particular, for 
minority (non-controlling) shareholders. 
 
IV Corporate Governance and Financial Systems 
 
Economic theory distinguishes two models of financial systems: Anglo-
American market-oriented model and German bank-oriented model. 
The Anglo-American market-oriented model for a financial system is associ-
ated with dispersion of shares. In this model, the majority of financial institutions 
are not allowed or are not willing to play any significant role in corporate govern-
ance. Dispersion of ownership developed the stock market which has become an 
instrument for the battle against opportunistic behavior of managers, and the 
threat of company takeover has become a synonym for corporate governance. 
Under this model, ownership is dispersed among a large number of individuals 
and institutional investors as outside owners, whereby cross shareholding is not 
very common, and takeover activity is very lively. 
The German bank-oriented model for a financial system is associated with con-
centrated ownership. Banks and financial institutions play a significant role in 
corporate governance through the ownership of a corporation’s shares or through 
pursuing the right to vote on behalf of investors/shareholders. This is the insider 
system in Continental Europe and Japan, where the ownership of individual cor-
porations is in the hands of a small number of family holdings, banks and other 
companies, and where cross shareholding is usual. However, as opposed to ex-
pectations implied by the difference between the two models, in the major part of 
the world large companies usually have a controlling shareholder. Neither in the 
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 USA is there a complete dispersion of corporate ownership, and concentrated 
ownership is much more frequent than expected. 
As opposed to the widely held belief that big corporations are owned by a large 
number of shareholders, surveys confirmed that only a few big corporations are 
owned by a large number of shareholders in countries with weak shareholder 
protection. In countries with good legal protection of shareholders, such as the 
countries of the common law tradition, corporations owned by a greater number 
of shareholders are more frequent (dispersion of ownership is more frequent), 
and consequently these countries have greater and more liquid stock markets. 
However, regardless of the model of a financial system, the biggest corporations 
tend to have controlling (majority) shareholders, with the exception of the USA. 
However, even in the USA the largest corporations record a moderate concentra-
tion of ownership, contrary to the common impression that they have numerous 
owners. 
A considerable concentration of ownership is registered in Germany, Japan and 
Italy, while strong concentration of ownership is common in developing countries. 
 
V Costs and Benefits of Different Models of Corporate Governance 
 
A dispersion of ownership provides less incentive for shareholders to supervise 
managers because of the problem of free riding. Supervision costs are higher 
than the expected supervision benefits. Free riding may prevent the transfer of 
control over a company into the hands of those who would be the most efficient 
managers. Possible protection is the sale of shares, including takeovers and re-
placement of managers and the system of fiduciary obligation which requires the 
board and managers to act in the interests of those owners who do not have con-
trol. 
Concentrated ownership alleviates the problem of free riding in corporate control, 
and consequently owners are more active in controlling managers. Big share-
holders have real incentives and skills for supervising managers. However, there 
are different types of big and active shareholders; hence different corporate gov-
ernance options are applied. On the other hand, concentrated ownership reduces 
the possibilities for diversification of risk which makes the provision of capital 
from outside owners much more difficult, especially of the capital of small share-
holders. 
According to empiric results, as far as the relation between concentration of 
ownership and the success of a company is concerned, corporate success in-
creases with lower levels of concentration of ownership and drops with high lev-
els of concentration. The general implication of many models of corporate gov-
ernance is that companies with more concentrated ownership, providing that 
other characteristics remain the same, sell their shares at higher prices because 
of the incentive of one number of owners to supervise the company and make 
the necessary changes in the management.  
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V 1. Corporate Governance and Privatization 
 
One of the main reasons behind privatization is increase in the efficiency of cor-
porate operations of a company, which is achieved through the restructuring of 
the company – its management, organization, status. Such a restructuring is 
possible only if privatization establishes a system of corporate governance which 
leads toward the restructuring of the company, and consequently its more ade-
quate response to market signals through the change in the employment level 
and the relation between capital and labor, reduction of costs, increase in pro-
ductivity and better quality of supply. Ownership by external owners is superior in 
short-term restructuring relative to ownership by insiders – i.e. employees and 
managers. Insiders are stimulated to reduce costs of non-working inputs, but not 
of working inputs, which jeopardizes a company’s adjustment. 
Long-term restructuring is reflected in the adjustment of a company’s size, 
change of internal organization, introduction of new technologies and invest-
ments. The ownership of outside shareholders, due to their consistent for-profit 
orientation, is superior also with regard to long-term restructuring. 
The Privatization Law set out the initial structure of property rights. It is not insig-
nificant from the viewpoint of the restructuring of a company what legal model of 
privatization will be dominant because it determines the initial structure of prop-
erty rights. Namely, a company’s shareholders bear the risk and are stimulated to 
control the behavior of the company, i.e. the decisions of the managers. Control 
may be active (direct, as with personal involvement) or passive (as in joint stock 
companies), through institutional investors and financial markets (on which po-
tential future owners appear) which will force managers to make efficient deci-
sions so as to maximize the value of the company. 
Changes in the behavior of a company depend on the introduction of a new sys-
tem of governance. Not all forms of private ownership (employee ownership, 
managerial ownership, outsider ownership) are capable of establishing easily 
and quickly the new system of governance in companies, which will change their 
behavior. The initial structure of property rights established through privatization 
is subject to gradual changes. The optimal initial structure of property rights can-
not be determined in advance – dispersion or concentration, and inside or out-
side ownership. It will be changing through constant movement of resources to-
ward those able to use them in the most profitable way. The role of legislation 
concerning the economic system is to remove obstacles in the exchange of 
property rights (to reduce transaction costs) and to ensure conditions for the de-
velopment of financial markets. 
The degree of dispersion, i.e. of concentration of ownership depends on what is 
the dominant type of private ownership. Some types of private ownership (the 
structure of property rights) offer the company’s shareholders wider incentives to 
pursue changes within the company – i.e. reorganization and restructuring that 
will increase its efficiency. 
The structure of property rights is established on the basis of the privatization 
law, which is reflected in various types of private ownership or their combination 
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 in enterprises – employee ownership, managerial ownership, outside (external 
owners’) ownership which includes the ownership of foreign investors. 
The domination of employee ownership in companies is an obstacle for easy re-
structuring. Due to the dispersion of equity shares, employees can hardly pursue 
efficient control of the management’s decisions. Moreover, they are primarily in-
terested in preserving their own jobs and will very reluctantly sell their shares to 
external investors who could leave them jobless through restructuring. Since they 
are employees and owners at the same time, they have conflicting interests with 
regard to decision-making in terms of whether to increase the company’s prop-
erty or to increase their salaries. This results in inefficient allocation of labor. 
Moreover, they do not possess the necessary capital for capital increase, while 
external owners also invest reluctantly because of possible conflicts with em-
ployees. 
Most often managers appear as the company’s owners, together with employees 
of non-managerial occupations. Managerial ownership means that managers are 
the majority shareholders. As in the previously described model, this one also 
involves insider ownership, and it is true that bad managers are prone to hide in-
formation, direct the benefits of business operations in their direction and block 
the sale of shares and the creation of critical concentration of ownership of out-
side shareholders which would facilitate control and the disciplining of managers. 
There is no threat of their dismissal and they are therefore stimulated to under-
take risky actions since they can transfer risk to creditors. The experience of 
market economies shows that 5-10% of managerial ownership can be optimal for 
managers to act efficiently. 
Outside shareholding, depending on the privatization model, may appear as con-
centrated or in the form of a great dispersion of shares. The ownership of out-
sider shareholders as a rule stimulates shareholder control of managers, and the 
company has easier access to the capital and necessary expert know-how for 
reorganization and restructuring, especially where foreign investors are con-
cerned. Wide dispersion of this type of private ownership supports the develop-
ment of a secondary securities market, but may also be an obstacle for the con-
trol of managers and for the restructuring of a company, if the company is owned 
by too many small shareholders. For a revision of such an initial structure of 
property rights, it is necessary that the privatization law and legislation regulating 
securities and stock exchange operations does not limit the sale of shares. The 
control and disciplining of managers, and consequent restructuring of the com-
pany will be also achieved in the situation of a dispersion of shares through the 
setting up of investment privatization funds and other institutions that may man-
age someone else’s portfolio. This form of concentration of control of a company 
and its managers is not covered by the existing legislation. 
It cannot be established in advance what initial structure of property rights is effi-
cient. An efficient structure of property rights should be established on the mar-
ket. Each company, depending on its type and size, has a different optimal struc-
ture of property rights, with regard to economic features of certain forms of pri-
vate ownership (employee ownership, outsider ownership, managerial owner-
ship, dispersion or concentration of ownership). This means that the new struc-
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 ture of property rights will enable the shareholders to carry out reallocation of all 
resources within the company and market-wide by pursuing adequate control of 
managers/decision-makers. Such restructuring will bring about changes in costs, 
the capital-labor ratio, the ability to providing capital, growth in productivity and 
quality of products, change in relative prices and change in the structure of pro-
duction. Some enterprises or their plants will be closed down, but on the other 
hand, there will be expansion of new companies and growth of remaining ones. 
Hence, the initial structure of property rights determines the speed and cost of 
corporate restructuring. The initial structure of property rights will probably not be 
optimal in all companies in terms of dispersion being too wide, or of certain cate-
gories of shareholders gaining ownership, and then blocking necessary changes 
in the company. 
Besides establishing adequate mechanisms of control of managers, corporate 
restructuring is also reflected in the shaping of new organizational forms of a 
company, new internal organization, as well as its new, optimal size (closing 
down of certain parts). After privatization, each company (its shareholders and 
managers) will choose (contract) an organizational form, a managerial structure, 
internal organization and size that are the cheapest for doing business. The 
speed and costs of restructuring, again, depend on the initially established struc-
ture of property rights and the possibility of their exchange with minimal informa-
tion obstacles. 
 
VI Corporate Governance and Shareholder Protection 
 
According to vast empiric literature, differences in legal protection of investors to 
a great extent explain variations present in corporate governance and financial 
systems in the world. In these surveys, legal regulations are assessed according 
to the quality of legal protection of investors and to the level of law enforcement. 
However, in spite of these differences, some countries show a similar level of 
economic development. They show that the level of external financing depends 
on the level of legal protection of investors, and not, contrary to expectations, on 
whether the countries in question belong to bank-oriented or market-oriented fi-
nancial systems. 
Differences in company laws in the world do not necessarily imply different inves-
tor protection. On the other hand, there is evidence (sample comprising 49 coun-
tries) that differences in legal regulations with regard to the protection of inves-
tors affect the development of financial markets and the approach of companies 
to external financing. In the case of legal regulations which protect the investors 
poorly, their inefficiency is more or less successfully substituted (compensated) 
through economic means, such as greater concentration of ownership and/or by 
the choice of the structure of capital (the ratio of debtor and owner capital), 
and/or by the manner of corporate governance (family holding, block alliances, 
pyramidal group), and/or by the type of financial market. “Different rules and insti-
tutions may be substituted well and can be mutually complementary to yield the 
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 same result”12. A similar development level of G-7 countries which belongs to dif-
ferent legal systems may be understood as a result of institutional substitutions. 
The USA and Great Britain are countries of the common law tradition and their 
legal systems offer the best legal protection for investors. Another four countries 
belong to European civil law, whereby France and Italy belong to the French civil 
law tradition, and Germany and Japan to the German civil law tradition, which is, 
in terms of investor protection, halfway between the common law system and the 
subgroup of French civil law tradition. Canada is characterized by bijuridism, i.e. 
parallel legal systems – common law and civil law are enforced in different re-
gions of this country. 
The results confirmed a strict correlation between legal protection of investors, 
concentration of ownership and liquidity of financial markets. Common law coun-
tries offer the best protection of investors and have developed financial markets. 
Among the countries of the European common law system, the French subgroup 
offers the poorest protection, while the German and Scandinavian countries are 
halfway between common law protection and the French subgroup. 
With regard to differences between common law and European civil law tradi-
tions, in our opinion, weaknesses in legal protection of investors in the countries 
of the European common law tradition, and consequently less developed finan-
cial markets may be compensated by the reduction of information costs because 
of the existence of large (concentrated) shareholders. Smaller and less liquid fi-
nancial markets and developed financial markets serve different purposes. For 
example, countries with more developed financial systems register superior 
growth in capital-intensive sectors because these sectors naturally rely on exter-
nal financing13. Also, preliminary data on the success of different models of cor-
porate governance in Italy confirm that some models are more successful in cer-
tain sectors. Thus, the control of family holdings and block alliances yields better 
results in traditional and specialized sectors. Group control is better for the sec-
tors of high technology where huge investments are needed. This proves that 
companies associated in groups are less limited financially. Also, this means that 
the control of a pyramidal group acts as a substitute for financial institutions. 
 
VII Transition Economies, Corporate Governance and Financial Systems 
 
The following questions need to be answered: what is the purpose of different 
structures of corporate governance and financial systems. Each of them is asso-
ciated with different costs and benefits, comparative advantages and shortcom-
ings. Each system provides different instruments for the reduction of opportunis-
tic behavior. 
                                                 
12 Berglof,E.,(1997), Reforming Corporate Governance: Redirecting the European Agenda, 
Economic Policy, April. 
13See Rayan,R. and Zingales,L.,(1998), Financial Dependence and Growth, American Eco-
nomic Review, No.88. 
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 Transition economies have been relying on various privatization models for politi-
cal reasons. Consequently, different structures of financial markets and corporate 
governance have been created. In the majority of transition economies, capital 
markets are still underdeveloped. Insider privatization and consequent insider 
shareholding (employee and managerial ownership) proved inefficient in the re-
structuring of enterprises. In Russia14, for example, majority shareholders are 
managers whose property rights included the right to share in the profits of the 
company, together with nearly full right to control. The experience of the Czech 
Republic15 implies that control by banks and funds plays a significant role in cor-
porate governance. Direct sale is the only privatization method which unambigu-
ously creates efficient managerial structures in enterprises. 
Progress in development of institutions in the area of financial markets requires 
stronger legal protection of investors, with special emphasis on adjustment of the 
regulation of a banking system to international standards, strengthening of bank-
ruptcy legislation, modernization of company and securities legislation, and im-
provement in the application of law. A close relation has been noted between im-
provement in regulation of financial markets, restructuring of enterprises and cor-
porate governance with promotion of foreign investments and credits. As shown 
by experiences of transition economies, the problem with legal regulations is 
predominantly present in the area of application and not in the quality of these 
regulations. To avoid the pitfalls of the established structures of corporate gov-
ernance, as well as to ensure privatization proceeds, governments apply different 
methods of privatization that remains to be carried out – direct sale through ten-
der and auction sales. This is also the experience of Serbia. 
Also, to improve the ownership structure and corporate governance which results 
from the earlier voucher and MBO/EBO privatization, governments have tried to 
promote restructuring of companies through the introduction of the Anglo-Saxon 
model of a market for corporate control and through external financing. Such in-
stitutions did not work well in many countries. Modern laws have been adopted, 
but their enforcement depends on ingrained legal traditions and knowledge of 
business people and legal experts. The quality of law cannot, therefore, be cho-
sen on the basis of desired results, but according to economic forces and the 
pressures they exert within the system and according to the given legal tradition. 
The most important commercial laws were expected to get closer, in terms of 
their contents, to internationally accepted standards, and to reach internationally 
accepted levels of enforcement. On the other hand, the legal framework for 
emerging market economies should be consistent with legal tradition and the 
level of economic development of each country. The necessity for consistency 
explains why the adoption of new legislation which is not close to legal tradition 
of a given country reduces the level of enforcement of that law16. The problem is 
that judges and legal professionals in transition economies should acquire 
                                                 
14 Boyko,M., Schleifer,A. i Vishny,R.,(1995), Privatizing Russia, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge Mass 
15 Classens,S.,(1997),Corporate Governance and Equity Prices: Evidence from Czech and 
Slovak Republilics, The Journal of Finance, Vol.52, No.4 
16 See Pistor,K., Raiser,M. i Gelfer,S.,(2000),Law and Finance in Transition Economies, The 
Economics of Transition, Vol.8, No.2 
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 knowledge on how to apply sophisticated rules and to understand the new way in 
which the economy functions. 
Hence, empiric results suggest that the application of law is much more important 
for the development of financial markets than the quality of the law itself. Also, 
the choice of legal regulations should be in compliance with legal tradition, but 
also with the wider cultural tradition of each country. 
 
VII 1. Corporate Governance and Privatization in Serbia 
 
Different ownership structures and models of corporate governance imply the 
development of financial markets. Since privatization philosophy has changed as 
of mid 2001, and the new concept relies on the establishment of majority-
controlling shareholding, namely, on concentration of ownership as well, the 
dominant type of corporate governance and the financial system has been implic-
itly redefined. With regard to these changes, it should be borne in mind that if 
concentrated ownership prevails, then financial instruments will be held by a 
smaller number of investors, which results in reduced liquidity of financial mar-
kets. And conversely, low liquidity of financial markets may conserve the existing 
concentration of ownership. Moreover, low liquidity of the market may also per-
petuate the existing, inadequate protection of investors. Concentration of owner-
ship is negatively correlated with legal protection of shareholders. Development 
of financial markets is positively correlated with legal protection of shareholders. 
Given the dominating privatization model under the earlier privatization legislation 
(1989, 1990, 1991, the 1994 revision, 1997), the prevailing ownership structure in 
privatized enterprises was employee ownership. It is stressed that today in Ser-
bia there are about 1.000.000 shareholders. The remaining non-privatized equity 
shares of companies which have not completed their privatization are in the port-
folio of the Share Fund and will be sold mainly through auctions. On that basis, 
the Share Fund holds, on average, 10-60% of capital of 1.500 companies which 
have started privatization under former legislation. On the other hand, under the 
positive 2001 Law, 30% of equity that remained after tender privatization will be 
transferred free of charge to the employees, former employees and pensioners, 
which will enable dispersion of ownership. Also, another 15% of equity shares 
remaining after tender privatization are foreseen to be transferred free of charge 
to adult citizens, which is a basis for dispersion of ownership. Hence, only after 
the completion of the privatization process will we be able to define the owner-
ship structure, the degree of ownership concentration and the degree of owner-
ship dispersion in companies, as well as the dominant type of corporate govern-
ance. Until then, we assume that concentrated ownership will dominate, given 
the combination of the prevailing ownership structure achieved and the level of 
privatization realized under former privatization laws, and the ownership structure 
which may be achieved under the 2001 Privatization Law.  
It is interesting that the Share Fund, although collecting dividends on the basis of 
transferred shares pursuant to the Law, is not entitled to exercise the right to 
governance on the basis of these shares. This is an unusual provision since it 
separates the right to share in the profits of the company and the right to govern-
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 ance, thus building a bad foundation for corporate governance in this transitional 
period, although it concerns a provisional period until the sale of the transferred 
shares (the term of six years). Hence, the control of corporate governance in 
these enterprises cannot lead to structural changes and improvement of effi-
ciency.  
In any event, for the analysis of corporate governance and its impact on effi-
ciency and mutual competitiveness of companies and on competitiveness of the 
economy as a whole and of development, it is much more important to focus fu-
ture research on the following questions: the degree of ownership concentration 
in big enterprises (whether there exists a controlling shareholder with at least 
20% of direct or indirect  ownership in the company, i.e. dispersion of ownership), 
the structure of corporate governance (family holding, block alliance pyramidal 
structure), the structure of capital in the company and access to external financ-
ing. For the time being, in an economy which is not fully privatized yet, when we 
do not have precise data on what percentage of that economy has been privat-
ized so far and what kind of ownership concentration has been established and 
what is the structure of corporate governance, it is difficult to give a final assess-
ment on what else can be done through regulations as legal determinants of this 
process. Namely, the legal tradition together with economic forces and economic 
characteristics will certainly have a decisive impact on shaping the financial sys-
tem and the corresponding corporate governance framework in our country. 
Given the changed privatization philosophy in Serbia and a trend toward domi-
nantly concentrated ownership and the corresponding system of financial mar-
kets and corporate governance which incline toward the German model, it seems 
that we are getting closer to the financial system and corporate governance 
framework which fit better our legal structure and legal tradition. 
Corporate governance is certainly one of the determinants of efficiency of a com-
pany, of the price of its financial instruments, and hence of its attractiveness for 
investors and its competitiveness. Until privatization ends, it is hard to qualify its 
impact on competitiveness and other indicators of successfulness. Good corpo-
rate governance is an incentive for managers and/or controlling shareholders to 
make decisions that are acceptable for all (including non-controlling) investors 
with a view to encouraging investments. Good corporate governance reduces 
transaction costs within an enterprise and on the markets, thus stimulating inves-
tors to offer their capital. 
 
VIII There Are no Strict Recommendations in the Reform of Corporate Gov-
ernance 
 
Legal protection of shareholders in the world ranges from considerable protection 
that includes mandatory and default provisions which are applied in cases not 
regulated otherwise by statutes, to the protection which for the most part relies 
on procedural rules. The optimal protection level and consequently the best 
structure of company law is based on practice that shows that facilitating and 
procedural rules have greater effect against opportunism than mandatory rules. 
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 It cannot be easily said what system of corporate governance is better in spite of 
variations in them based on different financial systems. They are associated with 
different costs and benefits and serve different purposes. Although classified ac-
cording two different financial systems, differences between Great Britain and the 
USA, and Germany and Japan are much smaller than the differences existing 
between these four countries and most other countries. Most of the systems of 
corporate governance and corresponding financial systems in the world are not 
found in the most successful systems – i.e. in the USA, Great Britain and Ger-
many. Most of the systems are similar to the financial system of Italy, which is 
characterized by weak protection of investors. In the majority of corporate gov-
ernance frameworks and financial systems, companies are under the control of 
family holdings (and governments), and have problems in providing outside fi-
nancing. The majority of systems are based on weak legal protection, where in-
struments such as concentration of ownership and insurance of a family holding’s 
control are substitutes for weak legal protection of shareholders. And conversely, 
concentrated ownership “requires” only basic legal protection. Legal protection is 
only one dimension of protection against opportunistic behavior. Corporate own-
ership (concentrated or diffused), corporate governance, corporate financing and 
corresponding financial markets, for their part affect the creation of the legal sys-
tem. Evolution of a legal system is the result of the action of economic forces. 
Economic forces shape legal regulations and vice versa. The quality of laws can-
not be chosen on the basis of desired results, but in accordance with economic 
forces and their pressure within the system and the given legal tradition. The 
freedom of economic and legal policy makers is limited by informal institutions, 
social norms and social values, which result from the fact that legal regulations 
are not sufficient to design the desired ownership structure, the desired system of 
corporate governance and financial markets. In general, a better system does not 
exist, but what does exist is a system that is better for achieving desired pur-
poses. 
 
A Roundtable Organized by the G 17 Institute 
 
INSOLVENCY LEGISLATION IN THE LIGHT OF ECONOMIC AND LEGAL 
REFORMS IN SERBIA AND THE DRAFT LAW ON INSOLVENCY 
 
 
On April 11, 2003, the G 17 Institute organized a meeting of experts on the topic 
“Insolvency Legislation in the Light of Economic and legal Reforms in Ser-
bia and the Draft Law on Insolvency”. 
The conference was opened by Aleksandra Jovanović, Head of the G 17 Insti-
tute’s Department for Institutional Reforms, who noted that this conference is a 
part of a wider project “The Monitoring of Institutional and Legal Reforms”, which 
is funded by GTZ, a German organization for technical cooperation. In her open-
ing speech, Professor Jovanović stressed that there are two critical moments in 
the life of each enterprise, i.e. starting up and closing down of business. Certain 
costs are involved in starting up a business which are determined, among other 
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 things, by the costs of closing down, and because of this, mechanisms for closing 
down a business are important for each kind of investment, i.e. credits, equity 
funding, as well as privatization. Good insolvency legislation provides for the pro-
cedure of both liquidation and reorganization, it resolves the problem of transfer-
ring control to creditors before the entire property of one company goes bust, it 
makes possible for  insolvent companies to use closing down mechanisms, and 
for “ill” but potentially “alive” companies to undergo restructuring. Change in in-
solvency legislation means that the significance and importance of good mecha-
nisms for possible closing down of business are finally taken into consideration. 
Our reality is that out of 34,200 illiquid legal entities (which employ 468,000 
workers) that were registered until December 31, 2002, 29,000 enterprises filed 
for bankruptcy, but insolvency proceedings were opened in as few as 575 enter-
prises (figures released in the magazine “Ekonomist”, March 31, 2003). In Pro-
fessor Jovanović’s opinion, the non-application of bankruptcy is a gross disre-
spect of market behavior, despite the fact that under current regulations, bank-
ruptcy proceedings are too expensive, lasts too long (5-10 years) and do not 
stimulate creditors. 
Insolvency legislation is complementary with privatization and stabilization of economic 
policy. It is therefore a necessary component of the transitional reform processes. This 
meeting of experts was organized as a continuation of an already initiated public debate 
on new insolvency legislation, with special emphasis on the assessment of economic and 
legal effects of the solutions offered in the Draft Law on Insolvency, Professor Jovanović 
concluded. 
 
Time and Regional Framework of the Adoption of the Insolvency Law In 
Serbia and its Main Features 
 
 
Vesna Rakić Vodinelić, Director of the Institute for Comparative Jurisprudence 
and Professor at the Faculty of Business Law in Belgrade discussed the time-
frame and the regional framework for the adoption of the Insolvency Law of Ser-
bia and the main features of that Law. 
For the sake of better understanding of the current position of Serbia with regard 
to insolvency legislation and of the features of the new Insolvency Law, Professor 
Rakić Vodinelić gave a brief overview of historical development of bankruptcy law 
and of some codifications which had a decisive effect on the development and 
today’s approximation of regional insolvency laws.  
Professor Rakić Vodinelić began the historical overview of the development of 
bankruptcy legislation with the XVI century, referring to it as “the first great wave 
of bankruptcy legislation” after the period of application of Roman law. The first 
rules on bankruptcy in the form of bankruptcy law were adopted by municipal au-
thorities in Antwerpen, the Netherlands, in 1515, with the aim to prevent debtors 
from fleeing the territory of the Netherlands, as this town was the center of world 
trade. From than on, bankruptcy legislation started spreading across Europe: in 
1532, Charles V adopted the Bankruptcy Law for the whole territory of the then 
Netherlands; in 1536 Francis I adopted the Bankruptcy Law for the then France; 
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 in 1542, Henry VIII adopted the Bankruptcy Law that was enforced in the then 
Great Britain. This legislation had, inter alia, the following common features: 1.) 
the debtor was, as a rule, considered to be a criminal offender and charges were 
pressed against him for bankruptcy; 2.) consequently, bankruptcy was consid-
ered a disgrace for the debtor, and it discredited him in his future business life. 
The next great wave of bankruptcy legislation took place in the XIX century, 
bringing about, alongside the idea of the disgrace of the debtor, a new idea of 
rehabilitation of the debtor in the form of reorganization of his business. Euro-
pean states reformed their bankruptcy legislation, while the first bankruptcy laws 
were enacted in East Asian countries. The idea of reorganization of the debtor, 
which has survived up to the present day, and which has been increasingly de-
veloping and dominating in bankruptcy legislation in general, appeared in the 
USA for the first time for purely pragmatic reasons. The essence is that liquida-
tion of the debtor must not be allowed because of the enormous social damage it 
creates, and that it is better to help the debtor recover through the process of re-
organization, which is an integral part of insolvency proceedings. 
The XX century marks the beginning of a new global wave of reforms of insol-
vency legislation, which still continues. Year 1978 is especially important be-
cause the Bankruptcy Reform Act was enacted in the US, and the entire Chapter 
XI of this document deals with the reorganization of the debtor, i.e. its recovery 
through more or less compulsory measures for reorganization which are under-
taken by the court and other relevant institutions. This Act is still very influential, 
inspiring reforms of insolvency legislation worldwide. Professor Rakić Vodinelić 
stressed that of greatest interest to us is the reform of bankruptcy legislation car-
ried out in CEE countries. The experiences of these countries shows that the ap-
plication of insolvency criteria from Western European legislation (the USA, Can-
ada and other developed countries) in the countries in transition results in the 
bankruptcy of almost the entire economy (e.g. in Moldova). Hence, the idea of 
reorganization was very well received in the transition countries.  
The characteristic of the XX and the beginning of the XXI centauries is an inter-
national and regional approach to insolvency legislation. International and re-
gional organizations have been putting great efforts into shaping the models of 
insolvency legislation that are applicable everywhere in the world, among which, 
in Professor Rakić Vodinelić’s opinion, the most important and the most relevant 
are the attempts and models created by the IMF, the World Bank and the UN-
CITRAL. More precisely, the IMF and the World Bank do not have a complete 
and comprehensive model of insolvency law, but they only give certain guidelines 
for the reform of insolvency legislation, including techniques for the implementa-
tion of changes. Unlike these organizations, the UNCITRAL released a publica-
tion which contains a concept that could be referred to as the model of insol-
vency law. Besides these initiatives of international organizations, Professor 
Rakić Vodinelić pointed out to some regional initiatives for the harmonization of 
insolvency legislation, in particular the initiatives for harmonizing bankruptcy with 
international elements, i.e. international bankruptcy. Owing to globalization, inter-
national bankruptcy is an increasing phenomenon; international bankruptcy pre-
vails over bankruptcy with internal elements, even in the EU Member States. 
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 Among the oldest regional conventions on bankruptcy is the one signed as early 
as 1648 between the Hanseat towns, i.e. towns in Northern Germany which were 
always markedly trading towns. However, a much more important year is 1960, 
when authorities in the then European Economic Community began working on 
rules on international bankruptcy that would be applicable in the entire Commu-
nity, with the result being the Convention on International Bankruptcy in the 
European Community; the text of this Convention, was transformed into the EU 
Directive which came into effect as of May 2002. There are also other regional 
integrations which share common principles or rules of international bankruptcy: 
the regional initiative of the USA, Canada and Mexico (NAFTA) and the regional 
initiative of 16 countries of Central Africa. Such initiatives are present in the 
states of Eastern Asia and South America, as opposed to the Balkans, which still 
do not have any initiative for harmonization of international bankruptcy rules be-
tween the Balkan states. 
In that sense, Professor Rakić Vodinelić discussed the Draft Law on Insolvency, 
pointing to some novelties of legal and political character. Professor Rakić 
Vodinelić stressed that this is a version of the Insolvency Draft Law from Febru-
ary 2003, which was initially created for the federal state, i.e. for the purposes of 
the Federal Ministry of Justice, but after federal prerogatives were transferred to 
the Member Republics, this Draft Law was adapted to conform to the needs of a 
republican law, since Montenegro already has the Insolvency Law. 
Professor Rakić Vodinelić pointed to some of the main characteristics of the Draft 
Law. The first characteristic concerns the model on which this Draft Law relies. A 
direct model for this Draft Law on Insolvency is the German Insolvency Law from 
1999, which radically changed German insolvency legislation which had been 
based on the principle of liquidation of the debtor, but with the 1999 Insolvency 
Law, it accepted the idea of reorganization with a stronger role of the trustee in 
insolvency. Croatian legislator used this Law as a model to an even greater ex-
tent, since it literally translated certain provisions. Slovenia does not have a 
Bankruptcy Law, but only the Law on Compulsory Settlement, Bankruptcy and 
Liquidation from 1989, which was enacted during the former SFRY, but has later 
been thoroughly amended and supplemented to incorporate the idea of reorgani-
zation, although in a slightly narrower form compared to the German law. An-
other characteristic concerns the abandonment of the practice common under 
the current Law, i.e. conclusion of compulsory arrangement and recovery of the 
debtor before opening insolvency proceedings. Empiric parameters showed that 
these attempts are futile and a sheer waste of time. The idea of as short as pos-
sible a period between filing the petition for insolvency and opening of the insol-
vency procedure was adopted instead; insolvency proceedings must be opened 
in any event, in order for its legal consequences to begin, among which the most 
important is the termination of authority of the administrative bodies of the debtor 
and the putting these authorities into the hands of the trustee in insolvency who 
works under the control of the court. The objective of this measure is to put a 
debtor, who proved incapable of performing efficiently and profitably, under con-
trol immediately in order for the legal consequences of the opening of insolvency 
proceedings to begin, and only then the court should make an assessment of 
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 whether there are conditions for the recovery of the debtor through the process of 
reorganization, in cooperation with creditors who are granted a much more active 
role than under the current law. The third important characteristic of the Draft 
Law is the introduction of the reorganization of the debtor, with several reorgani-
zation methods at disposal. Professor Rakić Vodinelić stressed that our law is not 
outdated, as it is familiar with the idea of reorganization, which is expressed un-
der the term of rehabilitation (sanacija) of a legal entity, an institution especially 
well developed during self-managed socialism. However, the difference between 
the two is fundamental because rehabilitation, as regulated by the Bankruptcy 
Law from the late 1970s, was defined more as a political than as a legal and 
economic measure, while reorganization is, or at least should be, a purely legal 
and economic measure. Finally, a significant characteristic of the Draft Law is the 
changed role of the trustee in terms of his/her wider independence from the 
bankruptcy court than before. 
However, Professor Rakić Vodinelić stressed that although this Draft Law on In-
solvency is better than the current Law, it has numerous shortcomings. The first 
shortcoming concerns the legal consequences of insolvency, in particular those 
related to employment, since in Professor Rakić Vodinelić’s opinion, these provi-
sions were not elaborated sufficiently. Secondly, although the trustee in insol-
vency is more independent than under the current Law, many provisions stipulate 
that the trustee must consult the bankruptcy judge, bankruptcy court and credi-
tors’ committee, and the question is whether and to what extent such provisions 
are justified. Professor Rakić Vodinelić sees the following as the major shortcom-
ing: the forms of reorganization of the debtor are only listed, and procedural pro-
visions on reorganization are missing. Each type and method of reorganization 
must be elaborated in detail in a procedural sense, and the area of reorganiza-
tion must be much more thoroughly regulated in order to avoid problems that 
may arise out of the vagueness of the entire area during the practical enforce-
ment of the law. Another shortcoming is related to the absence of provisions on 
international bankruptcy. In her opinion, the main reason for leaving the provi-
sions on international bankruptcy out of this law is that this is a republican law, 
which was initially created as a federal law, and as such, it contained provisions 
regulating international bankruptcy. Professor Rakić Vodinelić concluded that 
provisions on international bankruptcy are necessary in any case; they should 
have been formulated in this text, and later it could be decided whether such pro-
visions will be a part of the International Private Law. Incidentally, International 
Private Law contains only one provision on international bankruptcy, which does 
not say much, but does cause plenty of problems. 
 
Insolvency Proceedings 
 
 
Jelisaveta Vasilić, a lawyer, tried to show on a concrete example that the new 
Insolvency Law can be implemented, i.e. applied in practice, at the same time 
discussing all its characteristics and describing the entire procedure of bank-
ruptcy, from the insolvency petition to the reorganization process.  
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 Ms. Vasilić noted that when the reasons for bankruptcy occur, a debtor or a 
creditor files an initial act or petition on bankruptcy. With regard to the perplexi-
ties whether there is a bankruptcy with a preliminary proceedings, Ms. Vasilić 
stressed that the court, precisely on the basis of the petition on bankruptcy, with-
out hearings, makes a decision on whether it is necessary to open preliminary 
proceedings or not. The court issues a decision on the opening of the preliminary 
proceedings within three days from the day of receiving the petition. The decision 
is irrevocable at the outset, without the right of appeal. The previous proceedings 
lasts 30 days from the day the initial act is received, being followed by the hear-
ings held on the thirtieth day of the opening of the insolvency proceedings, where 
the conditions for opening the insolvency proceedings are defined. 
Ms. Vasilić stressed that the number of cases of bankruptcy with preliminary pro-
ceedings is limited. Insolvency without previous proceedings occurs in the follow-
ing cases: if the debtor files for bankruptcy without necessary documents and 
papers; if the creditor files a petition and the debtor admits the existence of rea-
sons for insolvency, and if the petition is filed by the creditor who was not paid off 
during the execution procedure. 
Ms. Vasilić also discussed the tasks of the bankruptcy judge and of the insol-
vency trustee until the examination hearings, with the associated interim dead-
lines. 
After receiving the petition, the judge schedules hearings to discuss the exis-
tence of bankruptcy reasons within 10 days from the day of receiving the initial 
act (in case the court did not rule on preliminary proceedings). At the hearings, 
the decision is made on the opening of insolvency proceedings, followed by the 
drafting of a decision and by assigning the trustee, within eight days at the latest 
(according to Litigation Law). The court releases the announcement on the open-
ing of insolvency proceedings (on the notice board at court and in official journals 
of the Republic) within about 12 days. The announcement leaves 60 days for the 
registration of claims and schedules the date of hearings for examining claims 
(examination hearings) which must be held 60 days from the last day for registra-
tion of claims. Hence, if the Law is applied consistently in practice, examination 
hearings would be held five months after the petition was filed (one month for 
scheduling and announcing examination hearings, two months for creditors to 
register their claims and two months for the activities of the trustee).   
The duty of the trustee in insolvency, before the examination hearings, is first to 
make a list of the debtor’s assets, i.e. to appoint a commission to carry this out 
within ten days from the date of his appointment (and not from the date of him 
being assigned). Mr. Vasilić stressed that we have examples in practice that the 
registration of a debtor’s assets and the creation of the initial bankruptcy balance 
took as long as one year and two months since the opening of insolvency pro-
ceedings, which is intolerable. Then the trustee must make an initial insolvency 
balance with the evaluation of the debtor’s property within 30 days from the day 
of being assigned to duty; he must create a plan of development, cost and dura-
tion of the bankruptcy within 30 days of his appointment, present the report on 
the economic and financial standing of the debtor with the assessment of the 
possibility of reorganization, 10 days prior to the examination hearings at the lat-
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 est,  make a list of accepted and opposed claims which is than posted on the no-
tice board at court, 15 days prior to the examination hearings at the latest. 
Finally, at the examination hearings, creditors may oppose registered claims of 
other creditors, i.e. the discussion is held on the list of claims submitted by the 
trustee and the final list of claims is established. Then follows the discussion on 
the financial report submitted by the trustee and the assessment of the possibility 
of reorganization; on that basis creditors whose claims constitute over 70% of the 
total accepted claims vote for liquidation or reorganization. If they opt for liquida-
tion, it is possible to make a decision immediately on the realization of property, 
i.e. creditors can agree methods for the realization of assets and on realization 
terms.  
The decision on insolvency can be made in the following ways: on the basis of 
the decision of creditors at the examination hearings; at the hearings of creditors, 
which is held 20 days after the examination hearings at latest, i.e. in case when 
at examination hearings there are not enough creditors whose claims exceed 
70% of the total accepted claims; if creditors did not accept reorganization by oral 
or written voting; and if reorganization fails, the judge issues an order on the con-
tinuation of insolvency. 
After the end of the examination hearings, which is the major part of the insol-
vency proceedings as far as the court is concerned, the realization of the insol-
vent estate begins. The decision on realization is made by the bankruptcy judge 
at the examination hearings upon the decision made by creditors, i.e. by a bank-
ruptcy judge within 20 days after the examination hearings, if creditors did not 
accept reorganization. The insolvency trustee or the creditors’ committee may 
raise objections to the decision on realization to the bankruptcy court within the 
objection term. If the decision on realization follows an unsuccessful reorganiza-
tion, the trustee in insolvency completely stops business operations of the debtor 
and begins the realization procedure immediately. 
The methods of realization are the following: public bid (with information pub-
lished about the place and address where property is located, the description of 
the property and its functional activity, initial price and terms of sale); direct set-
tlement with the collection of bids (with announcement in at least three daily 
newspapers with high circulation, at least 30 days before the decision is made on 
the choice of offer) and direct settlement without collecting bids, which must be 
approved by the creditors’ committee. 
The procedure of realization is composed of several elements and requires the 
trustee’s obligation to furnish information of intent, of the plan of sale, methods 
and terms of sale of the debtor to the creditors’ committee, of creditors who have 
secured claims on the property that is to be sold, and of all persons that showed 
interest in the given property, regardless of the basis of expressed interest, 30 
days before the date of the sale, at the latest. A differentiated creditor is entitled 
to propose more favorable realization of assets or real estate to which he lays a 
differentiated claim within 10 days from the day of receiving the announcement. 
Creditors may raise objections to the information 10 days before the sale at the 
latest. After the sale is carried out, the trustee in insolvency advises the judge 
and the bankruptcy court and the creditors’ committee of the sale completed 
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 within 10 days from the completion of the sale. The trustee settles with the differ-
entiated creditor within 3 days after receiving the price. Through the sale, the 
property is transferred to the buyer without burdens. The biggest change in the 
realization procedure is that creditors may raise objections to the sale, but this 
does not have power to revoke the completed sale, but may only be relevant for 
indemnification requests. Finally, the sale of a legal entity may be carried out only 
following the approval of the creditors’ committee. 
Ms. Vasilić stressed that there are no significant differences between the provi-
sions of the current Law and Draft Law with regard to the main distribution of 
property. The final list of all claims is known, as well as the amount of every indi-
vidual claim, the payment order for each claim and the amount of the insolvent 
estate. The trustee in insolvency should make a draft of the main distribution 
which must be available to all participants. A proportional part for rejected claims 
is deducted from distributed assets. Also, if the creditor holds a claim with an ab-
rogative condition, it will be paid only providing that there is collateral. If the credi-
tor holds a claim with a deferred condition, it will be paid a proportional part of the 
claim, if the condition is effective until the hearings. The distribution of the insol-
vent estate, i.e. payment of creditors, begins after the decision on the main distri-
bution of property, released by the bankruptcy court, becomes irrevocable. 
Finally, the bankruptcy court holds a final hearings with the following agenda: 
discussion on the final financial statement of the trustee, final request for pay-
ment of award and costs of the trustee, possible objections to the final financial 
statement, decision making on undistributed assets and on the closing of the in-
solvency proceedings. 
Ms. Vasilić stressed that according to the new Draft Law the entire insolvency 
procedure previously described should last 5 – 6 months from the moment of the 
filing of the initial act to the examination hearings. Under the current Insolvency 
Law, court practice records insolvency cases that last ten years, which is neither 
useful for creditors and debtors, nor for society as a whole. Only a fast and effi-
cient insolvency is good for creditors, debtors and for society as a whole. 
Ms. Vasilić stressed that this Draft Law was created in cooperation and with ac-
tive participation of foreign experts and therefore is not fully in line either with the 
continental or with the Anglo-Saxon model, but is a mixture of the two. 
The process of reorganization begins with the submission of a reorganization 
plan. The reorganization plan can be submitted by: the debtor, the trustee in in-
solvency, creditors which have at least 30% of secured claims, creditors which 
have at least 30% of unsecured claims, owners of at least 30% of the debtor’s 
capital in the form of shares, or similar. The reorganization plan must be submit-
ted in written form. 
As far as the terms for submitting the reorganization plan are concerned, Ms. Va-
silić stressed that the biggest objection, among the many that can be directed at 
this Draft Law, relates to the provision that creditors’ hearings are held 30 days 
after the date of the filing of the petition for bankruptcy. Claims must be identified 
before the reorganization; only those claims which are confirmed at examination 
hearings are considered confirmed claims. That is why this provision is hardly 
applicable in practice. To put right this shortcoming, in terms of submitting the 
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 reorganization plan, it is established that the reorganization plan should be sub-
mitted to the bankruptcy judge for approval 90 days from the date of the opening 
of insolvency proceedings at the latest (which is an achievable term), whereby 
the court, under certain circumstances, may prolong this term for additional 30 
days. Any further prolongation of the term for over 120 days is possible only fol-
lowing unanimous approval of secured creditors. The reorganization plan can be 
submitted simultaneously with the filing for insolvency, if all other conditions pre-
scribed by this law are fulfilled, but this plan cannot be subjected to voting. 
A reorganization plan must contain: a brief introduction into the line of business 
of the debtor and on circumstances that led to financial difficulties; the reorgani-
zation method (21 methods of reorganization proposed in the Draft), funds for the 
realization of the plan and the method of reorganization; the amount of the debt 
and the value of assets that will be distributed among creditors for full or partial 
payment of the debt; terms for the implementation of the plan; the list of mem-
bers of managing bodies; the list of experts who will be engaged in the reorgani-
zation; comparative data on success in five years of reorganization and the esti-
mation what will be achieved through the liquidation of the debtor; the date as of 
which the plan comes into effect; and finally, the contents of the plan should im-
ply that the reorganization will yield results. 
Voting and adoption of the reorganization plan is carried out as follows: all credi-
tors with confirmed claims are entitled to vote (that is why creditors’ hearings 
cannot be held 30 days from the date of the filing the petition). Voting is per-
formed in written form (in absentia) or orally (at the hearings). With written voting, 
each voting list must be endorsed by a legal entity (for legal entities), or by court 
or by another competent office (for natural persons and subjects which do not 
have the status of a legal entity). Creditors’ claims are divided into classes ac-
cording to priority (the court can approve special classes to be introduced for 
administrative reasons, e.g. too many small claims). Before voting, the court in-
forms participants about the results of written voting. Voting is performed per 
classes of creditors, and the plan is considered adopted if it was approved by the 
creditors which possess the major portion of claims in their class. The class of 
creditors whose claims are fully paid according to plan is considered as having 
accepted the plan, and that class is not obliged to vote. The plan is adopted fol-
lowing the acceptance of all classes of creditors. 
The adopted reorganization plan has the following effects: debtor-creditor rela-
tions are regulated pursuant to the conditions defined in the plan; the plan has 
the power of an executive document; all activities of the debtor must comply with 
the plan; the trustee supervises the implementation of the plan; the trustee ad-
vises the court and creditors on the violation of the plan; the label “bankrupt” is 
erased from the register; if the debtor violates the plan, every creditor has the 
right to inform the court of that circumstance; the court makes a decision on 
measures and gives orders for the implementation of the plan; the court may is-
sue the order on the continuation of insolvency proceedings (if the debtor is not 
the one who implements the plan, the decision on whether some new measures 
for the implementation of the plan will be introduced and whether the insolvency 
proceedings will continue rests with the court). 
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 In conclusion, Ms. Vasilić discussed the case of insolvency out of reorganization. 
This is possible in the following cases: if no reorganization plan is accepted; if the 
debtor does not act in compliance with the plan; if the debtor does not cooperate 
with the trustee or the creditors’ committee (which remains during the reorganiza-
tion, supervising the implementation of the reorganization process and coopera-
tion with the trustee in insolvency); if the debtor does not fulfill measures and or-
ders of the bankruptcy judge which are issued in accordance with the plan, and 
when the debtor in reorganization itself asks for insolvency (and there is no alter-
native plan). 
 
Characteristic Differences Between the Current Law on Compulsory Set-
tlement, Bankruptcy and Liquidation and the Text of the Future Law 
 
Mihajlo Rulić, judge and Deputy President of the High Commercial Court in Bel-
grade discussed characteristic differences between the current Law on Compul-
sory Settlement, Bankruptcy and Liquidation and the text of the future Insolvency 
Law (the February 2003 version).  
Mr. Rulić stressed that the titles of the current and the future laws clearly indicate 
the difference between the areas they regulate. The current Law, under Article 1 
stipulates that the Law regulates the conditions for pursuing proceedings of com-
pulsory settlement, bankruptcy and liquidation. The new Draft Law regulates the 
process of insolvency and reorganization of the debtor. This means that compul-
sory settlement will not be the only method of “reorganization”. 
The current Law foresees uniform bankruptcy proceedings regardless of the 
value of the assets of the debtor, and regardless of the amount of its liabilities. 
The new Law introduces the institution of small value proceedings, for cases 
when the debtor’s assets are lower than YuD 5 million, although it is still uncer-
tain who is responsible for the evaluation of the debtor’s assets and when, and 
what determines the type of proceedings. 
Both the current Law (art. 2) and the new Law (art. 3) foresee illiquidity of the 
debtor as reason for insolvency or reorganization.  
The new Law introduces a new body: the creditors’ committee. This committee 
makes decisions on whether the proceedings will be pursued as so called classi-
cal insolvency or the trustee will continue to work, aiming at reorganization of the 
enterprise. Regardless of what solution the committee opts for, whereby its deci-
sion is binding for the court, the committee elects a creditors’ board which acts as 
an operational body, giving opinion and in some cases giving approval to certain 
acts of the trustee. 
A significant difference between the current Law (art. 69) and the new one (art. 
26) is that according to the current Law the opinion of the creditors’ board only 
has an advisory character, while the new Law foresees, besides an advisory role, 
mandatory approval by the creditors’ board for certain acts of other insolvency 
bodies.  
The new Draft Law also introduces stricter criteria for appointment of the trustee, 
which should result in more efficient administration of insolvency proceedings. In 
Mr. Rulić’s opinion, the solution according to which the Agency will have the role 
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 of a trustee in insolvency proceedings in legal entities which are predominantly 
socially-owned or state-owned should be understood as temporary, because the 
new Law should continue regulating this area after the end of the privatization 
process. 
According to the current Law, insolvency proceedings are carried out over a legal 
entity (art.4), while, under the new Law, both legal entities and natural persons 
that operate a business (entrepreneur) may appear as debtors. This is an impor-
tant difference between the current and the new law, since an entrepreneur is 
responsible for his obligations to the creditors with his personal property accord-
ing to the Law which regulates organization, operation and liability of entrepre-
neurs. 
According to the current Law (art. 3), insolvency proceedings may be opened by 
creditors, by the debtor and by other persons, i.e. officials defined by the Law. 
With regard to many years of court practice, insolvency proceedings have been 
mainly opened by the office in charge of payment operations of the debtor. On 
the other hand, a creditor could file for insolvency of the debtor only providing his 
previous futile attempts to settle the claims with the debtor through mandatory 
settlement proceedings. Both the current and the future Laws foresee the possi-
bility that the debtor him/herself will file for bankruptcy. Again, cases of debtors 
who file for insolvency are not frequent in court practice (about 1% of all insol-
vencies filed since the adoption of the current Law in 1989 up to now). 
Both texts contain the institution of debt assumption; both texts also establish 
preliminary proceedings as a kind of litmus test which the file must pass before 
insolvency proceedings against the debtor are initiated. An important novelty is 
that the new Law stipulates that the previous insolvency proceedings cannot last 
longer than 30 days from the date of the filing of the petition of insolvency. This is 
a very short term, as Mr. Rulić stressed, bearing in mind the organization of 
courts, but it is certainly necessary to make a decision on the petition in the 
shortest possible period. 
According to article 93 of the current Law, with the day the insolvency proceed-
ings are opened, workers employed at the debtor’s are terminated. This is an im-
perative provision. The new Law foresees the termination of employment as a 
possibility and not as an imperative. 
According to article 102 of the current Law, interest on claims of the debtor which 
should be paid from the insolvent estate does not cease to be effective from the 
day of the opening of the insolvency proceedings. This is a default interest. This 
legal provision was aimed at accelerating insolvency proceedings, but it did not 
yield expected results and hence the new Law in its article 68 stipulates that con-
tracted interest stops to be effective from the date of the filing of the petition for 
insolvency. 
The new Draft Law also introduces some novelties in the course of proceedings 
with an apparent aim to accelerate it. 
It also introduces the institution of an arbitrage committee under the expert gov-
ernance of the bankruptcy judge (the bankruptcy judge is an individual arbiter or 
the president of an arbitration committee). 
 73
 The current Law does not contain provisions that regulate the treatment of addi-
tionally found assets, while the new Law in article 125 foresees distribution after 
the conclusion of insolvency proceedings on the basis of additionally found as-
sets. 
The entire third part of the new Draft Law that regulates reorganization is a nov-
elty, and therefore the question of efficiency of the projected reorganization 
methods will be answered by court practice in the future, Mr. Rulić concluded. 
 
Economic Aspects of Insolvency 
 
 
Ljubomir Madžar, from BK University, Belgrade, discussed the economic as-
pects of insolvency. Professor Madžar sees the new Law as a step in the right 
direction toward more complete protection of creditors than is the case today. 
Overprotection of debtors and near absence of the protection of creditors are 
joint characteristics of all socialist societies, and the contract was not the contract 
in the full sense of the word, the obligation was not a real obligation, and financial 
discipline did not exits. Hence, this Law is a step toward stricter market discipline, 
which is absolutely necessary, because otherwise market instruments cannot 
function. 
Professor Madžar stressed that it is necessary to examine all possible implica-
tions of this Law with regard to the reorganization of our courts and other institu-
tions that should perform duties and functions assigned to them by this Law. The 
question is whether our courts are ready to carry out everything stipulated by this 
Law, and if they are not, how to revise these oversights in order to achieve a 
mechanism that will impose financial discipline and ensure that the economy, at 
least in this area, operates as a real market economy. 
Professor Madžar approves the acceptance of the philosophy of Chapter XI of 
the US Bankruptcy Reform Act which says that the reasons for opening insol-
vency proceedings are not automatically the reason for closing down a company, 
since liquidation of an organization is expensive. By closing down a company 
that is not able to pay its debts, that company will stop producing losses, but at 
the same time, it will lose a large part of the added value that was generated, 
along with many jobs. There are insolvencies which mean only the transfer of as-
sets from one use to another, whereby added value, i.e. social product, is not 
lost. However, the majority of insolvencies are not of that type, and it may occur 
that the loss of added value and of jobs costs society more than the eliminated 
expenditures. It is therefore good to have a mechanism that gives organizations 
the opportunity to restructure, i.e. reorganize their work and stay in business. The 
mechanism in itself contains a certain contradiction which may result in so-called 
“moral hazard”. Therefore, strict rules must be established to ensure market dis-
cipline, i.e. enterprises which do not work well must go bankrupt. However, the 
application of these rules to individual cases, which is aimed at saving a portion 
of economic value, may turn out to be too expensive, and hence there is a ten-
dency of avoiding the strictest measures. In this way other businesspeople get 
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 the message that they could also go without punishment. In professor Madžar’s 
opinion, special attention must be paid to this problem. 
As far as the trustee in bankruptcy is concerned, Professor Madžar objects to the 
provision which stipulates that the trustee is not accountable primarily and only to 
the creditors’ committee, but to the court. In his opinion, solutions from other leg-
islations should be examined in that respect. The bankrupt organization is to 
blame for its state of affairs and therefore the creditors’ committee should have 
all power and control over it, and the trustee should be accountable to the credi-
tors’ committee, while the court should take care of proper enforcement of the 
law. 
Speaking of reasons for opening insolvency proceedings, professor Madžar 
pointed out that it is still unclear whether insolvency proceedings are opened 
when the company is insolvent or illiquid, i.e. there is lack of compliance between 
legal and economic terminology (in economic terms, an enterprise need not be 
insolvent to be illiquid, and in that case it would go bankrupt). He therefore sug-
gested that all terms which are used in bankruptcy legislation, as one specialized 
area, should be collected in one place, as was done with some other laws. 
In conclusion, Professor Madžar pointed out that bankruptcy legislation is a great 
opportunity for privatization. In his opinion, the privatization process should be 
carried out more in the form of conversion of credits, loans and debts into shares 
in ownership. This method would accelerate the privatization process and the 
sale of unattractive and heavily indebted enterprises. Since the opportunity for 
making this privatization method more relevant was missed during the creation of 
the Privatization Law, the Insolvency Law may serve as an opportunity for revi-
sion. It is necessary to examine the possibility of combining this method of priva-
tization with insolvency proceedings, since this would result in a double benefit, 
Professor Madžar concluded. 
 
The Most Important Practical Questions In Relation to the Enforcement of 
the Insolvency Law 
 
 
Vesna Rakić – Vodinelić drew attention to some other provisions of the Insol-
vency Law which must not be maintained as they are currently defined in the 
Draft. Firstly, a provision from article 32 stipulates that the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia cannot appear as a debtor in insolvency. In Professor Rakić 
Vodinelić’s opinion, the proposer must decide whether this is a federal law 
(which, as a matter of fact,  cannot be passed any longer) or a law on the level of 
the Republic, and, depending on that choice, erase all unnecessary provisions 
from this article. As far as the scope of work of the trustee in insolvency is con-
cerned, Professor Rakić Vodinelić especially criticized point 15 of article 16, 
which regulates the trustee’s scope of work with regard to the debtor in a foreign 
country. Since this Law does not regulate bankruptcy with an international ele-
ment, it should not contain this provision. The strongest message Professor 
Rakić Vodinelić wanted to send is that article 131 should not remain as formu-
lated in the Draft Law, since in the way it is proposed, this provision is in opposi-
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 tion with other provisions of the Law owing to inadequate systematization (22 of-
fered methods of reorganization can be systematized in 4-5 methods) and be-
cause it is not elaborated sufficiently. Moreover, Professor Rakić Vodinelić 
pointed to the inadequacy of the used terminology, which in part resulted from 
translation (bankruptcy and insolvency mean the same, while bankruptcy was 
used instead of liquidation, etc.). Again, she raised the question of international 
bankruptcy, which should be regulated. As far as reorganization is concerned, 
Professor Rakić Vodinelić raised the question of timeframes in insolvency pro-
ceedings. Shorter timeframes for insolvency proceedings are desirable because 
they will make the entire proceeding shorter, although they also increase the cost 
of the proceedings. Again, there is a question of overstepping timeframes, be-
cause all parties in the proceedings mostly do not lose their rights as a result of 
not respecting timeframes, and very rarely the judge and trustee in insolvency 
may be subjected to sanctions. Therefore it is necessary to find a balance be-
tween shortening timeframes and reducing the costs of proceedings, or to intro-
duce the possibility of denial of certain procedural authorizations instead of 
shortening terms, if certain actions are not undertaken in due time, which is a 
much more serious sanction that would guarantee the respect of terms, espe-
cially those related to the actions on the part of creditors. In conclusion, Profes-
sor Rakić Vodinelić wondered whether the most common creditors in our country 
(workers, public utility companies, the state) can be expected to be active and 
diligent in insolvency proceedings, as can be expected from private or commer-
cial creditors; she therefore suggested that the entire procedure of insolvency 
proceedings should be regulated according to the answer to this question.  
 
Jasmina Zjalić, judge at the Commercial Court in Novi Sad, discussed the 
(im)possibility of enforcement of the new Insolvency Law from an operational, i.e. 
practical perspective. 
Ms. Zjalić categorically and clearly stated that from a practical perspective the 
Insolvency Law designed as it is, with all the terms and guidelines it contains, is 
too narrow and overly standardized, thus becoming practically unenforceable, 
and for these reasons, application of such a Law would be too expensive. 
With regard to proceedings in two instances, bearing in mind that each party has 
the right of appeal, it will be impossible to process insolvency proceedings while 
respecting the prescribed terms. 
Ms. Zjalić further stressed that we do not have human resources capable of en-
forcing this Law within the prescribed terms. Many questions are still unresolved 
in relation to the trustees in bankruptcy (e.g. their certification). This Law in-
creases the responsibilities of the trustee, but on the other hand, he/she is not 
provided with the legal background that would guarantee successful work (exe-
cution procedure, new Litigation Law and in a certain way statutory obligation of 
financial discipline of the debtor before the insolvency proceedings). Such a 
situation can only turn away capable and quality human resources and open 
room for speculators. 
This Law signifies a dramatic shift as compared to the previous one, and, bearing 
in mind typical creditors in our economy (workers, public utility companies, the 
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 state), and without ensured financial discipline and control that precedes the in-
solvency proceedings, it could only turn away and discourage foreign investors. 
Bearing in mind everything previously advanced, Ms. Zjalic suggested that the 
old Law should be modified first as a provisional solution, primarily with the aim 
to make creditors’ rights more clear, waiting for other necessary regulations to be 
adopted, and only then to take this issue into serious consideration. 
 
Zoran Branovački, adviser with the Committee for an Economic Legal System 
of the Chamber of Commerce of Serbia first stressed that the Draft Law on Insol-
vency attracted great attention among businesspeople. Not intending to appear 
as a critic, Mr. Branovački pointed to objections expressed by regional chambers, 
which are more intended to serve as guidelines for improving the draft. 
Mr. Branovački stressed that, in spite of enormous interest among businesspeo-
ple for this Law, there are not many objections and proposals form their side. 
Businesspeople still do not believe that they can contribute with their proposals, 
but are waiting to see what the state will do, and only than will take a certain po-
sition. Therefore, presentations, public speeches, visits to regional centers are 
positive steps towards the change in business people’s attitude in the way that 
they can also contribute to the improvement of the concrete legislative text with 
their observations and experience. 
Businesspeople stress the following features of the Draft Law as positive: putting 
the interest of creditors into the center of the insolvency proceedings, setting up a 
creditors’ committee, giving wider authority to the creditors’ board, higher effi-
ciency of insolvency proceedings ensured through a simpler procedure and 
shorter terms, the introduction of bankruptcy of natural persons, the affirmation of 
the institution of arbitrage and the introduction of the process of reorganization as 
a completely new solution. 
Advocating the interests of businesspeople, i.e. members of regional chambers, 
Mr. Branovački gave several concrete objections to the text of the Insolvency 
Law. 
Firstly, with regard to mandatory appointment of the Agency that will act as a 
trustee in the insolvency of legal entities in state or social ownership, big socially- 
owned and state-owned companies, businesspeople do not understand why it is 
necessary to make a difference between the legal regimen between them and 
legal entities in private ownership. The consequent proposal is to explain the ne-
cessity for appointing this Agency. Article 24 of the Draft Law which refers to the 
power of the creditors’ board to dismiss its member is also unclear and requires 
explanation, since it is a legal precedent that a body which does not elect its 
members is allowed to dismiss them (the creditors’ committee is responsible for 
electing members of the creditors’ board). Also, the legislator’s intention not to 
give equal order of payment to claims on the basis of taxes and contributions and 
claims of other creditors, i.e. to give priority to claims on the basis of taxes and 
contributions  over other claims is an outdated form of putting the state in a more 
favorable position over other creditors. Furthermore, the Draft Law does not con-
tain the solution which provides for the creditor who holds over 25% of total 
claims to be entitled to mandatory membership in the creditors’ board. Business-
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 people believe that the absence of this solution holds the risk of creating a major-
ity among a large number of small creditors in relation to the biggest creditor, and 
of influencing the creditors’ board. In terms of certification of trustees and the so-
lution to set up a special certification agency, the question is if this solution is jus-
tified in the long run (business schools for education already exist within cham-
bers of commerce). Under the new law, the trustee is granted greater operative 
powers and greater responsibility, which is justified. However, certain provisions 
that regulate the responsibility of the trustee are too widely defined and should be 
put forth more precisely (e.g. the bankruptcy court can dismiss the trustee if he 
does not make satisfactory progress in the realization of assets, except if this is 
the result of a force majeur or unpredictable circumstances). Also, the enforce-
ment of this law will require harmonization with other laws and regulations. For 
example, the new Insolvency Law and the current Law on Payment Operations 
will be in collision as the National Bank of Serbia is left out of the list of subjects 
entitled to initiate the insolvency proceedings. Another objection, i.e. proposal, 
refers to possible introduction of more flexible terms for undertaking actions in 
insolvency proceedings, depending on whether the debtor belongs to the cate-
gory of small, medium or big enterprises, i.e. classification criteria prescribed un-
der the Accounting and Auditing Law should be applied to the flexibility of terms 
under the Insolvency Law. Furthermore, businesspeople wonder whether the 
abolition of interests on creditors’ claims after the initiation of insolvency proceed-
ings is justified. There are also questions related to the differentiation between 
current and durable solvency of a debtor: what will be the practical conse-
quences of application of the provisions on insolvency and how the procedure of 
establishment and proving whether it concerns current or durable insolvency will 
look like. Finally, there are some objections regarding the reorganization process, 
which certainly attracted the greatest interest. Firstly, there is an opinion that de-
cision making on the reorganization plan is very complicated as decisions are 
made by classes of creditors (the possibility of halting the approval of the reor-
ganization plan by one class). Secondly, article 142 is not clear, and contains 
one oversight (with regard to the implementation of the reorganization plan). This 
article does not put forth clearly what body is in charge of establishing the reor-
ganization plan and by what act this is done; hence, practical enforcement of this 
provision is questionable, Mr. Branovački concluded.  
 
Vesna Ilić, president of the Commercial Court in Kragujevac, speaking from the 
perspective of extremely negative experiences with creditors in practice, stressed 
that creditors are granted too much authority. Insolvency is aimed at protecting 
and settling of creditors, but not to an extent which leaves room for abuse. In her 
opinion, a solution by which the creditors’ board is entitled to give opinions and 
approvals is not good; it would be much better for it to have only an advisory, and 
not a binding character. 
Vesna Rakić Vodinelić, however, said that in general she does not agree with the 
approach to use bad experiences with creditors and their negligence as argu-
mentation to deprive them of the role they are entitled to in normal insolvency 
legislation, that is, to have a certain degree of control over insolvency.  
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Mihajlo Rulić explained that bad experiences with creditors in practice are the 
result of the still present syndrome of self management, where workers at the 
same time appear as creditors who, depending on their interest in the insolvency 
proceedings, act as it suits them, and such insolvency files currently cause most 
troubles for judges. 
 
Olivera Trikić, Director of the Department for Bankruptcy and Liquidation of 
Banks of the Agency for Deposit Insurance, Rehabilitation, Bankruptcy and Liq-
uidation of Banks spoke about the impossibility of responding to terms prescribed 
under the new Insolvency Law. To respond to the 10 day term for making the list 
is an illusion, and the experience of banks in bankruptcy shows that even the 60 
day terms is too short, due to the unavailability of all information. The 60 day 
term for registration of claims is hard to fulfill as well, because there are large 
numbers of registrations of claims, inaccurate data, lack of cooperation by work-
ers who stayed in their jobs, etc. With regard to the sale of property, it is impossi-
ble to start the sale of property if banks (both bankrupt and active) and enter-
prises do not have proof of ownership. The sale of real estate is also difficult due 
to the fact that the sale of property requires evaluation and public advertisement 
of the evaluation, which only increases the cost of the procedure, Ms. Trikić con-
cluded. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It is obvious that the New Draft Law on Insolvency attracted great interest among 
all participants at the roundtable, with notable perplexities and ambiguities both 
among theorist and practitioners, including the author of this text, regarding how 
certain provisions and novelties introduced by this Law will be efficiently applied 
in practice. 
It seems that the common position of all participants is that although the new In-
solvency Law may be seen as a positive step in the right direction, some of its 
solutions need to be more precise and supplemented precisely for the sake of its 
efficient application, while practical application must be followed by the estab-
lishment of financial discipline of the debtors prior to the insolvency proceedings 
and by amendments to other related laws and regulations.   
By organizing this meeting, the G 17 Institute wished to ensure continuation of 
the already initiated public debate on new insolvency legislation, with special 
emphasis on the assessment of economic and legal effects of the solutions fore-
seen in the Draft Law, and to offer answers to questions as to how to regulate 
efficiently this area which is of great importance for the continuation of the proc-
ess of reforms. 
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Economic Development as a Result of a Deliberate Policy of Attract-
ing Export-Oriented Foreign Direct Investments 
- the Experience of Ireland as a Lesson for Serbia 
 
 
 
The inflow of foreign direct investments (FDI) has a complex impact (positive for 
the most part) on the economic development of countries where investments are 
made. The intensity of the impact and long-term consequences depend solely on 
the ability of one country to make the best possible use of positive effects, while 
neutralizing negative ones. The ability of one country depends on the qualifica-
tion level of the workforce, as well as on the active policy of developing those 
qualifications in order to keep the largest possible portion of value added 
branches, and to attract new FDIs. 
This article will discuss the basic indicators of Ireland. This country managed to 
achieve an impressive acceleration of GDP growth from 2.7% on average per 
year during the 1980s to 7.3% during the 1990s, owing to the inflow of FDIs in 
export-oriented programs of high technologies which record the highest growth 
rates in international trade in goods and services. We have chosen the example 
of Ireland, because of certain similarities between this country and Serbia, while 
experiences from neighboring countries (Hungary) are not that useful because 
they lack a deliberate development strategy. Hungary has opened its economy 
completely to the inflow of FDIs, thus stimulating industrial restructuring and re-
covery of export-based production17, but it is highly dependant on future trends in 
relative competitivity indicators (in particular the price of labor) because it has not 
developed and advanced qualifications of the domestic workforce. Further mov-
ing of work-intensive processes away to the East (Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria…) 
is underway as the price of the Hungarian labor force is expected to increase af-
ter this country joins the EU. 
The major similarities between Serbia and Ireland are the following: (1) relatively 
small countries (population in Ireland - 3.6 million, and in Serbia - 7.5 million); (2) 
good geographical location (Ireland between the Anglo-Saxon and continental 
countries, and Serbia between Western Europe and the Near East); (3) political 
problems resulting from ethnic divisions (Northern Ireland, Kosovo, B&H); and (4) 
a vast Diaspora. The key advantage of Ireland in comparison to Serbia is that it is 
an English-speaking country and an EU member. 
The key difference between the two countries is that the Irish are relatively hum-
ble regarding their nation, which results in their clear determination to strengthen 
their economy in order to be able to resolve ethnic problems more easily. Both 
heavenly and earthly Greater Serbias are still present in the minds of about one 
                                                 
17 Hungarian exports increased from US$ 12.8 billion in 1995 to US$ 25 billion in 2000, whereby 
foreign branches increased their value of exports from US$ 7.5 to US$ 20 billion, indicating that 
the remaining exports were in stagnation. 
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 third of the adult, poorly educated and financially vulnerable population, which 
constitutes a breeding ground for chauvinistic ideas (covering up the interests of 
the few), and limits chances for internationalization of our national economy. 
We will therefore discuss the positive experiences of this country in order to 
search for the developmental paradigm for Serbia, a country lost between the 
need to reform the economy and society very quickly, and accumulated national 
problems and frustrations. 
 
Success in Exports as a Result of Specialization in the Fastest-Growing 
Sectors of World Trade 
 
The specialization of a national economy should be reflected in comparative ad-
vantages. The degree of specialization should be subject to the level of economic 
development. For example, economically underdeveloped countries are highly 
dependant on the export of one or several primary products (crude oil, citrus 
fruits, wood, etc.), while developed countries diversify their export supply through 
production and trade of industrial products (intra-industrial exchange). Serbia is, 
unfortunately, an absurd example: it reports among the world’s lowest levels of 
specialization (after Italy and Austria), with a symbolic export value. On the other 
hand, Ireland, during the period of strong exports growth, improved its specializa-
tion level, focusing on a small group of products: the three largest groups of 
products, according to the export value, constituted 49.9% of the total commodity 
exports (this share in Serbia amounted to 14.1% in 2002) in 2001. The 
Hirchmann index of export concentration rose from 0.205 in 1997 to 0.286 in 
2001, when the value of commodity exports increased from US$ 53.6 to US$ 
82.8 billion. Such impressive exports growth actually resulted from specialization 
in the fastest growing sectors of world trade.  
 
Table: The First 15 Groups of Products of Three-Digit SITC in the Irish Exports In 2001 
Rank Name of the groups of products Exports 
value in 
2001 in 
US$ thou-
sands 
Share in 
the total 
exports 
of Ire-
land in 
% 
Average 
annual 
growth rate 
of world ex-
ports, 1997-
2000, in % 
1 Organo – Inorganic Compounds 14,046,215 20.38 12.3 
2 Automatic Data Processing Machines And 
Units Thereof 
10,098,998 14.65 4.7 
3 Parts And Accessories Suitable For Use Solely 
Or Principally With Office Machines Or Auto-
matic Data Processing Machines 
9,887,010 14.35 12.5 
4 Medicaments 6,711,939 9.74 11.1 
5 Thermionic Electronic Tubes 5,573,987 8.09 12.9 
6 Special Transactions And Commodities Not 
Classified According To Kind 
3,308,476 4.80 5.3 
7 Telecommunications Equipment 3,115,871 4.52 15.4 
8 Musical Instruments 3,113,666 4.52 0.6 
9 Essential Oils, Perfume And Flavor Materials 2,212,556 3.21 3.5 
10 Miscellaneous Chemical Products, N.e.s. 1,754,134 2.55 4.3 
11 Medical Instruments 1,377,409 2.00 5.4 
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 12 Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles, N.e.s. 1,303,775 1.89 6.2 
13 Medicinal And Pharmaceutical Products, Other 
Than Medicaments 
1,295,981 1.88 4.6 
14 Edible Products And Preparations, N.e.s. 1,287,717 1.87 0.5 
15 Electrical Apparatus For Switching Or Protect-
ing Electrical Circuits Or For Making Connec-
tions To Or In Electrical Circuits  
1,100,043 1.60 8.0 
Total 1-15 66,187,777 78.45 9.1 
Other 248 groups of products 16,778,981 21.55  
 
 
The Table shows that 15 groups of Ireland’s exporting products registered an av-
erage annual growth rate of 9.1% in the world market, while among the seven 
most important ones, five belonged to the fastest growing sectors in world trade, 
with double-digit growth rates. 
The following Table shows basic information on winning competitive positions, 
traditional exports which are in stagnation on the markets won, and loss of com-
petitiveness of the Irish economy in the period 1997 – 2001. 
 
Table: Export Trends in Selected Groups of Products, Ireland, 1997-2001 
 
The fastest growing exports (over US$ 30 million in 2001), in US$K 
 
Code 
SITC 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Average 
annual 
growth 
rate, Irish 
exports, in 
% 
Average 
annual 
growth rates, 
total world 
exports, in % 
899 Misc. Manufactured 
Articles, N.e.s. 
23,059 245,096 450,974 760,250 1,303,775 53.8 6.1 
781 Motor vehicles 82,538 205,962 251,029 287,620 371,759 45.7 4.9 
515 Organo-inorganic 
compounds 
5,144,512 10,126,952 10,309,827 14,210,764 14,0462,15 28.5 12.3 
776 Thermionic Elec-
tronic Tubes 
2,160,542 2,283,921 2,821,231 4,167,047 5,573,987 26.7 12.9 
542 Medicaments 2,606,894 3,811,166 3,896,703 3,726,936 6,711,939 26.7 11.1 
764 Telecommunication 
Equipment 
1,348,943 1,892,946 3,679,776 3,179,196 3,115,871 23.3 15..3 
759 Parts and Accesso-
ries for Office or 
ADT Machines  
4,429,236 5,551,362 6,434,301 8,119,640 9,887,010 22.2 12..5 
541 Medicinal and 
Pharm. Products, 
Other Than Medica-
ments 
749,791 934,688 1,252,470 1,181,433 1,295,981 14.7 4.5 
551 Essential Oils, Per-
fume and Flavor 
Materials 
1,420,270 1,693,712 1,952,608 1,598,626 2,212,556 11.7 3.5 
598 Miscellaneous 
Chemical Products, 
N.e.s 
1,141,763 1,253,189 1,673,920 1,432,291 1,754,134 11.3 4..3 
 TOTAL 19,317,548 27,998.994 32,695,839 38,663,803 46,273,227 24.4  
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Traditional exports (selected groups of products), in KUS$ 
 
Code 
SITC 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Average 
annual 
growth 
rate, Irish 
exports, in 
% 
Average 
annual 
growth rates, 
total world 
exports, in % 
017 Meat, Prepared Or 
Preserved N.e.s. 
219,533 219,955 233,025 247,253 297,697 7.9 -4.5 
034 Fish, Fresh or Frozen 208,616 197,111 173,533 178,023 238,349 3.4 1.7 
054 Vegetables, Fresh, 
Chilled, Frozen or 
Simply Preserved 
101,220 105,672 98,466 86,509 115,495 3.4 0.7 
098 Edible Products and 
Preparations, N.e.s. 
1,142,887 1,196,465 1,259,397 1,208,468 1,287,717 3.0 0.5 
024 Cheese and Curd 313,663 309,435 290,863 265,406 345,788 2.5 -2.3 
012 Meat Other Than of 
Bovine Animals, and 
Edible Offal 
492,223 443,865 489,736 485,860 526,717 1.7 -2.8 
073 Chocolate 188,487 196,012 200,384 201,060 197,108 1.1 -3.6 
081 Feeding Stuff for 
Animals (not Includ-
ing Unmilled Cere-
als) 
115,465 115,948 121,085 111,643 119,808 0.9 -6.2 
112 Alcoholic Beverages 712,965 694,170 723,781 717,179 700,189 -0.5 -0.3 
898 Musical Instruments 
 
3,530,095 3,663,899 4,181,828 4,022,668 3,113,666 -3.1 0.6 
 TOTAL 7,025,154 7,142,532 7,772,098 7,524,069 6,942,534 -0.3  
 
 
Loss of export competitiveness (selected groups of products), in KUS$ 
 
Code 
SITC 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Average 
annual 
growth 
rate, Irish 
exports, in 
% 
Average 
annual 
growth rates, 
total world 
exports, in % 
792 Aircraft and Equipment 237,725 347,403 301,655 260,771 201,144 -4.1 5.8 
821 Furniture and Parts Thereof 139,252 140,091 113,759 97,181 100,476 -7.8 6.7 
011 Meat of Bovine Animals, 
Fresh, Chilled or Frozen  
886,012 930,324 1,142,634 875,904 589,818 -9.7 1.6 
023 Butter and Other Fats and 
Oils Derived From Milk 
478,689 481,791 384,572 321,183 294,594 -11.4 -8.3 
894 Baby Carriages, Toys, 
Games and Sporting Goods 
222,974 198,659 158,554 127,347 133,927 -12.0 2.0 
061 Sugars, Molasses and 
Honey 
79,930 51,733 55,944 43,094 47,944 -12.0 -11.4 
842 Female Coats, Capes, Etc. 101,040 91,719 81,789 65,354 55,421 -13.9 2.2 
841 Men's Coats, Jackets, Etc.  73,080 63,026 53,961 38,313 32,021 -18.6 -0.2 
845 Articles of Apparel, N.e.s. 193,930 201,672 136,843 96,038 77,969 -20.4 4.1 
895 Office and Stationery Sup-
plies, N.e.s. 
145,163 110,776 77,891 56,483 34,705 -30.1 3.1 
 TOTAL 2,557,804 2,617,194 2,507,612 1,981,668 1,568,019 -11.5  
 
 
In the Table showing exports trends in the selected groups of products it can be 
seen that the fastest growing portion of exports fully explains the total increase in 
exports. Namely, while in the period under consideration Irish exports grew from 
US$ 53.6 to 83 billion (an increase of US$ 29.4 billion), the 15 fastest-growing 
groups of products increased their export value by US$ 27 billion. This means 
that the remaining portion of exports was in stagnation or went into decline. The 
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 Table also shows that traditional export commodities stagnated, while work-
intensive products were rapidly disappearing from the exports supply. 
The Chart of structural changes in the exports of Ireland shows how dynamic the 
period from the mid-80s was, when the inflow of FDIs suddenly increased. Al-
ready in 1985 the portion of high technology products was rather large, but the 
structure of exports was diversified. The total export value could be increased 
only through specialization, which involved the winning over of certain segments 
and the subjection of the majority of sectors to the market, which for the most 
part resulted in their disappearance from export supply and stagnation or drop of 
industrial output. Primary products nearly completely vanished from export sup-
ply (although they increased their absolute value), thus reducing their share in 
total exports from 20.5% in 1985 to 6% in 2000. Industrial products of low and 
medium technologies also lost their relevance: from 32.1% to 20.4% respectively. 
TNC branches concentrated on high technologies (rise in the share in total ex-
ports from 23.3% in 1985 to 36.2% in 2000), while domestic companies focused 
on industrial products based on natural resources. Domestic companies man-
aged to restructure successfully from primary products to primary products-based 
industrial products (e.g. from agricultural to food products), thus increasing profit-
ability of production and exports. TNCs left the sectors in which Ireland lost com-
petitiveness of a cheap workforce and made use of the newly established advan-
tage of highly qualified labor and good treatment of foreign investors. 
 
 
Export Structure in Ireland, in %
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 The Role of Transnational Companies in the Exports of Ireland 
 
Concrete companies stand behind the data of Standard International Trade Clas-
sification on export values according to groups of products. Among one hundred 
greatest exporters in Ireland, two-thirds are TNC branches. The following Table 
lists 15 biggest branches according to the export value realized. 
  
Table: 15 Biggest Foreign Branches in Ireland According To the Export Value Realized In 
1998 
Mother company Industry Value in 
US$ million 
% of Irish 
exports 
Intel Electronics 4,804 6.4 
Dell Computer Electronics 4,313 5.8 
Microsoft Computer-related ser-
vices 
2,380 3.2 
Johnson & Johnson Pharmaceutical 1,337 1.8 
Bristol-Mayers Squibb Pharmaceutical 1,026 1.4 
Gateway Electronics 967 1.3 
Apple Computer Electronics 892 1.2 
EMC Electronics 744 1.0 
3 Com Electronics 684 0.9 
Motorola Electronics 506 0.7 
IBM Computer-related ser-
vices 
409 0.5 
Ingersoll-Rend Electronics 294 0.4 
Baxter International Medicinal instruments 265 0.4 
Allergan Pharmaceutical 253 0.3 
Lilly, Eli and Company Pharmaceutical 245 0.3 
Total 19,119 25.6 
Total Foreign Branches (major ownership of TNC) 45,804 61.2 
Total Irish Exports 74,878 100.0 
 
The Table shows that the companies operated in the area of electronics (8), the 
pharmaceutical industry (4), computer-related services (2) and medicinal instru-
ments (1). An important effect in the selection of location, i.e. Ireland in this case, 
is clusterization – concentration of the same or similar production processes in a 
relatively small geographical area. Of the 55 biggest branches according to the 
export value, as many as 9 operated in the production of medicinal instruments, 
of which 7 were from the USA, one from Germany and one from Austria. The en-
try of the first branch from the USA and its business success encouraged 
other companies to come, first from the USA and then from Europe (Bayer) 
in order to make use of technological externalities. A similar situation oc-
curred in the pharmaceutical industry (12 companies – 7 from the USA, 1 from 
Japan, 4 from Western Europe) and electronics (22 companies – 16 from the 
USA, and 6 from Japan and Western Europe). 
 
The Policy of Attracting FDIs 
 
A government’s policy in attracting FDIs should take into account the current 
state of affairs and trends in the world economy and comparative advantages of 
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 a national economy. In the early 60s Ireland set up the Investment and Develop-
ment Agency (IDA) and practiced a very liberal and non-selective approach to 
attracting FDIs. Market access to the then EEC was, besides favorable geo-
graphical location and English language, sufficient to attract TNCs from the USA. 
The effect of clusterization attracted other US TNCs and their competition from 
Canada, Japan, Australia and Western Europe to follow those who started their 
business in Ireland first. 
In the mid-80s, Ireland changed the strategy of attracting FDIs in a way that it fo-
cused on attracting TNCs which operate in the fastest-growing industries of the 
world economy: electronics and the pharmaceutical industry. Irish IDA has a co-
lossal budget – e.g. EUR 164 million for granting loans and benefits for new in-
vestments and EUR 27 million for promotion and administration in 2001. 
In the development strategy, investment incentives were complementary with ef-
forts to improve the economic foundations of the Irish economy. Profits from ex-
ports were tax-free at first. As of 1981 they introduced taxation of profits of com-
panies in the area of industry and certain services, as well as of companies lo-
cated in the international financial center or the Shannon area of free trade. Cur-
rent investments will be levied at the rate of 10% until 2010, and as of this year a 
universal taxation rate of 12.5% will come into effect. 
The Irish government also put extraordinary efforts into education and additional 
training of the workforce in order to make the country more attractive for invest-
ments. The share of students in the total population increased from 2.6% in the 
late 80s to 3.7% ten years later. With regard to this indicator, Ireland is among 
the top countries in the world18. Brain-hunting has been used for covering the 
deficit in the higher qualifications with the highest demand. 
In line with the active approach of the Government and IDA, in the late 90s Ire-
land recorded an investment boom. The FDIs inflow reached US$ 24 billion in 
2000, as compared to average annual values of about US$1.1 billion in the first 
half of 1990s. Cumulative inflow of FDIs increased from US$ 9.6 billion in 1995 to 
US$ 74.8 billion in 2001. 
 
                                                 
18 The greater share of students in the total population in the late 90s was recorded in Canada 
(5.8%), Austria (5.7%), Republic Korea (5.6%), the USA (5.2%), Taiwan (4.9%), New Zealand 
(4.5%), Finland (4.4%), Spain (4.3%) and Norway (4.2%). 
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Lessons for Serbia  
 
Certain conclusions can be drawn from the experience of Ireland, which may be 
beneficial for the coming period of economic recovery and development of Ser-
bia. 
- The policy of selling odds and ends should be abandoned to accept the 
reality that we must specialize in specific industries where we are able to 
achieve international competitiveness. 
- Short-term priority should be the resolution of administrative problems 
which are an obstacle to development of entrepreneurship, turning poten-
tial investors away, and to simplify procedures and establish clear “rules of 
the game”. 
- We should achieve the most demanded know-how through the educa-
tional system, prequalification and additional training of adults.  
- Tax incentives; a customs-free regime for imports that are used as inputs 
in exporting products, lower tax rates and tax exemptions for reinvested 
profits. 
- A clear developmental strategy expressed through the tariff system, the 
fiscal system and the government’s policy. 
 
During the last 15-20 years, the leading theorists for international economics 
and economic development developed the theory of “bounding growth” which oc-
curs in undeveloped countries that become a part of the developed world. 
Namely, independent of the amount of inputs produced (work, capital and tech-
nology), economic development occurs at a very rapid pace in a limited number 
of underdeveloped countries on the outskirts of the developed world. Thus, Ja-
pan recorded spectacular growth during the 50s and 60s, “the Asian Tigers” dur-
ing the 70s and 80s, Ireland, Mexico, China, Vietnam, Thailand and Philippine 
during the 90s. On the basis of the data on GDP growth, exports and FDI inflow, 
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 it seems that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are due to experience 
the becoming a part of the developed world at the beginning of the 21st century. 
This means that Serbia will miss a historic opportunity which has now become 
open if it continues to deal with its own irrational problems, instead of putting all 
efforts into taking advantage of this opportunity.  
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One month before the beginning of the European Union – Western Balkans 
Summit, which is scheduled for June 21, 2003 in Thessalonica, the EU has taken 
initiative for this meeting to be as successful as possible. Namely, in order to 
strengthen relations between the countries of the Western Balkans and the Un-
ion, the European Commission, on May 21, approved the Proposal titled “The 
Western Balkans and European Integration” in the EU Council and the European 
Parliament. 
This Proposal foresees the extension of current policies towards the Western 
Balkan region, which, according to the Union’s definition, is composed of Croatia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania. The 
policy towards this region, which was established through the Stabilization and 
Association Process, should be supplemented with some elements from the ac-
cession process applied to CEE countries, aimed at the achievement of the ulti-
mate goal – i.e. membership of these countries in the EU – in the shortest possi-
ble time. The Stabilization and Association Process will remain the main instru-
ment of relations between the Union and the region, but it is given a new dimen-
sion by adding elements that have proved successful with candidates for EU 
membership. Chris Patten, Commissioner for External Relations, gave the best 
explanation of the need and significance of such a proposal, by saying that 
“…the map of the EU will not be complete until the countries of the Western Bal-
kans are included in it. There is a great deal of work to be done: reforming the 
economies, standards of governance and democracy of the region remain major 
challenges – alongside the constant battle to tackle corruption and organized 
crime.  What we are proposing today shows that the EU will do all it can to help 
these countries prepare themselves and that our wish to see them one day as 
fellow members is real”. 
As a matter of fact, this Proposal is the Commission’s response to the question of 
how the experience from former accessions can be used and developed, as well 
as its attempt to define what can be considered a joint agenda for European inte-
gration. The Proposal still insists on the preservation of efforts in the realization 
of priorities which are considered important in the Stabilization and Association 
Process, in order for criteria for membership in the EU to begin to be met. What 
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 the Commission actually tends to achieve is sustaining of progress of reforms in 
these countries, and as such, to serve as a basis for further progress. However, 
this will not be sufficient – in order to join further integration processes, these 
countries need to move beyond reconstruction and recovery during the political 
and economic transition, as well as to start getting closer to the legal norms of 
community law. 
The Commission considers the need to develop strong and functional states 
which will be capable of meeting expectations of their citizens, facilitate regional 
cooperation and further the relations with the Union, to be the great challenge for 
the countries of the Western Balkans. Therefore the Commission stresses that 
“…priority must be given to the fight against organized crime and corruption – 
progress in this area is fundamental for ensuring the rule of law, for building con-
fidence into state institutions and generation of private institutions, and for getting 
closer to membership in the EU. The attainment of this goal will be subject to po-
litical will and capability of the countries in question, as well as to their readiness 
to harmonize with European standards and values”. 
How does the Commission plan to help these countries on their path to the EU, 
given that the Annual Report on the Stabilization and Association Process 
(March 2003) confirmed the progress made by countries included in the process, 
but at the same time pointed to significant shortcomings in the implementation of 
reforms, especially with regard to the functioning and capacities of public institu-
tions, the rule of law and the problems of organized crime and corruption. Taking 
precisely these elements into consideration, the Commission proposed to the 
Council to set up the European Integration Partnership for the Western Balkan 
countries. 
This Partnership is inspired by the pre-accession phase of enlargement, i.e. the 
process of preparation for membership, and its main task is to identify priorities 
for action in preparation for closer integration with the EU. The priorities will be 
based on political and strategic priorities of the Commission, on the basis of as-
sessment made in the Annual Reports, while concurrently monitoring fulfillment 
of the Copenhagen criteria (1993) and of special conditions for the Western Bal-
kans (1997). As a matter of fact, the main objective of this Partnership is to iden-
tify reforms, both long-term and short-term, which these countries should carry 
out. The identification of what are the necessary reforms should help in two 
ways: firstly, to serve as a test for assessing individual progress of countries in 
question, and secondly, to set guidelines for earmarking financial assistance 
through the CARDS program. Special emphasis is put on the fact that this con-
cerns monitoring of individual stages of development of each country, while 
guidelines should be created in accordance with the specific needs of each of 
them.  
This practically means that each Western Balkan country should respond to this 
Partnership by developing and applying its own Action plan, which would define a 
timetable and details of realization of the priorities identified by the Partnership. 
On the other hand, the Commission monitors progress made in the implementa-
tion of the Partnership through offices set up on the basis of the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement (for countries that have already concluded this Agree-
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 ment) or on the basis of regular political dialogues, while findings will be pre-
sented through regular annual reports. 
 
Support for Institution Building 
 
Besides the European Integration Partnership, the Commission proposed some 
other measures that might be of assistance in particular segments of transition in 
the countries of the Western Balkans, applying practices that have shown their 
worth in the preparation of the current Enlargement. As assistance and support in 
institution building, the Commission proposed the introduction of so called “twin-
ning programs”, the transfer of administrative skills, i.e. the sending of public ser-
vants from EU Member States to work as advisers at the institutions of the West-
ern Balkan countries. Actually, public servants from different ministries of EU 
Member States (both new and old), depending on the needs, will be sent as ex-
pert assistance to the Western Balkans; they will help their counterparts in rele-
vant ministries very operationally and functionally, not only in the process of es-
tablishing EU standards, but also in the much more difficult process of organiza-
tion of administration necessary for achieving this goal efficiently. Such projects 
have already been foreseen by the CARDS program in October 2002; twinning 
programs have already begun in Albania and Croatia, and should be developed 
further to extend to other Western Balkan countries.  
Another program that will become available to the countries of the Western Bal-
kans is TAIEX, i.e. Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office. The 
Commission introduced this program in order to provide directed technical assis-
tance to candidate countries in the realization of acquis, and monitoring and as-
sessment of the legal systems of candidate countries. Of course, realization of 
the TAIEX program for the Western Balkans through this Office is designed to 
meet the needs of this region. The results of the legal system assessment should 
become an integral part of each future annual report of the Commission, but at 
the same time, they will be the basis for periodic revisions of the European Inte-
gration Partnership.  
 
Economic Development 
 
Besides political dialogue, each Association Process is essentially based on the 
realization of four basic freedoms (free movement of goods, people, services and 
capital), i.e. on free trade. This is also the case with the Stabilization and Asso-
ciation Process, where, as the Commission stressed, trade is considered to be “a 
foundation stone”. Although countries in the region increased their exports to the 
Union and stimulated their mutual trade through the network of bilateral trade 
agreements, it turned out that they need help in order to make the best use of 
trade benefits granted to them by the Union. 
On the other hand, the Union insists on establishing a free trade area in the re-
gion in the medium term, which would bring these countries additional benefits 
from liberalization. To achieve this goal the Commission proposed to extend the 
system of pan-European diagonal accumulation of origin to these countries. In-
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 clusion of these countries in this system (of course, not all of them and not im-
mediately, as they need to fulfill the necessary conditions), which guarantees a 
certain standard and quality of products, would strengthen trade in the region, 
thus supporting economic development. Another significant result, as assessed 
by the Commission, would be increase in their mutual cooperation and mutual 
trust, which would support the general objective of the entire Stabilization and 
Association process. 
Furthermore, as assistance in furthering economic development, the Commission 
puts emphasis on the improvement of business climate for small and medium-
sized enterprises due to the significance of such enterprises in the process of 
transition of the economies of the Western Balkan countries. Therefore the coun-
tries of the Western Balkans have been invited to commit to the principles of the 
European Charter for Small Enterprises in order to exchange experiences with 
other European states. On the other hand, the Commission proposed regular 
economic dialogue with each of these countries separately, which would serve as 
an instrument for finding the answer to these and all other questions related to 
economic progress of the Western Balkans.  
 
Financial Assistance and Regional Cooperation 
 
The main financial instrument of the Union’s assistance in the Stabilization Proc-
ess is the CARDS program, which will continue to realize its task. The Program 
began as support for the reconstruction and building of these states, but its main 
task today is actually institution and administrative capacity building, and assis-
tance to justice and home affairs. What the Commission suggests in that respect 
is not the change of the CARDS’s mandate (such a change, in terms of finding 
the response to regional needs is yet to be made), but increase in the program’s 
budget, as well as the exceptional possibility of granting macro financial assis-
tance to these countries.  
The countries of the Western Balkans are encouraged “to take ownership of the 
regional cooperation”, and the fact that this is possible is shown through initia-
tives such as the Cooperation process in South Eastern Europe, which was cre-
ated and which has been implemented in this region. Cooperation through the 
Stability Pact is also supported in the area such as refugee return, migrations, 
freedom of movement, trade and investments; cross border cooperation with Un-
ion’s Member States is also encouraged. 
 
Other Proposals 
 
The Commission proposed to develop dialogue with the Western Balkan coun-
tries with the aim of establishing realizable, measurable and real parameters for 
the assessment of progress in the area of justice and home affairs, as an essen-
tial element in its support to the rule of law. These parameters will, further, be-
come priorities in that area and they will be observed and developed through the 
European Integration Partnership. Migration policy in general, and visa regimes 
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 in particular, are another priority, and the Commission foresees stronger assis-
tance programs for these areas, also. 
According to the Commission’s proposal, Western Balkan countries should be 
included in EU programs, in particular in the area of education, VET and energy, 
and the participation of these countries would facilitate their becoming familiar 
with the Union’s policy and methods of work, which would, again, contribute to 
their preparation for establishing closer relationship with the EU. Of course, these 
countries would not be able to join the existing programs immediately; the Com-
mission has left some room in order to examine legal and financial aspects, and 
ways of including these countries in the Union’s programs. 
As far as narrower political proposals are concerned, the Commission especially 
insists on strengthening parliamentary collaboration, in particular on the estab-
lishment of relations between parliamentary committees for European issues. Its 
concrete proposal is to establish contacts at the regional level by creating one 
body which the Commission titled the Balkan Conference of Parliamentary 
Committees for European Issues; this would make it possible for national parlia-
ments of the EU Member States and of the Western Balkan countries, as well as 
for the European parliament, to develop regular dialogue on issues related to the 
EU. 
The Commission’s proposal to partially include Western Balkan countries into the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Union, of course, not in the policy 
creation process, but more as a support to its implementation, is very interesting. 
These countries would be included by invitation to join declarations, common po-
sitions and other decisions within the framework of this policy, which could 
“strengthen the process of harmonization of priorities and make them closer to 
the EU in the political sphere”. 
 
The Summit in Thessalonica 
 
All proposals related to the Western Balkans, not only those initiated by the 
Commission, will become a part of the preparation and realization of the Summit 
in Thessalonica. Great expectations are inherent in this Summit. This proposal 
shows that not only are the countries included in the Stabilization and Associa-
tion Process preparing to appear as proactive as possible in relation to the Un-
ion, individually, but also as a group. The Proposal shows us that these countries 
are seriously considered not only as candidates, but also as partners in their 
coming closer to the Union. It is precisely the Commission’s proposal thus de-
fined which presents significant success lobbying thus far of the Western Balkan 
countries which have been tending for some time to apply some pre-accession 
instruments. On the other hand, they failed in what they wanted most: access to 
regional funds which would mean great financial assistance to reforms in these 
less developed countries. The Commission’s proposal does not mention utiliza-
tion of structural or cohesion funds of the Union for these needs. Because of this, 
the Summit in Thessalonica will be the place where Western Balkan countries 
will have to negotiate new instruments of financial assistance in order to become 
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 really equal partners to the European Union in the best possible way and in the 
shortest possible time. 
 
 
Economic News 
 
 
Annual Program for Serbia and Montenegro 
 
 
The European Commission adopted its Annual Program for the state of Serbia 
and Montenegro for 2003. Within the CARDS program (Community Assistance 
for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization Program), the Commission 
earmarked EUR 229 million for Serbia and EUR 13.5 million for Montenegro to 
support reforms and modernization efforts for good governance, economic re-
construction and the development of civil society. 
EUR 229 million allocated for Serbia are projected for the following priorities and 
activities: economic reconstruction, regeneration and reforms (EUR 141 million), 
good governance and institution building (EUR 59 million), social development 
and civil society (EUR 24 million) and other (EUR 5 million). 
EUR 141 allocated for economic reconstruction and reforms are organized ac-
cording to the following activities: 
• Energy (EUR 69 million) – support for the major overhaul of thermal power 
plants Nikola Tesla A5 and B1 and training programs and the introduction 
of the culture of modern management at the EPS. 
• Environment (EUR 12.5 million) – aimed at strengthening environmental 
standards by developing the necessary institutions and legislation, includ-
ing preparation of national and local environmental action plans. 
• Transport (EUR 4.5 million) – aimed at speeding up economic develop-
ment and facilitating transport through Serbia and Montenegro by support-
ing feasibility studies for the following projects: (i) Belgrade City Bypass; 
(ii) Belgrade to Montenegro road; and (iii) Inland Waterways’ Master Plan. 
The sum allocated for economic development is organized in the following way: 
• Local / Municipal Development (EUR 35 million) – support for the decen-
tralization of state authority by enhancing the delivery of municipal ser-
vices and by strengthening the ability of municipalities to design and im-
plement local development initiatives. 
• Privatization and Enterprise Development (EUR 13.5 million) – assistance 
in the privatization of state-owned and socially-owned companies and 
boosting of economic development, encouraging the decentralization of 
the Privatization Agency. This also includes assistance in establishing an 
“expert fund”, which will finance an in-house ream of privatization advis-
ers. A significant activity refers to the rebuilding a businesses culture in 
Serbia by supporting the EBRD-based “Turn-Around Managements” 
(TAM) Group to assist in the reconstruction of about 25 enterprises. The 
Program will encourage the economic and social cohesion of the popula-
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 tion by promoting regional development strategies, aiming to improve 
employability, market access and social development. It will also help ex-
port growth and the return of Serbia to international markets, by increas-
ing the activities of the Serbian Investment and Export Promotion Agency 
(SIEPA), as well as by helping selected enterprises that can demonstrate 
export potential. 
• Rural development / Agriculture (EUR 7 million) – aimed at ensuring food 
safety and the well-being of livestock, and at boosting food exports by im-
proving the effectiveness of sanitary, phyto-sanitary and veterinary in-
spections. 
The sum allocated for Good Governance and Institution Building (EUR 59 million) 
is planned to be spent on following: 
• Public Finance Management (EUR 28 million) – promotion of greater ef-
fectiveness in public finance and more transparency and greater account-
ability in the use of public funds by providing equipment and training to the 
Public Revenue Agency, the Ministry of Finance and the Economy, etc. 
• Justice and Home Affairs (EUR 13 million) – aimed at empowering the law 
enforcement agencies and courts to combat cross-border and domestic 
organized crime by offering training and equipment to the border police, to 
the Belgrade Police, to the Prosecution Office and to the Ministry of Inte-
rior. 
• Reform in the Public Health Sector (EUR 9.5 million) - assistance in the 
reform of the health sector, providing advice on policy and planning at the 
Ministry of Health and other key medical bodies, in order to create a na-
tional integrated public health strategy and an action plan for its implemen-
tation. 
• European Integration (EUR 9 million) – aimed at helping Serbia and Mon-
tenegro meet their obligations in the Stabilization and Association Process 
by taking steps to approximate local standards to those of the EU. 
• Customs and Taxation (EUR 5 million) – continued assistance in moderni-
zation and development of the customs services of the state and its con-
stituent republics, and at ensuring coordination between customs and 
taxation authorities. 
• Public Administration Reform (EUR 2 million) – aimed at ensuring a more 
efficient and effective public administration by assisting in the reorganiza-
tion and establishment of a training center at the Ministry of State Admini-
stration.  
Funds allocated for Social Development and Civil Society in the total amount of 
EUR 24 million will be directed towards the following activities: 
• Vocational Education and Training (EUR 13 million) – contribution to the 
economic development and social stability of Serbia, by developing its ca-
pacity to run national vocational education and adult training, that aim to 
get people back to work. This program also includes the upgrade of such 
facilities as workshops and laboratories, and assistance to the European 
Investment Bank in preparing, tendering and monitoring investments in the 
education sector. 
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 • Media (EUR 6 million) – promotion of independent media by strengthening 
the role of those outlets most capable of adapting to the new market con-
ditions, in particular the Media Center and B92 (a major independent elec-
tronic media), as well as further transformation of RTS into an independ-
ent and financially sustainable public broadcasting service.  
• TEMPUS (EUR 4 million) – this program will continue to develop joint in-
ter-university projects, as well as individual mobility of university experts. 
• Civil Society (EUR 1 million) – assistance in the reduction of poverty by 
establishing a fund that brings government and NGOs together in order to 
help the most vulnerable. 
The reminder of the money (EUR 5 million) is classified as “other”, and will be 
used to cover currently unforeseeable program related expenditures, and as a 
General Technical Assistance Facility. 
The amount of EUR 13.5 million, allocated on the basis of the Annual Pro-
gram for Montenegro, is related to the following areas: Economic Reconstruc-
tion, Regeneration and Reforms (EUR 7.5 million), Good Governance and In-
stitution Building (EUR 4 million), Social  Development and Civil Society (EUR 
1.5 ,million) and other (EUR 0.5 million). 
The funds allocated for Economic Reconstruction, Regeneration and Reform 
(EUR 7.5 million) will be spent as follows: 
• Environment (EUR 4 million) – protection of the environment, both 
along the coastline and inland, by preparing an investment program for 
improving the treatment of waste-water and disposal of solid waste. 
This program will also help the development of a strategic plan that in-
troduces EU environmental standards and aims at attracting substan-
tial foreign direct investments. 
• Energy (EUR 2 million) – aimed at increasing energy efficiency and 
meeting the demand for electricity by continuing to support the power 
companies. 
• The sum allocated for economic development (EUR 1.5 million) will be 
directed towards rural development / agriculture. This program in-
cludes the improvement of livestock and horticultural production, and 
protection of human health by strengthening disease surveillance that 
includes establishing of investigative laboratory facilities. 
Funds allocated for Good Governance and Institution Building (EUR 4 mil-
lion) are organized as follows: 
• Justice and Home Affairs (EUR 3 million) - the development of an effi-
cient and professional judiciary by organizing training for judges and by 
providing equipment to the courts.  
• Customs and Taxation (EUR 1 million) – assistance will focus on sup-
porting managers of the customs and taxation services in the imple-
mentation of a long-term modernization and development strategy. 
Funds earmarked for Social Development and Civil Society (EUR 1.5 mil-
lion): 
• Support to Civil Society and Media (EUR 1.5 million) –assistance in 
developing a fair and democratic society by strengthening the role 
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 of NGOs by providing grants and offering management and support 
initiatives aimed at NGOs dealing with socio-economic and envi-
ronmental issues.  
• TEMPUS (EUR 0.5 million) – This program will continue to develop 
joint inter-university projects and individual mobility. 
Finally, the item “other”, in the amount of EUR 0.5 million, as in Serbia, will be 
used to cover currently unforeseeable program related expenditures and as a 
General Technical Assistance Facility. 
 
 
Source: “Midday Express”, http://europa.eu.int/comm/press_room/index_en.htm 
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